[{"data":1,"prerenderedAt":815},["ShallowReactive",2],{"/en-us/blog/how-to-benchmark-security-tools":3,"navigation-en-us":37,"banner-en-us":447,"footer-en-us":457,"blog-post-authors-en-us-Isaac Dawson":699,"blog-related-posts-en-us-how-to-benchmark-security-tools":713,"blog-promotions-en-us":753,"next-steps-en-us":805},{"id":4,"title":5,"authorSlugs":6,"body":8,"categorySlug":9,"config":10,"content":14,"description":8,"extension":25,"isFeatured":12,"meta":26,"navigation":27,"path":28,"publishedDate":20,"seo":29,"stem":33,"tagSlugs":34,"__hash__":36},"blogPosts/en-us/blog/how-to-benchmark-security-tools.yml","How To Benchmark Security Tools",[7],"isaac-dawson",null,"security",{"slug":11,"featured":12,"template":13},"how-to-benchmark-security-tools",false,"BlogPost",{"title":15,"description":16,"authors":17,"heroImage":19,"date":20,"body":21,"category":9,"tags":22},"How to benchmark security tools: a case study using WebGoat","When tasked to compare security tools, it's critical to understand what's a fair benchmark. We take you step by step through WebGoat's lessons and compare them to SAST and DAST results.",[18],"Isaac Dawson","https://res.cloudinary.com/about-gitlab-com/image/upload/v1749678166/Blog/Hero%20Images/benchmarking.jpg","2020-08-11","As your organization grows, the necessity for having automated security tools be a component of your development pipeline will increase. According to the latest [BSIMM10 study](https://www.bsimm.com/about.html), full-time security members represented just 1.37% of the number of developers. That's one security team member for every 73 developers. Without automated tooling assisting security teams, vulnerabilities may more easily find their way into production.\n\nWhen tasked to compare security tools, having the knowledge to judge a fair benchmark is paramount for success. We're going to take a very in-depth look at WebGoat's lessons in this blog post.\n\n## Running a fair benchmark\n\nThere are many factors that need to be taken into consideration when comparing various security tools.\n\n1. Is the tool I am testing right for my organization?\n2. Do the applications I chose to run the tools against reflect what my organization uses?\n3. Do the applications contain real security issues in real world scenarios, or are they synthetic?\n4. Are the results consistent across runs? Are they actionable?\n### Choosing the right tool\n\nSome tools are developer focused, while others may be tailored to security teams. Highly technical tools built for security teams may give better results, but if it requires domain expertise and significant tuning, it may end up being a worse choice for your organization.\nYour organization may also be more concerned about a tool which can run relatively quickly within your development pipeline. If your developers need results immediately, a SAST or DAST tool which takes hours or days to complete may be next to worthless.\n\n### Choosing applications\n\nIt's important when comparing tools that they are run against applications that have been developed in-house or closely mirror what your development teams are creating. A SAST tool that's excellent at finding Java security issues will not necessarily translate to one that's great at finding actionable issues in a NodeJS application. If your organization has a diverse set of languages you should run each tool against applications that reflect those environments.\n\n### Real world flaws\n\nApplications like [WebGoat](https://owasp.org/www-project-webgoat/) or [OWASP's Java Benchmark](https://github.com/OWASP/Benchmark) do not represent real world applications. Most vulnerabilities have been purposely injected into very simple data and code flows. The majority of flaws in WebGoat exist in the same Java class where the source of user input is defined. In reality, a large number of security issues will be hidden in nested layers of abstraction or multiple function or method calls. You'll want to ensure your test suite of applications includes real world applications and the tools can traverse these complex flows to find potential flaws.\n\nEven if a tool is excellent at finding language specific issues, it may or may not support the development team's choice in frameworks. Most SAST tools need to add support for specific frameworks. If the tool supports the language of choice but does not support the particular framework, there will be a higher chance for poor results.\n\n### Are results consistent and useful?\n\nAnalysis of applications should be run multiple times – DAST tools in particular have a difficult time with consistency due to the dynamic nature of testing live applications. Ensure each tool is run the same number of times to gather enough data points to make a clear decision.\n\nSecurity tools tend to over report issues and this can end up causing alert fatigue and reduce the value of the tool. It's important to tune the tools to reduce the number of non-actionable results. Just pay attention to how much time is required to maintain this tuning effort and be sure to include this in the final decision.\n## WebGoat as a benchmarking target\n\nWebGoat is a known vulnerable application that was built to help developers and people interested in web application security understand various flaws and risks to applications. Over the years it has seen numerous contributions to the lessons and became a de facto standard for learning about web application security.\n\nDue to the increase in popularity of this project, customers have chosen to rely on using it as a benchmark when assessing the capabilities of various SAST and DAST tools. The purpose of this post is to outline some potential pitfalls when using WebGoat as a target for analysis.\n\nWebGoat was built as a learning aid, not for benchmarking purposes. Certain methods chosen to demonstrate vulnerability do not actually result in real flaws being implemented in WebGoat. To a human attempting to exercise certain flaws, it may look like they've succeeded in finding an issue. In reality, the WebGoat application just makes it appear like they've discovered a flaw.\nThis can cause confusion when an automated tool is run against WebGoat. To a human, they expect the tool to find a flaw at a particular location. Since a number of lessons include synthetic flaws, the tools will fail to report them.\nFor this post, GitLab's Vulnerability Research Team used the v8.1.0 release of WebGoat, however a number of the issues identified will be applicable to older versions as well.\n\n## WebGoat's architecture\n\nThe focus of this post is on WebGoat and in particular as a target for benchmarking. The WebGoat repository has grown in size over the years and now includes multiple sub-projects:\n\n- webgoat-container - This project holds the static content as well as the [Spring Boot](https://spring.io/projects/spring-boot) Framework's lesson scaffolding. The frontend is built using [Backbone.js](https://backbonejs.org/).\n- webgoat-images - Contains a Vagrant file for training purposes.\n- webgoat-integration-tests - Contains test files\n- webgoat-lessons - Contains the source and resources for the lessons.\n- webgoat-server - The primary entry point for the SpringBootApplication.\n- webwolf - An entirely separate project for assisting users in exploiting various lessons.\n\nWhen building the WebGoat target application, the webgoat-container, webgoat-server and webgoat-lessons are all included into a single SpringBoot server packaged as a JAR artifact.\nFor the most part, lessons that contain legitimate flaws exist in a single class file. Certain SAST tools which implement extensive taint tracking capabilities may not be fully exercised. The end result being, SAST tools with limited capabilities will find just as many flaws as more advanced tools that can handle intra-procedural taint flows. It would be better to benchmark these tools against relatively complex applications versus comparing them with WebGoat's simplistic flaws.\n\n## Analysis methodology\nOnly the webgoat-container, webgoat-server and webgoat-lessons projects are included in our analysis of WebGoat for SAST/DAST tools. The other projects webgoat-images, webgoat-integration-tests and webwolf are not included.\nOur analysis follows the lessons and attempts to identify in the source where the flaws, if any, exist. If a lesson is a description or does not process user input, it is not included in the flaw category listing below.\nEach lesson is broken down to cover the following:\n\n- Flaw category\n- Lesson with title\n- Link as viewable from a browser\n- Source\n- Lesson's purpose - Relevant source code\n- Whether DAST/SAST would be able to find and the probability level\n    - Possible: A DAST/SAST tool should be able to find the flaw with little to no configuration changes or custom settings\n    - Probable: A DAST/SAST tool could find the flaw with some configuration changes or custom settings\n    - Improbable: A DAST/SAST tool most likely will not be able to find the flaw, due to either hardcoded values or other conditions that are not realistic\n    - Impossible: A DAST/SAST tool would not be able to find any flaw due to it being completely synthetic or other unrealistic circumstances\n- Reasoning why it can or can't be found with a SAST or DAST tool\n- Example attack where applicable.\n\nIn many places there are additional flaws that exist in the code but are not part of the lesson; we will highlight some of these but not exhaustively.\n\nPlease note this post contains spoilers, if you are new to WebGoat as a learning tool and wish to use it for study, it is recommended to do that first before reading our analysis.\n\n## (A1) Injection\n\n---\n\n\u003Cdetails>\n\u003Csummary markdown=\"span\">Findings\u003C/summary>\n\n### (A1) Injection > SQL Injection (intro) > What is SQL?\n\n**Link:** `http://localhost:8080/WebGoat/start.mvc#lesson/SqlInjection.lesson/1`\n\n**Source:** - webgoat-lessons/sql-injection/src/main/java/org/owasp/webgoat/sql_injection/introduction/SqlInjectionLesson2.java\n\n**Lesson:**\n\nThis lesson is for practicing raw SQL queries – it allows anyone to run full SQL queries without parameterized statements.\n\n```text\nwebgoat-lessons/sql-injection/src/main/java/org/owasp/webgoat/sql_injection/introduction/SqlInjectionLesson2.java#L55-65\npublic AttackResult completed(@RequestParam String query) {\n    return injectableQuery(query);\n}\n\nprotected AttackResult injectableQuery(String query) {\n    try (var connection = dataSource.getConnection()) {\n        Statement statement = connection.createStatement(TYPE_SCROLL_INSENSITIVE, CONCUR_READ_ONLY);\n        ResultSet results = statement.executeQuery(query);\n        StringBuffer output = new StringBuffer();\n\n        results.first();\n        ...\n```\n\n**Can SAST Find?** - Possible\n\n**Can DAST Find?**\n- Probable\n\n**SAST Reasoning:**\n\nIt should be relatively straightforward for a SAST tool to identify that the query comes from a known source (line 55) and is used in a statement's executeQuery method.\n\n**DAST Reasoning:**\n\nWhile it should not be difficult for a DAST tool to find such a vulnerability, most DAST tools are not built with attack strings that attempt direct SQL queries. DAST SQL Injection tests are almost always trying to inject into the middle of an already existing SQL query. There is a good chance most DAST tools will not find the `/SqlInjection/attack2` endpoint's query parameter vulnerable.\n\n**Example Attack:** - `query=(SELECT repeat('a',50000000) from information_schema.tables)` will take ~3 seconds to complete.\n\n---\n\n### (A1) Injection > SQL Injection (intro) > Data Manipulation Language (DML)\n\n**Link:** `http://localhost:8080/WebGoat/start.mvc#lesson/SqlInjection.lesson/2`\n\n**Source:** - webgoat-lessons/sql-injection/src/main/java/org/owasp/webgoat/sql_injection/introduction/SqlInjectionLesson3.java\n\n**Lesson:**\n\nThis lesson is for practicing raw SQL queries – it allows anyone to run UPDATE/INSERT SQL queries without parameterized statements.\n\n```text\nwebgoat-lessons/sql-injection/src/main/java/org/owasp/webgoat/sql_injection/introduction/SqlInjectionLesson3.java#L56-65\n\npublic AttackResult completed(@RequestParam String query) {\n    return injectableQuery(query);\n}\n\nprotected AttackResult injectableQuery(String query) {\n    try (Connection connection = dataSource.getConnection()) {\n        try (Statement statement = connection.createStatement(TYPE_SCROLL_INSENSITIVE, CONCUR_READ_ONLY)) {\n            Statement checkStatement = connection.createStatement(TYPE_SCROLL_INSENSITIVE,\n                    CONCUR_READ_ONLY);\n            statement.executeUpdate(query);\n        ...\n```\n\n**Can SAST Find?** - Possible\n\n**Can DAST Find?**\n- Probable\n\n**SAST Reasoning:**\n\nIt should be relatively straightforward for a SAST tool to identify that the query comes from a known source on line 56 and is used in a statement's executeUpdate method.\n\n**DAST Reasoning:**\n\nWhile it should not be difficult for a DAST tool to find such a vulnerability, most DAST tools are not built with attack strings that attempt direct SQL queries. DAST SQL Injection tests are almost always trying to inject into the middle of an already existing SQL query. There is a good chance most DAST tools will not find the `/SqlInjection/attack3` endpoint's query parameter vulnerable.\n\n**Example Attack:** - `query=insert into employees (first_name) (SELECT repeat('a', 50000000) from employees)` will take ~2 seconds to error out (where `repeat('a', 5)` takes 200ms).\n\n---\n\n### (A1) Injection > SQL Injection (intro) > Data Definition Language (DDL)\n\n**Link:** `http://localhost:8080/WebGoat/start.mvc#lesson/SqlInjection.lesson/3`\n\n**Source:** - webgoat-lessons/sql-injection/src/main/java/org/owasp/webgoat/sql_injection/introduction/SqlInjectionLesson4.java\n\n**Lesson:**\n\nThis lesson is for practicing raw SQL queries – it allows anyone to create tables via SQL queries without parameterized statements.\n\n```text\nwebgoat-lessons/sql-injection/src/main/java/org/owasp/webgoat/sql_injection/introduction/SqlInjectionLesson4.java#L52-59\n\npublic AttackResult completed(@RequestParam String query) {\n    return injectableQuery(query);\n}\n\nprotected AttackResult injectableQuery(String query) {\n    try (Connection connection = dataSource.getConnection()) {\n        try (Statement statement = connection.createStatement(TYPE_SCROLL_INSENSITIVE, CONCUR_READ_ONLY)) {\n            statement.executeUpdate(query);\n        ...\n```\n\n**Can SAST Find?** - Possible\n\n**Can DAST Find?**\n- Probable\n\n**SAST Reasoning:**\n\nIt should be relatively straightforward for a SAST tool to identify that the query comes from a known source on line 53 and is used in a statement's executeUpdate method.\n\n**DAST Reasoning:**\n\nWhile it should not be difficult for a DAST tool to find such a vulnerability, most DAST tools are not built with attack strings that attempt direct SQL injection queries. DAST SQL Injection tests are almost always trying to inject into the middle of an already existing SQL query. There is a good chance most DAST tools will not find the /SqlInjection/attack4 endpoint's query parameter vulnerable to sql injection.\n\n**Example Attack:** - `query=insert into employees (first_name) (SELECT repeat('a', 50000000) from information_schema.tables)` will take ~2 seconds to error out (where `repeat('a', 5)` takes 200ms).\n\n---\n\n### (A1) Injection > SQL Injection (intro) > Data Control Language (DCL)\n\n**Link:** `http://localhost:8080/WebGoat/start.mvc#lesson/SqlInjection.lesson/4`\n\n**Source:** - webgoat-lessons/sql-injection/src/main/java/org/owasp/webgoat/sql_injection/introduction/SqlInjectionLesson5.java\n\n**Lesson:**\n\nThis lesson is for practicing raw SQL queries – it pretends to allow users to run grant/alter on tables via SQL queries. However, it is not calling any SQL functionality.\n\n```text\nwebgoat-lessons/sql-injection/src/main/java/org/owasp/webgoat/sql_injection/introduction/SqlInjectionLesson5.java#46-51\n\nString regex = \"(?i)^(grant alter table to [']?unauthorizedUser[']?)(?:[;]?)$\";\nStringBuffer output = new StringBuffer();\n\n// user completes lesson if the query is correct\nif (query.matches(regex)) {\n    output.append(\"\u003Cspan class='feedback-positive'>\" + query + \"\u003C/span>\");\n```\n\n**Can SAST Find?** - Impossible\n\n**Can DAST Find?**\n- Impossible\n\n**SAST Reasoning:**\n\nThis is a synthetic vulnerability that does not actually call any database functionality.\n\n**DAST Reasoning:**\n\nThis is a synthetic vulnerability that does not actually call any database functionality.\n\n---\n\n### (A1) Injection > SQL Injection (intro) > What is SQL injection?\n**Link:** `http://localhost:8080/WebGoat/start.mvc#lesson/SqlInjection.lesson/5`\n\n**Source:** - Static content only\n\n**Lesson:**\n\nThis lesson is for practicing SQL Injection query string generation, but does not call any server side functionality.\n\n**Can SAST Find?** - Impossible\n\n**Can DAST Find?**\n- Impossible\n\n**SAST Reasoning:**\n\nThis lesson does not actually call any server side functionality.\n\n**DAST Reasoning:**\n\nThis lesson does not actually call any server side functionality.\n\n---\n\n### (A1) Injection > SQL Injection (intro) > Try It! String SQL injection\n\n**Link:** `http://localhost:8080/WebGoat/start.mvc#lesson/SqlInjection.lesson/8`\n\n**Source:** - webgoat-lessons/sql-injection/src/main/java/org/owasp/webgoat/sql_injection/introduction/SqlInjectionLesson5a.java\n\n**Lesson:**\n\nThis lesson provides a form for testing out SQL Injection against database functionality with the goal of returning all results from a table.\n\n```text\nwebgoat-lessons/sql-injection/src/main/java/org/owasp/webgoat/sql_injection/introduction/SqlInjectionLesson5a.java#L53-L54\n\npublic AttackResult completed(@RequestParam String account, @RequestParam String operator, @RequestParam String injection) {\n    return injectableQuery(account + \" \" + operator + \" \" + injection);\n...\n\nwebgoat-lessons/sql-injection/src/main/java/org/owasp/webgoat/sql_injection/introduction/SqlInjectionLesson5a.java#L57-62\n\nprotected AttackResult injectableQuery(String accountName) {\n    String query = \"\";\n    try (Connection connection = dataSource.getConnection()) {\n        query = \"SELECT * FROM user_data WHERE first_name = 'John' and last_name = '\" + accountName + \"'\";\n        try (Statement statement = connection.createStatement(ResultSet.TYPE_SCROLL_INSENSITIVE, ResultSet.CONCUR_UPDATABLE)) {\n            ResultSet results = statement.executeQuery(query);\n    ...\n```\n\n**Can SAST Find?** - Possible\n\n**Can DAST Find?**\n- Possible\n\n**SAST Reasoning:**\n\nThe `executeQuery` method is called from a dynamically concatenated string containing user input.\n\n**DAST Reasoning:**\n\nThe three inputs `account`, `operator` and `injection` are all concatenated together and each parameter could technically be used as an attack vector. In this case a DAST tool will most likely suffer from over reporting duplicate flaws, as the three input vectors all end up being used in the same resultant query string.\n\n**Example Attack(s):**\n- `account=Smith' or 1%3d1--&operator=&injection=`\n- `account=&operator=Smith' or 1%3d1--&injection=`\n- `account=&operator=&injection=Smith' or 1%3d1--`\n\n---\n\n### (A1) Injection > SQL Injection (intro) > Try It! Numeric SQL injection\n\n**Link:** `http://localhost:8080/WebGoat/start.mvc#lesson/SqlInjection.lesson/9`\n\n**Source:** - webgoat-lessons/sql-injection/src/main/java/org/owasp/webgoat/sql_injection/introduction/SqlInjectionLesson5b.java\n\n**Lesson:**\n\nThis lesson provides a form for testing out SQL Injection when the column type is restricted to numerical values. The goal is to return all results from a table. While the resultant query does make use of prepared statements, it incorrectly concatenates user input for the `userid` column.\n\n```text\nwebgoat-lessons/sql-injection/src/main/java/org/owasp/webgoat/sql_injection/introduction/SqlInjectionLesson5b.java#L56-71\n\nString queryString = \"SELECT * From user_data WHERE Login_Count = ? and userid= \" + accountName;\ntry (Connection connection = dataSource.getConnection()) {\n        PreparedStatement query = connection.prepareStatement(queryString, ResultSet.TYPE_SCROLL_INSENSITIVE, ResultSet.CONCUR_READ_ONLY);\n        ...\n        ResultSet results = query.executeQuery();\n        ...\n```\n\n**Can SAST Find?** - Possible\n\n**Can DAST Find?**\n- Possible\n\n**SAST Reasoning:**\n\nWhile the query is correctly used in a PreparedStatement only the `Login_Count` is parameterized, the `accountName` is still dynamically assigned, leading to SQL Injection.\n\n**DAST Reasoning:**\n\nDAST tools should attempt to inject into both parameters, and provided the correct attack string is used, should successfully identify that the `userid` parameter is vulnerable to SQL Injection.\n\n**Example Attack:**\n- `login_count=1&userid=1+or+1%3D1`\n\n---\n\n### (A1) Injection > SQL Injection (intro) > Compromising confidentiality with String SQL injection\n\n**Link:** `http://localhost:8080/WebGoat/start.mvc#lesson/SqlInjection.lesson/10`\n\n**Source:** - webgoat-lessons/sql-injection/src/main/java/org/owasp/webgoat/sql_injection/introduction/SqlInjectionLesson8.java\n\n**Lesson:**\n\nThis lesson provides a form for testing out SQL Injection where the goal is to return all results from a table.\n```text\nwebgoat-lessons/sql-injection/src/main/java/org/owasp/webgoat/sql_injection/introduction/SqlInjectionLesson8.java#L59-65\n\nString query = \"SELECT * FROM employees WHERE last_name = '\" + name + \"' AND auth_tan = '\" + auth_tan + \"'\";\n\ntry (Connection connection = dataSource.getConnection()) {\n    try {\n        Statement statement = connection.createStatement(ResultSet.TYPE_SCROLL_INSENSITIVE, ResultSet.CONCUR_UPDATABLE);\n        log(connection, query);\n        ResultSet results = statement.executeQuery(query);\n...\n```\n\n**Can SAST Find?** - Possible\n\n**Can DAST Find?**\n- Possible\n\n**SAST Reasoning:**\n\nThe `name` and `auth_tan` user supplied values are dynamically assigned to a query string, leading to SQL Injection.\n\n**DAST Reasoning:**\n\nDAST tools should attempt to inject into both parameters which are valid attack vectors leading to exploitable SQL Injection.\n\n**Example Attack:**\n- `name=&auth_tan=1'+or+1%3D1--`\n- `name=1'+or+1%3D1--&auth_tan=`\n\n---\n\n### (A1) Injection > SQL Injection (intro) > Compromising Integrity with Query chaining\n\n**Link:** `http://localhost:8080/WebGoat/start.mvc#lesson/SqlInjection.lesson/11`\n\n**Source:** - webgoat-lessons/sql-injection/src/main/java/org/owasp/webgoat/sql_injection/introduction/SqlInjectionLesson9.java\n\n**Lesson:**\n\nThis lesson provides a form for testing out SQL Injection where the goal is to modify a users salary.\n```text\nwebgoat-lessons/sql-injection/src/main/java/org/owasp/webgoat/sql_injection/introduction/SqlInjectionLesson9.java#L61-66\n\nString query = \"SELECT * FROM employees WHERE last_name = '\" + name + \"' AND auth_tan = '\" + auth_tan + \"'\";\ntry (Connection connection = dataSource.getConnection()) {\n    try {\n        Statement statement = connection.createStatement(TYPE_SCROLL_SENSITIVE, CONCUR_UPDATABLE);\n        SqlInjectionLesson8.log(connection, query);\n        ResultSet results = statement.executeQuery(query);\n...\n```\n\n**Can SAST Find?** - Possible\n\n**Can DAST Find?**\n- Possible\n\n**SAST Reasoning:**\n\nThe `name` and `auth_tan` user supplied values are dynamically assigned to a query string, leading to SQL Injection.\n\n**DAST Reasoning:**\n\nDAST tools should attempt to inject into both parameters `name` and `auth_tan` which are valid attack vectors leading to exploitable SQL Injection.\n\n**Example Attack:**\n- `name=&auth_tan=1'+or+1%3D1--`\n- `name=1'+or+1%3D1--&auth_tan=`\n\n---\n\n### (A1) Injection > SQL Injection (intro) > Compromising Availability\n\n**Link:** `http://localhost:8080/WebGoat/start.mvc#lesson/SqlInjection.lesson/12`\n\n**Source:** - webgoat-lessons/sql-injection/src/main/java/org/owasp/webgoat/sql_injection/introduction/SqlInjectionLesson10.java\n\n**Lesson:**\n\nThis lesson provides a form for testing SQL Injection where the goal is remove evidence of attacks.\n\n```text\nwebgoat-lessons/sql-injection/src/main/java/org/owasp/webgoat/sql_injection/introduction/SqlInjectionLesson10.java#L58-63\n\nString query = \"SELECT * FROM access_log WHERE action LIKE '%\" + action + \"%'\";\n\n        try (Connection connection = dataSource.getConnection()) {\n            try {\n                Statement statement = connection.createStatement(ResultSet.TYPE_SCROLL_INSENSITIVE, ResultSet.CONCUR_READ_ONLY);\n                ResultSet results = statement.executeQuery(query);\n...\n```\n\n**Can SAST Find?** - Possible\n\n**Can DAST Find?**\n- Possible\n\n**SAST Reasoning:**\n\nThe action user supplied values are dynamically concatenated to a query string, leading to SQL Injection.\n\n**DAST Reasoning:**\n\nDAST tools should attempt to inject into the action_string parameter, leading to exploitable SQL Injection.\n\n**Example Attack:**\n- `action_string=1'+or+1%3D1--`\n\n---\n\n### (A1) Injection > SQL Injection (advanced) > Try It! Pulling data from other tables\n\n**Link:** `http://localhost:8080/WebGoat/start.mvc#lesson/SqlInjectionAdvanced.lesson/2`\n\n**Source:** - webgoat-lessons/sql-injection/src/main/java/org/owasp/webgoat/sql_injection/advanced/SqlInjectionLesson6a.java\n\n**Lesson:**\n\nThis lesson is to demonstrate how to extract data from tables other than the one the query was defined to execute against.\n\n```text\nwebgoat-lessons/sql-injection/src/main/java/org/owasp/webgoat/sql_injection/advanced/SqlInjectionLesson6a.java#L60-67\n\nquery = \"SELECT * FROM user_data WHERE last_name = '\" + accountName + \"'\";\n//Check if Union is used\nif (!accountName.matches(\"(?i)(^[^-/*;)]*)(\\\\s*)UNION(.*$)\")) {\n    usedUnion = false;\n}\ntry (Statement statement = connection.createStatement(ResultSet.TYPE_SCROLL_INSENSITIVE,\n        ResultSet.CONCUR_READ_ONLY)) {\n    ResultSet results = statement.executeQuery(query);\n...\n```\n\n**Can SAST Find?** - Possible\n\n**Can DAST Find?**\n- Possible\n\n**SAST Reasoning:**\n\nThe `accountName` user supplied value is dynamically assigned to a query string, leading to SQL Injection.\n\n**DAST Reasoning:**\n\nDAST tools should attempt to inject into the `userid_6a` parameter, leading to exploitable SQL Injection.\n\n**Example Attack:**\n- `userid_6a=1'+or+1%3D1--`\n\n---\n\n### (A1) Injection > SQL Injection (advanced) > (no title)\n\n**Link:** `http://localhost:8080/WebGoat/start.mvc#lesson/SqlInjectionAdvanced.lesson/4`\n\n**Source:** - webgoat-lessons/sql-injection/src/main/java/org/owasp/webgoat/sql_injection/advanced/SqlInjectionChallenge.java\n\n**Lesson:**\n\nThis lesson is a challenge to attempt to extract data from the database that leads to the attacker being able to login as a different user by executing SQL Injection attacks.\n\n```text\nwebgoat-lessons/sql-injection/src/main/java/org/owasp/webgoat/sql_injection/advanced/SqlInjectionChallenge.java#L63-65\n\nString checkUserQuery = \"select userid from sql_challenge_users where userid = '\" + username_reg + \"'\";\nStatement statement = connection.createStatement();\nResultSet resultSet = statement.executeQuery(checkUserQuery);\n...\n```\n\n**Can SAST Find?** - Possible\n\n**Can DAST Find?**\n- Possible\n\n**SAST Reasoning:**\n\nThe `username_reg` user supplied value is dynamically assigned to a query string, leading to SQL Injection.\n\n**DAST Reasoning:**\n\nDAST tools should attempt to inject into the `username_reg` parameter with a timing or blind sql injection based attack string, leading to exploitable SQL Injection.\n\n**Example Attack:**\n- `username_reg='%2b(select+repeat('a', 50000000)+from+information_schema.tables)%2b'&email_reg=asdf&password_reg=asdf&confirm_password_reg=asdf`\n\n---\n\n### (A1) Injection > SQL Injection (mitigation) > Input validation alone is not enough!! (Lesson 9)\n\n**Link:** `http://localhost:8080/WebGoat/start.mvc#lesson/SqlInjectionMitigations.lesson/8`\n\n**Source:** - webgoat-lessons/sql-injection/src/main/java/org/owasp/webgoat/sql_injection/mitigation/SqlOnlyInputValidation.java\n- webgoat-lessons/sql-injection/src/main/java/org/owasp/webgoat/sql_injection/advanced/SqlInjectionLesson6a.java\n\n**Lesson:**\nThis lesson demonstrates filtering of user input not being sufficient for protecting against SQL injection attacks. This particular case looks to see if the input string contains a space and returns an error if it does.\n```text\nwebgoat-lessons/sql-injection/src/main/java/org/owasp/webgoat/sql_injection/mitigation/SqlOnlyInputValidation.java#L48-L52\n\npublic AttackResult attack(@RequestParam(\"userid_sql_only_input_validation\") String userId) {\nif (userId.contains(\" \")) {\n    return failed(this).feedback(\"SqlOnlyInputValidation-failed\").build();\n}\nAttackResult attackResult = lesson6a.injectableQuery(userId);\n...\n\nwebgoat-lessons/sql-injection/src/main/java/org/owasp/webgoat/sql_injection/advanced/SqlInjectionLesson6a.java#56-67\n\npublic AttackResult injectableQuery(String accountName) {\n    String query = \"\";\n    try (Connection connection = dataSource.getConnection()) {\n        boolean usedUnion = true;\n        query = \"SELECT * FROM user_data WHERE last_name = '\" + accountName + \"'\";\n        //Check if Union is used\n        if (!accountName.matches(\"(?i)(^[^-/*;)]*)(\\\\s*)UNION(.*$)\")) {\n            usedUnion = false;\n        }\n        try (Statement statement = connection.createStatement(ResultSet.TYPE_SCROLL_INSENSITIVE,\n                ResultSet.CONCUR_READ_ONLY)) {\n            ResultSet results = statement.executeQuery(query);\n```\n\n**Can SAST Find?** - Possible\n\n**Can DAST Find?**\n- Possible\n\n**SAST Reasoning:**\n\nSAST tools would most likely be flag this as a flaw existing under the `webgoat-lessons/sql-injection/src/main/java/org/owasp/webgoat/sql_injection/advanced/SqlInjectionLesson6a.java` class. The `SqlOnlyInputValidation.java` file is calling the same method, but the vulnerability exists in `SqlInjectionLesson6a.java`. Where the flaw is reported depends on how the SAST tool was designed. For example if the SAST tool is capable of tracking taint across intra-procedural calls it may flag the call to `lesson6a.injectableQuery(userId)` on line 52. If the SAST tool was designed to only parse the Abstract Syntax Tree (AST) it may only report the flaw in `SqlInjectionLesson6a.java` on line 67.\n\n**DAST Reasoning:**\n\nAny input filtering done on potential attack vectors makes it more difficult for DAST tools to identify exploitable issues. There is a chance some DAST tools would not find the `userid_sql_only_input_validation` parameter vulnerable to SQL Injection.\n\n**Example Attack:**\n- `userid_sql_only_input_validation='%2b(SELECT/**/repeat(char(60),50000000)from/**/information_schema.tables)%2b'`\n\n---\n\n### (A1) Injection > SQL Injection (mitigation) > Input validation alone is not enough!! (Lesson 10)\n\n**Link:** `http://localhost:8080/WebGoat/start.mvc#lesson/SqlInjectionMitigations.lesson/9`\n\n**Source:** - webgoat-lessons/sql-injection/src/main/java/org/owasp/webgoat/sql_injection/mitigation/SqlOnlyInputValidationOnKeywords.java\n- webgoat-lessons/sql-injection/src/main/java/org/owasp/webgoat/sql_injection/advanced/SqlInjectionLesson6a.java\n\n**Lesson:**\nThis lesson demonstrates filtering of user input not being sufficient for protecting against SQL Injection attacks. This particular case looks to see if the input string contains `SELECT` or `FROM` keywords and replaces them with empty strings, it additionally checks if the input contains a space and returns an error if it does.\n```text\nwebgoat-lessons/sql-injection/src/main/java/org/owasp/webgoat/sql_injection/mitigation/SqlOnlyInputValidationOnKeywords.java#L48-L53\n\npublic AttackResult attack(@RequestParam(\"userid_sql_only_input_validation_on_keywords\") String userId) {\n    userId = userId.toUpperCase().replace(\"FROM\", \"\").replace(\"SELECT\", \"\");\n    if (userId.contains(\" \")) {\n        return failed(this).feedback(\"SqlOnlyInputValidationOnKeywords-failed\").build();\n    }\n    AttackResult attackResult = lesson6a.injectableQuery(userId);\n    ...\n\nwebgoat-lessons/sql-injection/src/main/java/org/owasp/webgoat/sql_injection/advanced/SqlInjectionLesson6a.java#56-67\n\npublic AttackResult injectableQuery(String accountName) {\n    String query = \"\";\n    try (Connection connection = dataSource.getConnection()) {\n        boolean usedUnion = true;\n        query = \"SELECT * FROM user_data WHERE last_name = '\" + accountName + \"'\";\n        //Check if Union is used\n        if (!accountName.matches(\"(?i)(^[^-/*;)]*)(\\\\s*)UNION(.*$)\")) {\n            usedUnion = false;\n        }\n        try (Statement statement = connection.createStatement(ResultSet.TYPE_SCROLL_INSENSITIVE,\n                ResultSet.CONCUR_READ_ONLY)) {\n            ResultSet results = statement.executeQuery(query);\n```\n\n**Can SAST Find?** - Possible\n\n**Can DAST Find?**\n- Possible\n\n**SAST Reasoning:**\n\nSAST tools would most likely flag this as a flaw existing under the `webgoat-lessons/sql-injection/src/main/java/org/owasp/webgoat/sql_injection/advanced/SqlInjectionLesson6a.java` class. The `SqlOnlyInputValidationOnKeywords.java` file is calling the same method, but the vulnerability exists in `SqlInjectionLesson6a.java`. Where the flaw is reported depends on how the SAST tool was designed. For example if the SAST tool is capable of tracking taint across intra-procedural calls it may flag the call to `lesson6a.injectableQuery(userId)` on line 53. If the SAST tool was designed to only parse the Abstract Syntax Tree (AST) it may only report the flaw in `SqlInjectionLesson6a.java` on line 67.\n\n**DAST Reasoning:**\n\nAny input filtering done on potential attack vectors makes it much more difficult for DAST tools to identify exploitable issues. There is a good chance most DAST tools would not find the `userid_sql_only_input_validation_on_keywords` parameter vulnerable.\n\n**Example Attack:**\n- `userid_sql_only_input_validation_on_keywords='%2b(SELselectECT/**/repeat(char(60),50000000)FRfromOM/**/information_schema.tables)%2b'`\n\n---\n\n### (A1) Injection > SQL Injection (mitigation) > (no title) (Lesson 12)\n\n**Link:** `http://localhost:8080/WebGoat/start.mvc#lesson/SqlInjectionMitigations.lesson/11`\n\n**Source:** - webgoat-lessons/sql-injection/src/main/java/org/owasp/webgoat/sql_injection/mitigation/Servers.java\n\n**Lesson:**\nThis lesson includes a SQL Injection vulnerability in a column field of a SQL query, which can not be specified by a parameter in a parameterized query. As such, it uses a dynamically generated query string with user input for specifying the column name.\n\n```text\nwebgoat-lessons/sql-injection/src/main/java/org/owasp/webgoat/sql_injection/mitigation/Servers.java#L69-L74\n\n public List\u003CServer> sort(@RequestParam String column) throws Exception {\n    List\u003CServer> servers = new ArrayList\u003C>();\n\n    try (Connection connection = dataSource.getConnection();\n            PreparedStatement preparedStatement = connection.prepareStatement(\"select id, hostname, ip, mac, status, description from servers  where status \u003C> 'out of order' order by \" + column)) {\n        ResultSet rs = preparedStatement.executeQuery();\n        ...\n```\n\n**Can SAST Find?** - Possible\n\n**Can DAST Find?**\n- Possible\n\n**SAST Reasoning:**\n\nWhile the SQL query is a prepared statement, the column field can not be specified as a `parameter` in a parameterized query. A SAST tool should identify that the query string is concatenated with user input on line 73.\n\n**DAST Reasoning:**\n\nA DAST tool, if it is able to find the `/WebGoat/SqlInjectionMitigations/servers` endpoint, should be able to exploit the column based SQL injection issue.\n\n**Example Attack:**\n- `/WebGoat/SqlInjectionMitigations/servers?column=(select+repeat('a',50000000)+from+information_schema.tables)`\n\n---\n\n### (A1) Injection > Path traversal > Path traversal while uploading files\n\n**Link:** `http://localhost:8080/WebGoat/start.mvc#lesson/PathTraversal.lesson/1`\n\n**Source:**  - webgoat-lessons/path-traversal/src/main/java/org/owasp/webgoat/path_traversal/ProfileUpload.java\n - webgoat-lessons/path-traversal/src/main/java/org/owasp/webgoat/path_traversal/ProfileUploadBase.java\n\n**Lesson:**\nThis lesson's goal is to upload a file to overwrite a system file. It uses a common insecure pattern of using user input to generate a file path and supplying the file contents to create a new file.\n\n```text\nwebgoat-lessons/path-traversal/src/main/java/org/owasp/webgoat/path_traversal/ProfileUpload.java#L31-L32\n\npublic AttackResult uploadFileHandler(@RequestParam(\"uploadedFile\") MultipartFile file, @RequestParam(value = \"fullName\", required = false) String fullName) {\n    return super.execute(file, fullName);\n}\n\nwebgoat-lessons/path-traversal/src/main/java/org/owasp/webgoat/path_traversal/ProfileUploadBase.java#L41-43\n\nvar uploadedFile = new File(uploadDirectory, fullName);\nuploadedFile.createNewFile();\nFileCopyUtils.copy(file.getBytes(), uploadedFile);\n...\n```\n\n**Can SAST Find?** - Possible\n\n**Can DAST Find?**\n- Improbable\n\n**SAST Reasoning:**\n\nA SAST tool should be able to identify that the `new File` call's second parameter is tainted from the `uploadFileHandler` `fullName` parameter.\n**DAST Reasoning:**\n\nDAST tools have difficulties identifying insecure file upload path traversal attacks. As the attack is a two-step process, the tool most likely will not be able to identify where the uploaded file ultimately resides on the file system. The first step is uploading the file, while the second is for identifying where the uploaded file exists and attempting to access it.\nIn this lesson there is no way to retrieve a non `.jpg` suffixed file. The `var catPicture = new File(catPicturesDirectory, (id == null ? RandomUtils.nextInt(1, 11) : id) + \".jpg\");` limits what can be retrieved. Additionally, the only way to attempt to access uploaded files is through a completely unrelated web page. A DAST tool would not understand the relationship between the upload endpoint and the retrieval endpoint.\nWhile it is possible to attempt null byte attacks if the string contains `path-traversal-secret.jpg` the `FileCopyUtils` method uses `java.io.File.toPath` which disallows null bytes. For example attempting the attack: `/WebGoat/PathTraversal/random-picture?id=%2e%2e%2f%2e%2e%2f%2e%2e%2f%2e%2e%2f%2e%2e%2f%2e%2e%2fetc%2fpasswd%00path-traversal-secret.jpg%00` will fail with the error: `java.nio.file.InvalidPathException: Nul character not allowed`.\n\nGiven the above, while it is possible to upload arbitrary files, it is not possible to access them, hence a DAST tool would be unable to identify this as a flaw. A human of course could use various techniques to attempt to overwrite system files, but a DAST tool is not built for such activities.\n---\n\n### (A1) Injection > Path traversal > Path traversal while uploading files (lesson 3)\n\n**Link:** `http://localhost:8080/WebGoat/start.mvc#lesson/PathTraversal.lesson/2`\n\n**Source:**  - webgoat-lessons/path-traversal/src/main/java/org/owasp/webgoat/path_traversal/ProfileUploadFix.java\n - webgoat-lessons/path-traversal/src/main/java/org/owasp/webgoat/path_traversal/ProfileUploadBase.java\n\n**Lesson:**\nThis lesson's goal is to upload a file to overwrite a system file. It uses a common insecure pattern of using user input to generate a file path and supply the file contents to create a new file. In this lesson filtering is done on user input, replacing `../` with an empty string.\n\n```text\nwebgoat-lessons/path-traversal/src/main/java/org/owasp/webgoat/path_traversal/ProfileUploadFix.java#L24-L28\n\n    public AttackResult uploadFileHandler(\n            @RequestParam(\"uploadedFileFix\") MultipartFile file,\n            @RequestParam(value = \"fullNameFix\", required = false) String fullName) {\n        return super.execute(file, fullName != null ? fullName.replace(\"../\", \"\") : \"\");\n    }\n\nwebgoat-lessons/path-traversal/src/main/java/org/owasp/webgoat/path_traversal/ProfileUploadBase.java#L41-43\n\nvar uploadedFile = new File(uploadDirectory, fullName);\nuploadedFile.createNewFile();\nFileCopyUtils.copy(file.getBytes(), uploadedFile);\n```\n\n**Can SAST Find?** - Yes\n\n**Can DAST Find?**\n- Improbable\n\n**SAST Reasoning:**\n\nA SAST tool should be able to identify that the `new File` call's second parameter is tainted from the `uploadFileHandler` `fullName` parameter.\n**DAST Reasoning:**\n\nDAST tools have difficulties identifying insecure file upload path traversal attacks. As the attack is a two-step process, the tool most likely will not be able to identify where the uploaded file ultimately resides on the file system. The first step is uploading the file, while the second is for identifying where the uploaded file exists and attempting to access it.\nIn this lesson there is no way to retrieve a non `.jpg` suffixed file. The `var catPicture = new File(catPicturesDirectory, (id == null ? RandomUtils.nextInt(1, 11) : id) + \".jpg\");` limits what can be retrieved. Additionally, the only way to attempt to access uploaded files is through a completely unrelated web page. A DAST tool would not understand the relationship between the upload endpoint and the retrieval endpoint.\nWhile it is possible to attempt null byte attacks if the string contains `path-traversal-secret.jpg` the `FileCopyUtils` method uses `java.io.File.toPath` which disallows null bytes. For example attempting the attack: `/WebGoat/PathTraversal/random-picture?id=%2e%2e%2f%2e%2e%2f%2e%2e%2f%2e%2e%2f%2e%2e%2f%2e%2e%2fetc%2fpasswd%00path-traversal-secret.jpg%00` will fail with the error: `java.nio.file.InvalidPathException: Nul character not allowed`.\n\nGiven the above, while it is possible to upload arbitrary files, it is not possible to access them, hence a DAST tool would be unable to identify this as a flaw. A human of course could use various techniques to attempt to overwrite system files, but a DAST tool is not built for such activities.\n---\n\n### (A1) Injection > Path traversal > Path traversal while uploading files (lesson 4)\n\n**Link:** `http://localhost:8080/WebGoat/start.mvc#lesson/PathTraversal.lesson/3`\n\n**Source:**  - webgoat-lessons/path-traversal/src/main/java/org/owasp/webgoat/path_traversal/ProfileUploadRemoveUserInput.java\n - webgoat-lessons/path-traversal/src/main/java/org/owasp/webgoat/path_traversal/ProfileUploadBase.java\n\n**Lesson:**\nThis lessons goal is to upload a file to overwrite a system file. It uses a common insecure pattern of using user input to generate a file path and supplying the file contents to create a new file. In this lesson the filename is taken from the `MultipartFile.getOriginalFilename()` which is still user input, as it is possible to modify the filename part of a Multipart upload:\n```text\nContent-Disposition: form-data; name=\"uploadedFileRemoveUserInput\"; filename=\"../../test.html\"\n```\n\n```text\nwebgoat-lessons/path-traversal/src/main/java/org/owasp/webgoat/path_traversal/ProfileUploadRemoveUserInput.java#L24-L28\n\npublic AttackResult uploadFileHandler(\n        @RequestParam(\"uploadedFileFix\") MultipartFile file,\n        @RequestParam(value = \"fullNameFix\", required = false) String fullName) {\n    return super.execute(file, fullName != null ? fullName.replace(\"../\", \"\") : \"\");\n}\n\nwebgoat-lessons/path-traversal/src/main/java/org/owasp/webgoat/path_traversal/ProfileUploadBase.java#L41-43\n\nvar uploadedFile = new File(uploadDirectory, fullName);\nuploadedFile.createNewFile();\nFileCopyUtils.copy(file.getBytes(), uploadedFile);\n```\n\n**Can SAST Find?** - Possible\n\n**Can DAST Find?**\n- Improbable\n\n**SAST Reasoning:**\n\nA SAST tool should be able to identify that the `new File` call's second parameter is tainted from the uploadFileHandler fullName parameter, which originates from the `MultipartFile.getOriginalFilename()` from `ProfileUploadRemoveUserInput.java`.\n**DAST Reasoning:**\n\nDAST tools have difficulties identifying insecure file upload path traversal attacks. As the attack is a two-step process, the tool most likely will not be able to identify where the uploaded file ultimately resides on the file system. The first step is uploading the file, while the second is for identifying where the uploaded file exists and attempting to access it.\nIn this lesson there is no way to retrieve a non `.jpg` suffixed file. The `var catPicture = new File(catPicturesDirectory, (id == null ? RandomUtils.nextInt(1, 11) : id) + \".jpg\");` limits what can be retrieved. Additionally, the only way to attempt to access uploaded files is through a completely unrelated web page. A DAST tool would not understand the relationship between the upload endpoint and the retrieval endpoint.\nWhile it is possible to attempt null byte attacks if the string contains `path-traversal-secret.jpg` the `FileCopyUtils` method uses `java.io.File.toPath` which disallows null bytes. For example attempting the attack: `/WebGoat/PathTraversal/random-picture?id=%2e%2e%2f%2e%2e%2f%2e%2e%2f%2e%2e%2f%2e%2e%2f%2e%2e%2fetc%2fpasswd%00path-traversal-secret.jpg%00` will fail with the error: `java.nio.file.InvalidPathException: Nul character not allowed`.\n\nGiven the above, while it is possible to upload arbitrary files, it is not possible to access them, hence a DAST tool would be unable to identify this as a flaw. A human of course could use various techniques to attempt to overwrite system files, but a DAST tool is not built for such activities.\n---\n\n### (A1) Injection > Path traversal > Retrieving other files with a path traversal\n\n**Link:** `http://localhost:8080/WebGoat/start.mvc#lesson/PathTraversal.lesson/4`\n\n**Source:**  - webgoat-lessons/path-traversal/src/main/java/org/owasp/webgoat/path_traversal/ProfileUploadRemoveUserInput.java\n - webgoat-lessons/path-traversal/src/main/java/org/owasp/webgoat/path_traversal/ProfileUploadBase.java\n\n**Lesson:**\nThis lesson's goal is to retrieve a particular file from the file system. It uses a rather uncommon method of validating the entire query string via `request.getQueryString()` to see if it contains `..` or `/`. While technically the call to `new File` is vulnerable to path traversal attacks, it is not actually an exploitable arbitrary local file inclusion vulnerability. It can only return files which are jpg's, and null-byte attacks are not possible due to calls to FileCopyUtils which validates that the path does not contain null bytes.\n\n```text\nwebgoat-lessons/path-traversal/src/main/java/org/owasp/webgoat/path_traversal/ProfileUploadRemoveUserInput.java#L75-94\n\npublic ResponseEntity\u003C?> getProfilePicture(HttpServletRequest request) {\n    var queryParams = request.getQueryString();\n    if (queryParams != null && (queryParams.contains(\"..\") || queryParams.contains(\"/\"))) {\n        return ResponseEntity.badRequest().body(\"Illegal characters are not allowed in the query params\");\n    }\n    try {\n        var id = request.getParameter(\"id\");\n        var catPicture = new File(catPicturesDirectory, (id == null ? RandomUtils.nextInt(1, 11) : id) + \".jpg\");\n\n        if (catPicture.getName().toLowerCase().contains(\"path-traversal-secret.jpg\")) {\n            return ResponseEntity.ok()\n                    .contentType(MediaType.parseMediaType(MediaType.IMAGE_JPEG_VALUE))\n                    .body(FileCopyUtils.copyToByteArray(catPicture));\n        }\n        if (catPicture.exists()) {\n            return ResponseEntity.ok()\n                    .contentType(MediaType.parseMediaType(MediaType.IMAGE_JPEG_VALUE))\n                    .location(new URI(\"/PathTraversal/random-picture?id=\" + catPicture.getName()))\n                    .body(Base64.getEncoder().encode(FileCopyUtils.copyToByteArray(catPicture)));\n        }\n    ...\n```\n\n**Can SAST Find?** - Possible\n\n**Can DAST Find?**\n- Improbable\n\n**SAST Reasoning:**\n\nA SAST tool should be able to identify that the `new File` call's second parameter is tainted. However, the File object is only used in calls to either `getName()` or `FileCopyUtils` which validates that the filename does not contain null bytes. So while it's technically vulnerable, it is not exploitable for arbitrary file access.\n\n**DAST Reasoning:**\n\nDAST tools have difficulties identifying insecure file upload path traversal attacks. As the attack is a two-step process, the tool most likely will not be able to identify where the uploaded file ultimately resides on the file system. The first step is uploading the file, while the second is for identifying where the uploaded file exists and attempting to access it.\nIn this lesson there is no way to retrieve a non `.jpg` suffixed file. The `var catPicture = new File(catPicturesDirectory, (id == null ? RandomUtils.nextInt(1, 11) : id) + \".jpg\");` limits what can be retrieved.\nWhile it is possible to attempt null byte attacks if the string contains `path-traversal-secret.jpg` the `FileCopyUtils` method uses `java.io.File.toPath`, which disallows null bytes. For example attempting the attack: `/WebGoat/PathTraversal/random-picture?id=%2e%2e%2f%2e%2e%2f%2e%2e%2f%2e%2e%2f%2e%2e%2f%2e%2e%2fetc%2fpasswd%00path-traversal-secret.jpg%00` will fail with the error: `java.nio.file.InvalidPathException: Nul character not allowed`.\n\nGiven the above, a DAST tool would most likely be unable to identify this as a flaw. Most DAST tools use hardcoded filepaths such as `/etc/passwd` or `c:/windows/win.ini` when attempting to access arbitrary files.\n\n---\n\n\u003C/details>\n\n## (A2) Broken Authentication\n\n---\n\u003Cdetails>\n\u003Csummary markdown=\"span\">Findings\u003C/summary>\n\n### (A2) Broken Authentication > Authentication Bypasses > 2FA Password Reset\n\n**Link:** `http://localhost:8080/WebGoat/start.mvc#lesson/AuthBypass.lesson/1`\n\n**Source:** - webgoat-lessons/auth-bypass/src/main/java/org/owasp/webgoat/auth_bypass/AuthBypass.java\n- webgoat-lessons/auth-bypass/src/main/java/org/owasp/webgoat/auth_bypass/AccountVerificationHelper.java\n\n**Lesson:**\nThis lesson is for bypassing 2FA password reset by removing POST parameters.\n\n```text\nwebgoat-lessons/auth-bypass/src/main/java/org/owasp/webgoat/auth_bypass/AccountVerificationHelper.java#L69-86\n\npublic boolean verifyAccount(Integer userId, HashMap\u003CString, String> submittedQuestions) {\n    //short circuit if no questions are submitted\n    if (submittedQuestions.entrySet().size() != secQuestionStore.get(verifyUserId).size()) {\n        return false;\n    }\n\n    if (submittedQuestions.containsKey(\"secQuestion0\") && !submittedQuestions.get(\"secQuestion0\").equals(secQuestionStore.get(verifyUserId).get(\"secQuestion0\"))) {\n        return false;\n    }\n\n    if (submittedQuestions.containsKey(\"secQuestion1\") && !submittedQuestions.get(\"secQuestion1\").equals(secQuestionStore.get(verifyUserId).get(\"secQuestion1\"))) {\n        return false;\n    }\n\n    // else\n    return true;\n\n}\n\n```\n\n**Can SAST Find?** - Impossible\n\n**Can DAST Find?**\n- Impossible\n\n**SAST Reasoning:**\n\nThis lesson is a hypothetical case where it 'fails open.' In other words by not submitting the validated parameters, the checks are never executed and the verifyAccount method returns true.\n\nSAST tools can not determine 'reasoning' of a methods purpose. This method is not wired into any obvious framework or method that would hint for the SAST tool to know it's for authentication purposes.\n\n**DAST Reasoning:**\n\nMuch like above, this is a hypothetical case. There is no context around the lesson that could assist a DAST tool in knowing it's testing a password reset function.\n---\n\n### (A2) Broken Authentication > JWT tokens > JWT signing\n\n**Link:** `http://localhost:8080/WebGoat/start.mvc#lesson/JWT.lesson/3`\n\n**Source:** - webgoat-lessons/jwt/src/main/java/org/owasp/webgoat/jwt/JWTVotesEndpoint.java\n\n**Lesson:**\nThis lesson is for modifying JWT claims to impersonate or elevate privileges. It is a multi-step process. First to get a JWT value you need to use the fake 'login' `/JWT/votings/login?user=` endpoint, which sets it in an HTTP cookie. Next, the goal is to bypass authorization checks and reset the votes by issuing a POST request to the `/JWT/votings` with a modified token. The modifications require setting the alg to None and changing the admin parameter to true.\n```text\nwebgoat-lessons/jwt/src/main/java/org/owasp/webgoat/jwt/JWTVotesEndpoint.java#L163-165\n\nJwt jwt = Jwts.parser().setSigningKey(JWT_PASSWORD).parse(accessToken);\nClaims claims = (Claims) jwt.getBody();\nboolean isAdmin = Boolean.valueOf((String) claims.get(\"admin\"));\n```\n\n**Can SAST Find?** - Probable\n\n**Can DAST Find?**\n- Impossible\n\n**SAST Reasoning:**\n\nA SAST tool would need to be used in conjunction with a dependency scanning solution that looked for vulnerable libraries. This vulnerability exists due to the dependency on `io.jsonwebtoken` version 0.7.0. Using static analysis alone would be difficult for a SAST tool to identify that the `setSigningKey` would be ignored if the algorithm was set to `None`. Additionally, authorization issues are usually difficult for SAST to identify in terms of simple conditional statements. \n**DAST Reasoning:**\n\nVulnerabilities that require multiple steps are usually difficult for DAST tools to identify. If the JWT was used in an authentication endpoint, it may be possible for a DAST tool to identify a vulnerability. It would attempt to modify the JWT and determine if it was able to successfully login. A DAST tool would be unable to determine that the secondary `/JWT/votings` endpoint suffers from verification flaw.\n\n---\n\n### (A2) Broken Authentication > JWT tokens > JWT cracking\n\n**Link:** `http://localhost:8080/WebGoat/start.mvc#lesson/JWT.lesson/4`\n\n**Source:** - webgoat-lessons/jwt/src/main/java/org/owasp/webgoat/jwt/JWTSecretKeyEndpoint.java\n\n**Lesson:**\nThis lesson is for cracking a JWT value which uses an insecure cryptographic algorithm. `HS256` JWT values include a signature which can generated and compared by brute forcing tools.\n```text\nwebgoat-lessons/jwt/src/main/java/org/owasp/webgoat/jwt/JWTSecretKeyEndpoint.java#L57-68\n\npublic String getSecretToken() {\n    return Jwts.builder()\n            .setIssuer(\"WebGoat Token Builder\")\n            .setAudience(\"webgoat.org\")\n            .setIssuedAt(Calendar.getInstance().getTime())\n            .setExpiration(Date.from(Instant.now().plusSeconds(60)))\n            .setSubject(\"tom@webgoat.org\")\n            .claim(\"username\", \"Tom\")\n            .claim(\"Email\", \"tom@webgoat.org\")\n            .claim(\"Role\", new String[]{\"Manager\", \"Project Administrator\"})\n            .signWith(SignatureAlgorithm.HS256, JWT_SECRET).compact();\n    }\n\n```\n\n**Can SAST Find?** - Possible\n\n**Can DAST Find?**\n- Probable\n\n**SAST Reasoning:**\n\nA SAST tool that included this particular `Jwts` library signatures would be able to identify that the `signWith` method is a potential sink and the first parameter determines if a vulnerability exists, depending on the argument's value.\n\n**DAST Reasoning:**\n\nA DAST tool with builtin JWT cracking functionality would be able to extract JWT values encountered during crawling and attempt to brute force the signature. Note the ability to actually determine vulnerability would be dependent on the weakness of the JWT key used for signing.\n\n---\n\n### (A2) Broken Authentication > JWT tokens > Refreshing a token (incomplete lesson)\n\n**Link:** `http://localhost:8080/WebGoat/start.mvc#lesson/JWT.lesson/6`\n\n**Source:** - webgoat-lessons/jwt/src/main/java/org/owasp/webgoat/jwt/JWTRefreshEndpoint.java\n\n**Lesson:**\n\nThis lesson as of v8.1.0 is still incomplete, as the lesson page details do not give enough information to solve. Only by looking at the source and getting the username/password can one solve this challenge. The underlying flaw is that the application does not properly associate refresh tokens with access tokens, allowing one who has captured a leaked refresh token to update someone else's access token.\n\n```text\nwebgoat-lessons/jwt/src/main/java/org/owasp/webgoat/jwt/JWTRefreshEndpoint.java#L116-122\n\ntry {\n    Jwt\u003CHeader, Claims> jwt = Jwts.parser().setSigningKey(JWT_PASSWORD).parse(token.replace(\"Bearer \", \"\"));\n    user = (String) jwt.getBody().get(\"user\");\n    refreshToken = (String) json.get(\"refresh_token\");\n} catch (ExpiredJwtException e) {\n    user = (String) e.getClaims().get(\"user\");\n    refreshToken = (String) json.get(\"refresh_token\");\n}\n...\n```\n\n**Can SAST Find?** - Improbable\n\n**Can DAST Find?**\n- Probable\n\n**SAST Reasoning:**\n\nA SAST tool would not be able to reason the logic behind requiring the access token and refresh token to be linked unless this logic was built into the JWT library. It could be possible with a very strictly defined set of a rule sets to find this flaw, but it is highly improbable.\n**DAST Reasoning:**\n\nA DAST tool could be configured to contain two user accounts and authorize to get both tokens. It could then attempt to switch one user's refresh token with the secondary user and determine if the server responded with a new access token.\n---\n\n### (A2) Broken Authentication > JWT tokens > Final challenges\n\n**Link:** `http://localhost:8080/WebGoat/start.mvc#lesson/JWT.lesson/7`\n\n**Source:** - webgoat-lessons/jwt/src/main/java/org/owasp/webgoat/jwt/JWTFinalEndpoint.java\n\n**Lesson:**\nThis lesson is a highly improbable series of events that could lead to overwriting a signing key stored in a database. The underlying vulnerability here is actually SQL injection that is exploitable by modifying the `kid` JWT field.\n```text\nL162-176\nJwt jwt = Jwts.parser().setSigningKeyResolver(new SigningKeyResolverAdapter() {\n    @Override\n    public byte[] resolveSigningKeyBytes(JwsHeader header, Claims claims) {\n        final String kid = (String) header.get(\"kid\");\n        try (var connection = dataSource.getConnection()) {\n            ResultSet rs = connection.createStatement().executeQuery(\"SELECT key FROM jwt_keys WHERE id = '\" + kid + \"'\");\n            while (rs.next()) {\n                return TextCodec.BASE64.decode(rs.getString(1));\n            }\n        } catch (SQLException e) {\n            errorMessage[0] = e.getMessage();\n        }\n        return null;\n    }\n}).parseClaimsJws(token);\n...\n```\n\n**Can SAST Find?** - Possible\n\n**Can DAST Find?**\n- Probable\n\n**SAST Reasoning:**\n\nA SAST tool would flag this particular issue as a SQL injection flaw. SAST tools with taint tracking capabilities, or one that has added signatures for sources and sinks of this JWT library, could follow that the token was decoded and the `kid` came from user input. It would then identify on line 167 user supplied input was used in generation of a dynamically generated SQL query. SAST tools which take a more grep like approach, would most likely flag line 167 as the vulnerability since string concatenation used in a SQL query.\n\n**DAST Reasoning:**\n\nA DAST tool could be configured to decode JWT claims and attempt SQL injection in the various fields.\n\n**Example Attack:**\n- Decode JWT\n- Modify the JWT header\n```text\n{\n  \"typ\": \"JWT\",\n  \"kid\": \"'+(select repeat('a',50000000) from INFORMATION_SCHEMA.tables)+'\",\n  \"alg\": \"HS256\"\n}\n```\n- Re-encode the token\n- Send request during a timing attack verification phase.\n\n---\n\n### (A2) Broken Authentication > Password reset > Security questions\n\n**Link:** `http://localhost:8080/WebGoat/start.mvc#lesson/PasswordReset.lesson/3`\n\n**Source:** - webgoat-lessons/password-reset/src/main/java/org/owasp/webgoat/password_reset/QuestionsAssignment.java\n\n**Lesson:**\n\nThis lesson is to demonstrate the ability of guessing or brute forcing security questions. The users and security questions are hardcoded. The goal is to guess one of them.\n\n```text\nwebgoat-lessons/password-reset/src/main/java/org/owasp/webgoat/password_reset/QuestionsAssignment.java#L45-51\n\nstatic {\n    COLORS.put(\"admin\", \"green\");\n    COLORS.put(\"jerry\", \"orange\");\n    ...\n}\n\nwebgoat-lessons/password-reset/src/main/java/org/owasp/webgoat/password_reset/QuestionsAssignment.java#L63-68\n\nString validAnswer = COLORS.get(username.toLowerCase());\nif (validAnswer == null) {\n    return failed(this).feedback(\"password-questions-unknown-user\").feedbackArgs(username).build();\n} else if (validAnswer.equals(securityQuestion)) {\n    return success(this).build();\n}\n```\n\n**Can SAST Find?**\n- Impossible\n\n**Can DAST Find?**\n- Improbable\n\n**SAST Reasoning:**\n\nA SAST tool would be unable to determine that this lesson has any relation to login logic as it's doing a simple existence check of inputs against a map value.\n\n**DAST Reasoning:**\n\nA DAST tool would need to be configured to treat this form as a login form for it to detect any potential discrepancy between a valid and invalid security question answer.\n\n---\n\n### (A2) Broken Authentication > Password reset > Creating the password reset link\n\n**Link:** `http://localhost:8080/WebGoat/start.mvc#lesson/PasswordReset.lesson/5`\n\n**Source:** - webgoat-lessons/password-reset/src/main/java/org/owasp/webgoat/password_reset/ResetLinkAssignmentForgotPassword.java\n- webgoat-lessons/password-reset/src/main/java/org/owasp/webgoat/password_reset/ResetLinkAssignment.java\n\n**Lesson:**\n\nThis lesson is to demonstrate incorrect usage of user supplied data (taken from the host header) in constructing a link. The goal is to abuse this to get a hypothetical user to click on a password reset link that points to the wrong host.\n\n```text\nwebgoat-lessons/password-reset/src/main/java/org/owasp/webgoat/password_reset/ResetLinkAssignmentForgotPassword.java#L60-74\n\nString resetLink = UUID.randomUUID().toString();\nResetLinkAssignment.resetLinks.add(resetLink);\nString host = request.getHeader(\"host\");\nif (hasText(email)) {\n    if (email.equals(ResetLinkAssignment.TOM_EMAIL) && (host.contains(\"9090\")||host.contains(\"webwolf\"))) { //User indeed changed the host header.\n        ResetLinkAssignment.userToTomResetLink.put(getWebSession().getUserName(), resetLink);\n        fakeClickingLinkEmail(host, resetLink);\n    } else {\n        try {\n            sendMailToUser(email, host, resetLink);\n        } catch (Exception e) {\n            return failed(this).output(\"E-mail can't be send. please try again.\").build();\n        }\n    }\n}\n```\n\n**Can SAST Find?** - Improbable\n\n**Can DAST Find?**\n- Impossible\n\n**SAST Reasoning:**\n\nThis is a hypothetical issue that most likely would not occur in the wild. There is no real way of a SAST tool to know that the extracted host header was incorrectly used in constructing a link.\n\n**DAST Reasoning:**\n\nA DAST tool would first need to be configured to treat this form as a login or password reset form. It would then also need to know that the conditions for getting a response required the host header to contain port 9090 or the string `webwolf`. This is a highly improbable set of conditions a DAST tool (or even a human without source) would need to know to have the flaw triggered. Additionally, this flaw requires a form of user interaction (although it's faked on line 66) which a DAST tool would not be able to do.\n\n---\n\u003C/details>\n\n## (A3) > Sensitive Data Exposure\n\n---\n\n\u003Cdetails>\n\u003Csummary markdown=\"span\">Findings\u003C/summary>\n\n---\n\n### (A3) > Sensitive Data Exposure > Insecure Login > Let's try\n\n**Link:** `http://localhost:8080/WebGoat/start.mvc#lesson/InsecureLogin.lesson/1`\n\n**Source:** - webgoat-lessons/insecure-login/src/main/java/org/owasp/webgoat/insecure_login/InsecureLoginTask.java\n\n**Lesson:**\n\nThis lesson is to demonstrate sending credentials over plain text communications. It does not contain any real flaws.\n\n```text\nwebgoat-lessons/insecure-login/src/main/java/org/owasp/webgoat/insecure_login/InsecureLoginTask.java#L35-37\n\nif (username.toString().equals(\"CaptainJack\") && password.toString().equals(\"BlackPearl\")) {\n    return success(this).build();\n}\n```\n\n**Can SAST Find?** - Possible (different issue)\n\n**Can DAST Find?**\n- Possible\n\n**SAST Reasoning:**\n\nThe source is only doing a simple equality test between user input and two constant values. There is a chance, depending on the SAST tool, that it would flag the password equality check as a hardcoded password.\n**DAST Reasoning:**\n\nIf this page were configured as a login page and it were accessed over HTTP, there is a chance a DAST tool would report this as credentials being sent over a plain text transport.\n\n---\n\u003C/details>\n\n## (A4) XML External Entities (XXE)\n\n---\n\n\u003Cdetails>\n\u003Csummary markdown=\"span\">Findings\u003C/summary>\n\n### (A4) XML External Entities (XXE) > XXE > Let’s try\n\n**Link:** `http://localhost:8080/WebGoat/start.mvc#lesson/XXE.lesson/3`\n\n**Source:** - webgoat-lessons/xxe/src/main/java/org/owasp/webgoat/xxe/SimpleXXE.java\n- webgoat-lessons/xxe/src/main/java/org/owasp/webgoat/xxe/Comments.java\n\nClass: Injection\n\n**Lesson:**\n\nThis lesson's goal is to exploit an XXE parser to have it return the contents of the OS root path. The target XML parser `JAXB` will decode the `SYSTEM` entity and return the contents of the specified entity.\n\n```text\nwebgoat-lessons/xxe/src/main/java/org/owasp/webgoat/xxe/Comments.java#L87-94\n\nprotected Comment parseXml(String xml) throws JAXBException, XMLStreamException {\n    var jc = JAXBContext.newInstance(Comment.class);\n    var xif = XMLInputFactory.newInstance();\n    var xsr = xif.createXMLStreamReader(new StringReader(xml));\n\n    var unmarshaller = jc.createUnmarshaller();\n    return (Comment) unmarshaller.unmarshal(xsr);\n}\n```\n\n**Can SAST Find?** - Possible\n\n**Can DAST Find?**\n- Possible\n\n**SAST Reasoning:**\n\nSAST tools should have signatures for common XML parsers like `JAXB` and determine if they do or do not disable entity and DTD resolution prior to processing user input.\n\n**DAST Reasoning:**\n\nMost DAST tools should be able to find this issue even though the attack request's response does not immediately contain the result. A DAST tool should be configured to handle callback related attacks and attempt to force the XML parser to use a URL instead of reading a system file. If the parser is vulnerable, and no egress filtering is in place, the parser will end up initiating a request to the specified URL.\n\n**Example Attack:**\n- `\u003C?xml version=\"1.0\"?>\u003C!DOCTYPE text [\u003C!ENTITY xxe SYSTEM \"http://callbackserver:9090/test\">]>\u003Ccomment>\u003Ctext>&xxe;\u003C/text>\u003C/comment>`\n\n---\n\n### (A4) XML External Entities (XXE) > XXE > Modern REST framework\n\n**Link:** `http://localhost:8080/WebGoat/start.mvc#lesson/XXE.lesson/6`\n\n**Source:** - webgoat-lessons/xxe/src/main/java/org/owasp/webgoat/xxe/ContentTypeAssignment.java\n- webgoat-lessons/xxe/src/main/java/org/owasp/webgoat/xxe/Comments.java\n\n**Lesson:**\n\nThis lesson's goal is to exploit an XXE parser to have it return the contents of the OS root path, much like ``http://localhost:8080/WebGoat/start.mvc#lesson/XXE.lesson/3``. The only difference is the `/WebGoat/xxe/content-type` endpoint accepts both JSON and XML. This is more of a hypothetical situation due to unrealistic conditional statements used to only allow valid responses if they are met. The same underlying `parseXml` is called for both of these lessons.\n\n```text\nwebgoat-lessons/xxe/src/main/java/org/owasp/webgoat/xxe/ContentTypeAssignment.java#L56-64\n\nif (APPLICATION_JSON_VALUE.equals(contentType)) {\n            comments.parseJson(commentStr).ifPresent(c -> comments.addComment(c, true));\n            attackResult = failed(this).feedback(\"xxe.content.type.feedback.json\").build();\n        }\n\n        if (null != contentType && contentType.contains(MediaType.APPLICATION_XML_VALUE)) {\n            String error = \"\";\n            try {\n                Comment comment = comments.parseXml(commentStr);\n...\n\nwebgoat-lessons/xxe/src/main/java/org/owasp/webgoat/xxe/Comments.java#L87-94\n\nprotected Comment parseXml(String xml) throws JAXBException, XMLStreamException {\n    var jc = JAXBContext.newInstance(Comment.class);\n    var xif = XMLInputFactory.newInstance();\n    var xsr = xif.createXMLStreamReader(new StringReader(xml));\n\n    var unmarshaller = jc.createUnmarshaller();\n    return (Comment) unmarshaller.unmarshal(xsr);\n}\n```\n\n**Can SAST Find?** - Possible\n\n**Can DAST Find?**\n- Improbable\n\n**SAST Reasoning:**\n\nA SAST tool will most likely disregard the conditional checks necessary to call the `comments.parseXml` on line 64 of `ContentTypeAssignment`. It should determine that the input string is parsed by an XML parser in `Comments.java` that did not disable entity or DTD resolution.\n\n**DAST Reasoning:**\n\nMost DAST tools will attempt to inject into parameter names and values, not transform the entire method from one to the other. The conditional checks in `ContentTypeAssignment` lines 56 and 61 are not realistic and would most likely block legitimate attack cases.\n\n---\n\n### (A4) XML External Entities (XXE) > XXE > Blind XXE assignment\n\n**Link:** `http://localhost:8080/WebGoat/start.mvc#lesson/XXE.lesson/10`\n\n**Source:** - webgoat-lessons/xxe/src/main/java/org/owasp/webgoat/xxe/BlindSendFileAssignment.java\n- webgoat-lessons/xxe/src/main/java/org/owasp/webgoat/xxe/Comments.java\n\n**Lesson:**\n\nThis lesson's goal is to exploit an XXE parser to have it post the contents of a file to a callback server. The same underlying `parseXml` is called for this lesson as well.\n\n```text\nwebgoat-lessons/xxe/src/main/java/org/owasp/webgoat/xxe/BlindSendFileAssignment.java#L56-64\n\n public AttackResult addComment(@RequestBody String commentStr) {\n        //Solution is posted as a separate comment\n        if (commentStr.contains(CONTENTS)) {\n            return success(this).build();\n        }\n\n        try {\n            Comment comment = comments.parseXml(commentStr);\n            comments.addComment(comment, false);\n        } catch (Exception e) {\n            return failed(this).output(e.toString()).build();\n        }\n        return failed(this).build();\n    }\n...\n\nwebgoat-lessons/xxe/src/main/java/org/owasp/webgoat/xxe/Comments.java#L87-94\n\nprotected Comment parseXml(String xml) throws JAXBException, XMLStreamException {\n    var jc = JAXBContext.newInstance(Comment.class);\n    var xif = XMLInputFactory.newInstance();\n    var xsr = xif.createXMLStreamReader(new StringReader(xml));\n\n    var unmarshaller = jc.createUnmarshaller();\n    return (Comment) unmarshaller.unmarshal(xsr);\n}\n```\n\n**Can SAST Find?** - Possible\n\n**Can DAST Find?**\n- Possible\n\n**SAST Reasoning:**\n\nThis flaw is the same as `(A4) XML External Entities (XXE) > XXE > Let’s try`\n\n**DAST Reasoning:**\n\nThis flaw is the same as `(A4) XML External Entities (XXE) > XXE > Let’s try`\n\n---\n\n\u003C/details>\n\n## (A5) Broken Access Control\n\n---\n\u003Cdetails>\n\u003Csummary markdown=\"span\">Findings\u003C/summary>\n\n### (A5) Broken Access Control > Insecure Direct Object References > Authenticate First, Abuse Authorization Later\n\n**Link:** `http://localhost:8080/WebGoat/start.mvc#lesson/IDOR.lesson/1`\n\n**Source:** - webgoat-lessons/idor/src/main/java/org/owasp/webgoat/idor/IDORLogin.java\n\n**Lesson:**\n\nThis lesson is for assigning the current session to a user profile for subsequent lessons – it is not supposed to contain any vulnerabilities.\n\n```text\nwebgoat-lessons/idor/src/main/java/org/owasp/webgoat/idor/IDORLogin.java#L59-74\n\npublic AttackResult completed(@RequestParam String username, @RequestParam String password) {\n        initIDORInfo();\n        UserSessionData userSessionData = getUserSessionData();\n\n        if (idorUserInfo.containsKey(username)) {\n            if (\"tom\".equals(username) && idorUserInfo.get(\"tom\").get(\"password\").equals(password)) {\n                userSessionData.setValue(\"idor-authenticated-as\", username);\n                userSessionData.setValue(\"idor-authenticated-user-id\", idorUserInfo.get(username).get(\"id\"));\n                return success(this).feedback(\"idor.login.success\").feedbackArgs(username).build();\n            } else {\n                return failed(this).feedback(\"idor.login.failure\").build();\n            }\n        } else {\n            return failed(this).feedback(\"idor.login.failure\").build();\n        }\n    }\n```\n\n**Can SAST Find?** - Impossible\n\n**Can DAST Find?**\n- Impossible\n\n**SAST Reasoning:**\n\nThere is nothing to find as it's only adding server side session data.\n\n**DAST Reasoning:**\n\nThere is nothing to find as it's only adding server side session data.\n\n---\n\n### (A5) Broken Access Control > Insecure Direct Object References > Observing Differences & Behaviors\n\n**Link:** `http://localhost:8080/WebGoat/start.mvc#lesson/IDOR.lesson/2`\n\n**Source:** - webgoat-lessons/idor/src/main/java/org/owasp/webgoat/idor/IDORDiffAttributes.java\n\n**Lesson:**\n\nThis lesson demonstrates hidden authorization properties and does not contain any real flaws.\n\n```text\nwebgoat-lessons/idor/src/main/java/org/owasp/webgoat/idor/IDORDiffAttributes.java#L36-48\n\npublic AttackResult completed(@RequestParam String attributes) {\n    attributes = attributes.trim();\n    String[] diffAttribs = attributes.split(\",\");\n    if (diffAttribs.length \u003C 2) {\n        return failed(this).feedback(\"idor.diff.attributes.missing\").build();\n    }\n    if (diffAttribs[0].toLowerCase().trim().equals(\"userid\") && diffAttribs[1].toLowerCase().trim().equals(\"role\")\n            || diffAttribs[1].toLowerCase().trim().equals(\"userid\") && diffAttribs[0].toLowerCase().trim().equals(\"role\")) {\n        return success(this).feedback(\"idor.diff.success\").build();\n    } else {\n        return failed(this).feedback(\"idor.diff.failure\").build();\n    }\n}\n```\n\n**Can SAST Find?** - Impossible\n\n**Can DAST Find?**\n- Impossible\n\n**SAST Reasoning:**\n\nThere is nothing to find, as it's only doing a comparison between inputs and expected values.\n\n**DAST Reasoning:**\n\nThere is nothing to find, as it's only doing a comparison between inputs and expected values.\n\n---\n\n### (A5) Broken Access Control > Insecure Direct Object References > Guessing & Predicting Patterns\n\n**Link:** `http://localhost:8080/WebGoat/start.mvc#lesson/IDOR.lesson/3`\n\n**Source:** - webgoat-lessons/idor/src/main/java/org/owasp/webgoat/idor/IDORViewOwnProfileAltUrl.java\n\n**Lesson:**\n\nThis lesson demonstrates accessing your own profile by using a direct object reference (userid). This lesson requires that you are already logged in via the hypothetical login endpoint `/WebGoat/IDOR/login`.\n\n```text\nwebgoat-lessons/idor/src/main/java/org/owasp/webgoat/idor/IDORViewOwnProfileAltUrl.java#L42-62\n\npublic AttackResult completed(@RequestParam String url) {\n        try {\n            if (userSessionData.getValue(\"idor-authenticated-as\").equals(\"tom\")) {\n                //going to use session auth to view this one\n                String authUserId = (String) userSessionData.getValue(\"idor-authenticated-user-id\");\n                //don't care about `http://localhost:8080` ... just want WebGoat/\n                String[] urlParts = url.split(\"/\");\n                if (urlParts[0].equals(\"WebGoat\") && urlParts[1].equals(\"IDOR\") && urlParts[2].equals(\"profile\") && urlParts[3].equals(authUserId)) {\n                    UserProfile userProfile = new UserProfile(authUserId);\n                    return success(this).feedback(\"idor.view.own.profile.success\").output(userProfile.profileToMap().toString()).build();\n                } else {\n                    return failed(this).feedback(\"idor.view.own.profile.failure1\").build();\n                }\n\n            } else {\n                return failed(this).feedback(\"idor.view.own.profile.failure2\").build();\n            }\n        } catch (Exception ex) {\n            return failed(this).feedback(\"an error occurred with your request\").build();\n        }\n    }\n```\n\n**Can SAST Find?** - Impossible\n\n**Can DAST Find?**\n- Impossible\n\n**SAST Reasoning:**\n\nThere is nothing to find, as it's only doing a comparison between inputs and expected values.\n\n**DAST Reasoning:**\n\nThere is nothing to find, as it's only doing a comparison between inputs and expected values. Additionally, the DAST tool would need to be configured to treat the `/WebGoat/IDOR/login` page as a login form to be able to successfully set the additional server side session data. However, a DAST tool must already be configured to login to the `/WebGoat/` end point and most DAST tools don't support logging in multiple times to different endpoints for the same scan.\n\n---\n\n### (A5) Broken Access Control > Insecure Direct Object References > Playing with the Patterns\n\n**Link:** `http://localhost:8080/WebGoat/start.mvc#lesson/IDOR.lesson/4`\n\n**Source:** - webgoat-lessons/idor/src/main/java/org/owasp/webgoat/idor/IDORViewOtherProfile.java\n- webgoat-lessons/idor/src/main/java/org/owasp/webgoat/idor/IDOREditOtherProfiile.java\n\n**Lesson:**\n\nThis lesson demonstrates accessing a mock users profile by using a direct object reference (userid). This lesson requires that you are already logged in via the hypothetical login endpoint `/WebGoat/IDOR/login`.\n```text\nwebgoat-lessons/idor/src/main/java/org/owasp/webgoat/idor/IDORViewOtherProfile.java#L48-67\n\npublic AttackResult completed(@PathVariable(\"userId\") String userId, HttpServletResponse resp) {\n        Map\u003CString, Object> details = new HashMap\u003C>();\n\n        if (userSessionData.getValue(\"idor-authenticated-as\").equals(\"tom\")) {\n            //going to use session auth to view this one\n            String authUserId = (String) userSessionData.getValue(\"idor-authenticated-user-id\");\n            if (userId != null && !userId.equals(authUserId)) {\n                //on the right track\n                UserProfile requestedProfile = new UserProfile(userId);\n                // secure code would ensure there was a horizontal access control check prior to dishing up the requested profile\n                if (requestedProfile.getUserId().equals(\"2342388\")) {\n                    return success(this).feedback(\"idor.view.profile.success\").output(requestedProfile.profileToMap().toString()).build();\n                } else {\n                    return failed(this).feedback(\"idor.view.profile.close1\").build();\n                }\n            } else {\n                return failed(this).feedback(\"idor.view.profile.close2\").build();\n            }\n        }\n        return failed(this).build();\n\nwebgoat-lessons/idor/src/main/java/org/owasp/webgoat/idor/IDOREditOtherProfiile.java#L41-88\npublic AttackResult completed(@PathVariable(\"userId\") String userId, @RequestBody UserProfile userSubmittedProfile) {\n\n    String authUserId = (String) userSessionData.getValue(\"idor-authenticated-user-id\");\n    // this is where it starts ... accepting the user submitted ID and assuming it will be the same as the logged in userId and not checking for proper authorization\n    // Certain roles can sometimes edit others' profiles, but we shouldn't just assume that and let everyone, right?\n    // Except that this is a vulnerable app ... so we will\n    UserProfile currentUserProfile = new UserProfile(userId);\n    if (userSubmittedProfile.getUserId() != null && !userSubmittedProfile.getUserId().equals(authUserId)) {\n        // let's get this started ...\n        currentUserProfile.setColor(userSubmittedProfile.getColor());\n        currentUserProfile.setRole(userSubmittedProfile.getRole());\n        // we will persist in the session object for now in case we want to refer back or use it later\n        userSessionData.setValue(\"idor-updated-other-profile\", currentUserProfile);\n        if (currentUserProfile.getRole() \u003C= 1 && currentUserProfile.getColor().toLowerCase().equals(\"red\")) {\n            return success(this)\n                    .feedback(\"idor.edit.profile.success1\")\n                    .output(currentUserProfile.profileToMap().toString())\n                    .build();\n        }\n...\n```\n\n**Can SAST Find?** - Impossible\n\n**Can DAST Find?**\n- Improbable\n\n**SAST Reasoning:**\n\nSAST tools have difficulties determining authorization checks unless custom rule sets are configured.\n\n**DAST Reasoning:**\n\nIDOR-based attacks can be difficult for DAST tools to detect. The DAST tool would need to be configured to treat the `/WebGoat/IDOR/login` page as a login form to be able to successfully set the additional server side session data. After which it would somehow need to determine that the edit and view profile endpoint at `/WebGoat/IDOR/profile/{user}` should have the `{user}` field replaced with the userid of the same user, and then replaced as a different user to trigger the flaw.\n---\n\n\u003C/details>\n\n## (A7) Cross-Site Scripting (XSS)\n\n---\n\n\u003Cdetails>\n\u003Csummary markdown=\"span\">Findings\u003C/summary>\n\n### (A7) Cross-Site Scripting (XSS) > Cross Site Scripting > Try It! Reflected XSS\n\n**Link:** `http://localhost:8080/WebGoat/start.mvc#lesson/CrossSiteScripting.lesson/6`\n\n**Source:** - webgoat-lessons/cross-site-scripting/src/main/java/org/owasp/webgoat/xss/CrossSiteScriptingLesson5a.java\n- webgoat-container/src/main/resources/static/js/goatApp/view/LessonContentView.js\n**Lesson:**\n\nThis lesson demonstrates a self-reflected XSS vulnerability. The goal is to inject XSS into the `field1` parameter.\n\n```text\nwebgoat-lessons/cross-site-scripting/src/main/java/org/owasp/webgoat/xss/CrossSiteScriptingLesson5a.java#L56-79\n\ncart.append(\"Thank you for shopping at WebGoat. \u003Cbr />You're support is appreciated\u003Chr />\");\ncart.append(\"\u003Cp>We have charged credit card:\" + field1 + \"\u003Cbr />\");\ncart.append(\"                             ------------------- \u003Cbr />\");\ncart.append(\"                               $\" + totalSale);\n\n//init state\nif (userSessionData.getValue(\"xss-reflected1-complete\") == null) {\n    userSessionData.setValue(\"xss-reflected1-complete\", (Object) \"false\");\n}\n\nif (field1.toLowerCase().matches(\"\u003Cscript>.*(console\\\\.log\\\\(.*\\\\)|alert\\\\(.*\\\\))\u003C\\\\/script>\")) {\n    //return )\n    userSessionData.setValue(\"xss-reflected-5a-complete\", \"true\");\n    if (field1.toLowerCase().contains(\"console.log\")) {\n        return success(this).feedback(\"xss-reflected-5a-success-console\").output(cart.toString()).build();\n    } else {\n        return success(this).feedback(\"xss-reflected-5a-success-alert\").output(cart.toString()).build();\n    }\n} else {\n    userSessionData.setValue(\"xss-reflected1-complete\", \"false\");\n    return success(this)\n            .feedback(\"xss-reflected-5a-failure\")\n            .output(cart.toString())\n            .build();\n}\n...\n\nwebgoat-container/src/main/resources/static/js/goatApp/view/LessonContentView.js#L183-185\n\nrenderOutput: function (output) {\n    var s = this.removeSlashesFromJSON(output);\n    this.$curOutput.html(polyglot.t(s) || \"\");\n    ...\n```\n\n**Can SAST Find?** - Probable\n\n**Can DAST Find?**\n- Possible\n\n**SAST Reasoning:**\n\nThe `field1` parameter comes directly from user input and is output in the response on lines 70, 72 and 78. The user input is inserted into the cart `StringBuffer` on line 57. However the response for this endpoint is JSON and the reason this is exploitable is due to how the frontend renders the `output` JSON field in `LessonContentView.js`. A SAST tool would need to be able to scan JavaScript and possibly Java to detect this as a Cross-Site Scripting flaw.\n\n**DAST Reasoning:**\n\nThis is a straightforward XSS attack. A DAST tool would most likely attempt various XSS attack strings in each parameter value.\n\n**Example Attack:**\n- `/WebGoat/CrossSiteScripting/attack5a?QTY1=1&QTY2=1&QTY3=1&QTY4=1&field2=12345&field1=%3cimg%20src%3dx+onerror%3dalert(1)%3e`\n\n---\n\n### (A7) Cross-Site Scripting (XSS) > Cross Site Scripting > Identify potential for DOM-Based XSS\n\n**Link:** `http://localhost:8080/WebGoat/start.mvc#lesson/CrossSiteScripting.lesson/9`\n\n**Source:** - webgoat-lessons/cross-site-scripting/src/main/java/org/owasp/webgoat/xss/CrossSiteScriptingLesson6a.java\n\n**Lesson:**\n\nThis lesson does not contain any vulnerabilities. The goal is to simply identify that `start.mvc#test` is the hidden route.\n\n```text\nwebgoat-lessons/cross-site-scripting/src/main/java/org/owasp/webgoat/xss/CrossSiteScriptingLesson6a.java#L42-50\n\npublic AttackResult completed(@RequestParam String DOMTestRoute) {\n\n    if (DOMTestRoute.matches(\"start\\\\.mvc#test(\\\\/|)\")) {\n        //return )\n        return success(this).feedback(\"xss-reflected-6a-success\").build();\n    } else {\n        return failed(this).feedback(\"xss-reflected-6a-failure\").build();\n    }\n}\n```\n\n**Can SAST Find?** - Impossible\n\n**Can DAST Find?**\n- Impossible\n\n**SAST Reasoning:**\n\nThere is nothing to find, as it's only doing a comparison between inputs and expected values.\n\n**DAST Reasoning:**\n\nThere is nothing to find, as it's only doing a comparison between inputs and expected values.\n\n---\n\n### (A7) Cross-Site Scripting (XSS) > Cross Site Scripting > Try It! DOM-Based XSS\n\n**Link:** `http://localhost:8080/WebGoat/start.mvc#lesson/CrossSiteScripting.lesson/10`\n\n**Source:** - webgoat-container/src/main/resources/static/js/goatApp/view/GoatRouter.js\n- webgoat-container/src/main/resources/static/js/goatApp/controller/LessonController.js\n- webgoat-container/src/main/resources/static/js/goatApp/view/LessonContentView.js\n\n**Lesson:**\n\nThis lesson is a client side DOM-XSS vulnerability that exists in a different java project `webgoat-container`. The underlying vulnerability is in an insecure call to the `jQuery.html` method.\n\n```text\nwebgoat-container/src/main/resources/static/js/goatApp/view/GoatRouter.js#L46-117\n\nvar GoatAppRouter = Backbone.Router.extend({\n\n    routes: {\n        'welcome': 'welcomeRoute',\n        'lesson/:name': 'lessonRoute',\n        'lesson/:name/:pageNum': 'lessonPageRoute',\n        'test/:param': 'testRoute',\n        'reportCard': 'reportCard'\n    },\n...\ntestRoute: function (param) {\n            this.lessonController.testHandler(param);\n            //this.menuController.updateMenu(name);\n        },\n...\n\nwebgoat-container/src/main/resources/static/js/goatApp/controller/LessonController.js#156-159\n\nthis.testHandler = function(param) {\n    console.log('test handler');\n    this.lessonContentView.showTestParam(param);\n};\n...\n\nwebgoat-container/src/main/resources/static/js/goatApp/view/LessonContentView.js#L220-222\n\nshowTestParam: function (param) {\n    this.$el.find('.lesson-content').html('test:' + param);\n},\n...\n```\n\n**Can SAST Find?** - Possible\n\n**Can DAST Find?**\n- Improbable\n\n**SAST Reasoning:**\n\nA SAST tool that does intra-procedural taint tracking would need to have signatures for the Backbone javascript framework. It would need to follow taint down to the final vulnerability on line 221 of `LessonContentView.js`. A non-intra-procedural taint tracking SAST tool may simply look for any `html()` method calls and flag it as a potential sink for XSS.\n\n**DAST Reasoning:**\n\nA DAST tool would most likely need to have some form of SAST-like capabilities to know that the target application not only uses Backbone, but is able to extract the routes from the `Backbone.router`. It could then potentially attack all URL Fragment based route links. Since the `#test/` route is technically never referenced anywhere, it is unlikely that a DAST tool would be able to find this vulnerable route.\n\nAlso, since this is a client-side vulnerability, the DAST tool must be instrumenting a real browser, otherwise it would be nearly impossible to trigger the flaw since it is dynamically rewriting the DOM.\n\n**Example Attack:**\n- ``http://localhost:8080/WebGoat/start.mvc#test/%3Cimg%20src=x%20onerror=alert(1`)%3E`\n\n---\n\u003C/details>\n\n## (A8)  Insecure Deserialization\n\n---\n\n\u003Cdetails>\n\u003Csummary markdown=\"span\">Findings\u003C/summary>\n\n### (A8)  Insecure Deserialization > Insecure Deserialization > Let’s try\n\n**Link:** `http://localhost:8080/WebGoat/start.mvc#lesson/InsecureDeserialization.lesson/4`\n\n**Source:** - webgoat-lessons/insecure-deserialization/src/main/java/org/owasp/webgoat/deserialization/InsecureDeserializationTask.java\n- webgoat-lessons/insecure-deserialization/src/main/java/org/dummy/insecure/framework/VulnerableTaskHolder.java\n\n**Lesson:**\n\nThis lesson demonstrates how object deserialization attacks can be exploited to run arbitrary code. In particular this lesson deals with java deserialization attacks.\n\n```text\nwebgoat-lessons/insecure-deserialization/src/main/java/org/owasp/webgoat/deserialization/InsecureDeserializationTask.java#L54-56\n\ntry (ObjectInputStream ois = new ObjectInputStream(new ByteArrayInputStream(Base64.getDecoder().decode(b64token)))) {\n    before = System.currentTimeMillis();\n    Object o = ois.readObject();\n...\n\nwebgoat-lessons/insecure-deserialization/src/main/java/org/dummy/insecure/framework/VulnerableTaskHolder.java#L38-59\n\nprivate void readObject( ObjectInputStream stream ) throws Exception {\n    //unserialize data so taskName and taskAction are available\n    stream.defaultReadObject();\n\n    //do something with the data\n    log.info(\"restoring task: {}\", taskName);\n    log.info(\"restoring time: {}\", requestedExecutionTime);\n\n    if (requestedExecutionTime!=null &&             (requestedExecutionTime.isBefore(LocalDateTime.now().minusMinutes(10))\n            || requestedExecutionTime.isAfter(LocalDateTime.now()))) {\n        //do nothing is the time is not within 10 minutes after the object has been created\n        log.debug(this.toString());\n        throw new IllegalArgumentException(\"outdated\");\n    }\n\n    //condition is here to prevent you from destroying the goat altogether\n    if ((taskAction.startsWith(\"sleep\")||taskAction.startsWith(\"ping\"))\n            && taskAction.length() \u003C 22) {\n    log.info(\"about to execute: {}\", taskAction);\n    try {\n        Process p = Runtime.getRuntime().exec(taskAction);\n...\n```\n\n**Can SAST Find?** - Possible\n\n**Can DAST Find?**\n- Impossible\n\n**SAST Reasoning:**\n\nA SAST tool should be able to identify the `Object o = ois.readObject();` call on line 56 of `InsecureDeserializationTask.java` and flag as a potential Deserialization issue. SAST tools would most likely also flag the `Runetime.getRuntime().exec(taskAction)` call on line 59 as a potential for OS command injection.\n\n**DAST Reasoning:**\n\nDAST tools usually work off of intercepting requests and analyzing parameter values to determine what to inject. The `/WebGoat/InsecureDeserialization/task` endpoint is never triggered with a valid object, only a reference to what is expected exists in the HTML output. Due to this, there is no way for a DAST tool to know that this endpoint expects a serialized java object, and hence would not be able to attack it.\n---\n\n\u003C/details>\n\n## (A9) Vulnerable Components\n\n---\n\n\u003Cdetails>\n\u003Csummary markdown=\"span\">Findings\u003C/summary>\n\n### (A9) Vulnerable Components > Vulnerable Components > The exploit is not always in \"your\" code\n\n**Link:** `http://localhost:8080/WebGoat/start.mvc#lesson/VulnerableComponents.lesson/4`\n\n**Source:** - webgoat-lessons/vulnerable-components/src/main/resources/html/VulnerableComponents.html\n\n**Lesson:**\n\nThis lesson demonstrates a vulnerable and non-vulnerable version of jquery-ui. The attack is built in to the source HTML form.\n```text\nL45-57\n        \u003Ctd>\u003Cinput id=\"closetext\" value=\"OK\u003Cscript>alert('XSS')\u003C/script>\" type=\"TEXT\" />\u003Cinput\n            name=\"SUBMIT\" value=\"Go!\" type=\"SUBMIT\" onclick=\"webgoat.customjs.vuln_jquery_ui()\" />\u003C/td>\n        \u003Ctd>\u003C/td>\n    \u003C/tr>\n\u003C/table>\n\u003Cscript th:inline=\"javascript\">\n/*\u003C![CDATA[*/\nwebgoat.customjs.vuln_jquery_ui = function()\n{\n    webgoat.customjs.jqueryVuln('#dialog').dialog({ closeText: webgoat.customjs.jquery('#closetext').val() });\n};\n/*]]>*/\n    \u003C/script>\n```\n\n**Can SAST Find?** - Possible\n\n**Can DAST Find?**\n- Possible\n\n**SAST Reasoning:**\n\nMost likely the SAST tool would *not* trigger on the exact line, but would be used in combination with a dependency scanning tool to identify the outdated version of jquery-ui.\n\n**DAST Reasoning:**\n\nA DAST tool would most likely click the form submission and inject it's own XSS value to trigger the flaw.\n\n**Example Attack:**\n- `OK\u003Cscript>alert('XSS')\u003C/script>`\n\n---\n\n### (A9) Vulnerable Components > Vulnerable Components > Exploiting CVE-2013-7285 (XStream)\n\n**Link:** `http://localhost:8080/WebGoat/start.mvc#lesson/VulnerableComponents.lesson/11`\n\n**Source:** - webgoat-lessons/vulnerable-components/src/main/java/org/owasp/webgoat/vulnerable_components/VulnerableComponentsLesson.java\n\n**Lesson:**\n\nThis lesson demonstrates a vulnerable version of `Xstream` that allows for XXE attacks. \n```text\nwebgoat-lessons/vulnerable-components/src/main/java/org/owasp/webgoat/vulnerable_components/VulnerableComponentsLesson.java#L37-68\n\nAttackResult completed(@RequestParam String payload) {\n        XStream xstream = new XStream(new DomDriver());\n        xstream.setClassLoader(Contact.class.getClassLoader());\n\n        xstream.processAnnotations(Contact.class);\n...\n\n        try {\n//        \tSystem.out.println(\"Payload:\" + payload);\n            Contact expl = (Contact) xstream.fromXML(payload);\n```\n\n**Can SAST Find?** - Possible\n\n**Can DAST Find?**\n- Possible\n\n**SAST Reasoning:**\n\nMost likely the SAST tool would *not* trigger on the exact line, but would be used in combination with a dependency scanning tool to identify the vulnerable `Xstream` component. It may also model the `Xstream` library to determine if XXE injection attacks are possible.\n\n**DAST Reasoning:**\n\nA DAST tool may not attempt XML attacks since the form gives no hint that the expected form should POST as XML; the default content-type is `application/x-www-form-urlencoded; charset=UTF-8` with the parameter name of `payload`. However some DAST tools may attempt XXE attacks in all parameter value types, regardless of content-type.\n\n**Example Attack:** - `payload=\u003C?xml version=\"1.0\"?>\u003C!DOCTYPE text [\u003C!ENTITY xxe SYSTEM \"http://192.168.2.249:9090/test\">]>\u003Ccomment>\u003Ctext>&xxe;\u003C/text>\u003C/comment>`\n\n---\n\n\u003C/details>\n\n## (A8:2013) Request Forgeries\n\n---\n\n\u003Cdetails>\n\u003Csummary markdown=\"span\">Findings\u003C/summary>\n\n### (A8:2013) Request Forgeries > Cross-Site Request Forgeries > Basic Get CSRF Exercise\n\n**Link:** `http://localhost:8080/WebGoat/start.mvc#lesson/CSRF.lesson/2`\n\n**Source:** - webgoat-lessons/csrf/src/main/java/org/owasp/webgoat/csrf/CSRFConfirmFlag1.java\n- webgoat-lessons/csrf/src/main/java/org/owasp/webgoat/csrf/CSRFGetFlag.java\n- webgoat-container/src/main/java/org/owasp/webgoat/WebSecurityConfig.java\n\n**Lesson:**\n\nThis lesson demonstrates exploiting a form that is not protected by anti-CSRF measures.\n\n```text\nwebgoat-lessons/csrf/src/main/java/org/owasp/webgoat/csrf/CSRFGetFlag.java#L49-51\n\n@RequestMapping(path = \"/csrf/basic-get-flag\", produces = {\"application/json\"}, method = RequestMethod.POST)\n@ResponseBody\npublic Map\u003CString, Object> invoke(HttpServletRequest req) {\n    ...\n\nwebgoat-lessons/csrf/src/main/java/org/owasp/webgoat/csrf/CSRFConfirmFlag1.java#L45-47\n\n@PostMapping(path = \"/csrf/confirm-flag-1\", produces = {\"application/json\"})\n@ResponseBody\npublic AttackResult completed(String confirmFlagVal) {\n...\n\nwebgoat-container/src/main/java/org/owasp/webgoat/WebSecurityConfig.java#L72\n    ...\n    security.and().csrf().disable();\n    ...\n```\n\n**Can SAST Find?** - Possible\n\n**Can DAST Find?**\n- Possible\n\n**SAST Reasoning:**\n\nProvided the target web framework has been modeled, it should contain signatures to determine that the service has been configured with anti-CSRF protections enabled. Depending on the framework, it may also look at each individual request mapping to determine vulnerability. In this case the `WebSecurityConfig.java` explicitly disabled CSRF protections.\n**DAST Reasoning:**\n\nDAST tools usually look at the `\u003Cform>` tag definition and try to identify any \"CSRF like\" tokens exist in parameters. Some DAST tools may also inspect the request itself to identify anti-CSRF tokens. Most DAST tools will likely flag both the `/WebGoat/csrf/basic-get-flag` and `/WebGoat/csrf/confirm-flag-1` as being vulnerable.\n\n---\n\n### (A8:2013) Request Forgeries > Cross-Site Request Forgeries > Post a review on someone else’s behalf\n\n**Link:** `http://localhost:8080/WebGoat/start.mvc#lesson/CSRF.lesson/3`\n\n**Source:** - webgoat-lessons/csrf/src/main/java/org/owasp/webgoat/csrf/ForgedReviews.java\n- webgoat-container/src/main/java/org/owasp/webgoat/WebSecurityConfig.java\n\n**Lesson:**\n\nThis lesson demonstrates exploiting a form that includes a weak form of anti-CSRF measures, as the CSRF token is a hardcoded value.\n```text\nwebgoat-lessons/csrf/src/main/java/org/owasp/webgoat/csrf/ForgedReviews.java#L78-102\n\npublic AttackResult createNewReview(String reviewText, Integer stars, String validateReq, HttpServletRequest request) {\n    final String host = (request.getHeader(\"host\") == null) ? \"NULL\" : request.getHeader(\"host\");\n    final String referer = (request.getHeader(\"referer\") == null) ? \"NULL\" : request.getHeader(\"referer\");\n    final String[] refererArr = referer.split(\"/\");\n\n    Review review = new Review();\n    review.setText(reviewText);\n    review.setDateTime(DateTime.now().toString(fmt));\n    review.setUser(webSession.getUserName());\n    review.setStars(stars);\n    var reviews = userReviews.getOrDefault(webSession.getUserName(), new ArrayList\u003C>());\n    reviews.add(review);\n    userReviews.put(webSession.getUserName(), reviews);\n    //short-circuit\n    if (validateReq == null || !validateReq.equals(weakAntiCSRF)) {\n        return failed(this).feedback(\"csrf-you-forgot-something\").build();\n    }\n    //we have the spoofed files\n    if (referer != \"NULL\" && refererArr[2].equals(host)) {\n        return failed(this).feedback(\"csrf-same-host\").build();\n    } else {\n        return success(this).feedback(\"csrf-review.success\").build(); //feedback(\"xss-stored-comment-failure\")\n    }\n}\n\nwebgoat-container/src/main/java/org/owasp/webgoat/WebSecurityConfig.java#L72\n    ...\n    security.and().csrf().disable();\n    ...\n```\n\n**Can SAST Find?** - Possible\n\n**Can DAST Find?**\n- Probable\n\n**SAST Reasoning:**\n\nProvided the target web framework has been modeled it should contain signatures to determine that the service has been configured with anti-CSRF protections enabled. Depending on the framework it may also look at each individual request mapping to determine vulnerability. In this case the `WebSecurityConfig.java` explicitly disabled CSRF protections. Most likely a SAST tool will completely ignore the hard coded value check.\n\n**DAST Reasoning:**\n\nDAST tools usually look at the `\u003Cform>` tag definition and try to identify any \"CSRF like\" tokens exist in parameters. Some DAST tools may also inspect the request itself to identify anti-CSRF tokens. In this case a DAST tool may be confused by the seemingly configured CSRF token, when in reality the value is hard coded. A DAST tool will need to do an active request and compare the results to see if the CSRF token is ever updated/changed.\n\n---\n\n### (A8:2013) Request Forgeries > Cross-Site Request Forgeries > CSRF and content-type\n\n**Link:** `http://localhost:8080/WebGoat/start.mvc#lesson/CSRF.lesson/6`\n\n**Source:** - webgoat-lessons/csrf/src/main/java/org/owasp/webgoat/csrf/CSRFFeedback.java\n- webgoat-container/src/main/java/org/owasp/webgoat/WebSecurityConfig.java\n\n**Lesson:**\n\nThis lesson demonstrates exploiting a CSRF vulnerable form that calls an endpoint which doesn't validate the content-type properly. Newer browsers will append a `=` to the end of `text/plain` forms where only the name value exists. This form is still vulnerable to CSRF if attackers use `XMLHttpRequest` or `navigator.sendBeacon`.\n\n```text\nwebgoat-lessons/csrf/src/main/java/org/owasp/webgoat/csrf/CSRFFeedback.java#L57-74\n\npublic AttackResult completed(HttpServletRequest request, @RequestBody String feedback) {\n        try {\n            objectMapper.enable(DeserializationFeature.FAIL_ON_IGNORED_PROPERTIES);\n            objectMapper.enable(DeserializationFeature.FAIL_ON_NULL_FOR_PRIMITIVES);\n            objectMapper.enable(DeserializationFeature.FAIL_ON_NUMBERS_FOR_ENUMS);\n            objectMapper.enable(DeserializationFeature.FAIL_ON_READING_DUP_TREE_KEY);\n            objectMapper.enable(DeserializationFeature.FAIL_ON_MISSING_CREATOR_PROPERTIES);\n            objectMapper.enable(DeserializationFeature.FAIL_ON_TRAILING_TOKENS);\n            objectMapper.readValue(feedback.getBytes(), Map.class);\n        } catch (IOException e) {\n            return failed(this).feedback(ExceptionUtils.getStackTrace(e)).build();\n        }\n        boolean correctCSRF = requestContainsWebGoatCookie(request.getCookies()) && request.getContentType().contains(MediaType.TEXT_PLAIN_VALUE);\n        correctCSRF &= hostOrRefererDifferentHost(request);\n        if (correctCSRF) {\n            String flag = UUID.randomUUID().toString();\n            userSessionData.setValue(\"csrf-feedback\", flag);\n            return success(this).feedback(\"csrf-feedback-success\").feedbackArgs(flag).build();\n    ...\n\nwebgoat-container/src/main/java/org/owasp/webgoat/WebSecurityConfig.java#L72\n    ...\n    security.and().csrf().disable();\n    ...\n```\n\n**Can SAST Find?** - Possible\n\n**Can DAST Find?**\n- Possible\n\n**SAST Reasoning:**\n\nProvided the target web framework has been modeled it should contain signatures to determine that the service has been configured with anti-CSRF protections enabled. Depending on the framework it may also look at each individual request mapping to determine vulnerability. In this case the `WebSecurityConfig.java` explicitly disabled CSRF protections.\n**DAST Reasoning:**\n\nDAST tools usually look at the `\u003Cform>` tag definition and try to identify any \"CSRF like\" tokens exist in parameters. Some DAST tools may also inspect the request itself to identify anti-CSRF tokens. In this case a DAST tool would treat this form the same as any other and flag it as vulnerable to CSRF regardless of content-type.\n\n---\n\n### (A8:2013) Request Forgeries > Cross-Site Request Forgeries > Login CSRF attack\n\n**Link:** `http://localhost:8080/WebGoat/start.mvc#lesson/CSRF.lesson/7`\n\n**Source:** - webgoat-lessons/csrf/src/main/java/org/owasp/webgoat/csrf/CSRFLogin.java\n- webgoat-container/src/main/java/org/owasp/webgoat/WebSecurityConfig.java\n\n**Lesson:**\n\nThis lesson demonstrates exploiting a CSRF vulnerable form to force a victim to login under the attackers account.\n\n```text\nwebgoat-lessons/csrf/src/main/java/org/owasp/webgoat/csrf/CSRFLogin.java#50-57\n\npublic AttackResult completed(HttpServletRequest request) {\n    String userName = request.getUserPrincipal().getName();\n    if (userName.startsWith(\"csrf\")) {\n        markAssignmentSolvedWithRealUser(userName.substring(\"csrf-\".length()));\n        return success(this).feedback(\"csrf-login-success\").build();\n    }\n    return failed(this).feedback(\"csrf-login-failed\").feedbackArgs(userName).build();\n}\n\nwebgoat-container/src/main/java/org/owasp/webgoat/WebSecurityConfig.java#L72\n    ...\n    security.and().csrf().disable();\n    ...\n```\n\n**Can SAST Find?** - Possible\n\n**Can DAST Find?**\n- Possible\n\n**SAST Reasoning:**\n\nProvided the target web framework has been modeled it should contain signatures to determine that the service has been configured with anti-CSRF protections enabled. Depending on the framework it may also look at each individual request mapping to determine vulnerability. In this case the `WebSecurityConfig.java` explicitly disabled CSRF protections.\n**DAST Reasoning:**\n\nDAST tools usually look at the `\u003Cform>` tag definition and try to identify any \"CSRF like\" tokens exist in parameters. Some DAST tools may also inspect the request itself to identify anti-CSRF tokens. In this case a DAST tool would treat this form the same as any other and flag it as vulnerable to CSRF.\n\n---\n\n### (A8:2013) Request Forgeries > Server-Side Request Forgery > Change the URL to display Jerry\n\n**Link:** `http://localhost:8080/WebGoat/start.mvc#lesson/SSRF.lesson/1`\n\n**Source:** - webgoat-lessons/ssrf/src/main/java/org/owasp/webgoat/ssrf/SSRFTask1.java\n\n**Lesson:**\n\nThis lesson does not contain a real vulnerability, it is only for demonstration purposes for modifying parameters.\n\n```text\nwebgoat-lessons/ssrf/src/main/java/org/owasp/webgoat/ssrf/SSRFTask1.java#44-66\n\nprotected AttackResult stealTheCheese(String url) {\n    try {\n        StringBuffer html = new StringBuffer();\n\n        if (url.matches(\"images/tom.png\")) {\n            html.append(\"\u003Cimg class=\\\"image\\\" alt=\\\"Tom\\\" src=\\\"images/tom.png\\\" width=\\\"25%\\\" height=\\\"25%\\\">\");\n            return failed(this)\n                    .feedback(\"ssrf.tom\")\n                    .output(html.toString())\n                    .build();\n        } else if (url.matches(\"images/jerry.png\")) {\n            html.append(\"\u003Cimg class=\\\"image\\\" alt=\\\"Jerry\\\" src=\\\"images/jerry.png\\\" width=\\\"25%\\\" height=\\\"25%\\\">\");\n            return success(this)\n                    .feedback(\"ssrf.success\")\n                    .output(html.toString())\n                    .build();\n        } else {\n            html.append(\"\u003Cimg class=\\\"image\\\" alt=\\\"Silly Cat\\\" src=\\\"images/cat.jpg\\\">\");\n            return failed(this)\n                    .feedback(\"ssrf.failure\")\n                    .output(html.toString())\n                    .build();\n        }\n```\n\n**Can SAST Find?** - Impossible\n\n**Can DAST Find?**\n- Impossible\n\n**SAST Reasoning:**\n\nThis endpoint does not contain any SSRF issues, it simply does a string match and returns different results.\n\n**DAST Reasoning:**\n\nThis endpoint does not contain any SSRF issues.\n\n---\n\n### (A8:2013) Request Forgeries > Server-Side Request Forgery >\n**Link:** `http://localhost:8080/WebGoat/start.mvc#lesson/SSRF.lesson/2`\n\n**Source:** - webgoat-lessons/ssrf/src/main/java/org/owasp/webgoat/ssrf/SSRFTask2.java\n\n**Lesson:**\n\nThis lesson is for exploiting SSRF but limits the user to a single URL that must exactly match `http://ifconfig.pro`.\n\n```text\nwebgoat-lessons/ssrf/src/main/java/org/owasp/webgoat/ssrf/SSRFTask2.java#L49-74\n\nprotected AttackResult furBall(String url) {\n        try {\n            StringBuffer html = new StringBuffer();\n\n            if (url.matches(\"http://ifconfig.pro\")) {\n                URL u = new URL(url);\n                URLConnection urlConnection = u.openConnection();\n                BufferedReader in = new BufferedReader(new InputStreamReader(urlConnection.getInputStream()));\n                String inputLine;\n\n                while ((inputLine = in.readLine()) != null) {\n                    html.append(inputLine);\n                }\n                in.close();\n\n                return success(this)\n                        .feedback(\"ssrf.success\")\n                        .output(html.toString())\n                        .build();\n            } else {\n                html.append(\"\u003Cimg class=\\\"image\\\" alt=\\\"image post\\\" src=\\\"images/cat.jpg\\\">\");\n                return failed(this)\n                        .feedback(\"ssrf.failure\")\n                        .output(html.toString())\n                        .build();\n            }\n\n```\n\n**Can SAST Find?** - Possible\n\n**Can DAST Find?**\n- Impossible\n\n**SAST Reasoning:**\n\nA SAST tool may report that this endpoint is vulnerable due to the user provided `url` parameter being used in a `URLConnection.openConnection()` call. In reality, this is not an exploitable flaw since the URL must exactly match `http://ifconfig.pro`\n\n**DAST Reasoning:**\n\nA DAST tool attempting SSRF injection attacks will most likely use a callback server to receive a forced request from the target application. Since the value is technically hardcoded, there is no way for a DAST tool to know if the endpoint is using a user provided value in construction of the `URLConnection.openConnection()` call.\n\n---\n\u003C/details>\n\n## Client side\n\n---\n\nThese lessons are just demonstrations of bypassing client side restrictions – since there is no real business logic to exploit they do not contain any real exploitable flaws.\n---\n\n## Challenges\n\n---\n\n\u003Cdetails>\n\u003Csummary markdown=\"span\">Findings\u003C/summary>\n\n### Challenges > Admin lost password\n\n**Link:** `http://localhost:8080/WebGoat/start.mvc#lesson/Challenge1.lesson/1`\n\n**Source:** - webgoat-lessons/challenge/src/main/java/org/owasp/webgoat/challenges/challenge1/Assignment1.java\n- webgoat-lessons/challenge/src/main/java/org/owasp/webgoat/challenges/challenge1/ImageServlet.java\n- webgoat-lessons/challenge/src/main/java/org/owasp/webgoat/challenges/SolutionConstants.java\n\n**Challenge:**\n\nThe purpose of this challenge is to find the hidden pin code embedded in the logo and replace the hardcoded password's 1234 with the value.\n```text\n\nwebgoat-lessons/challenge/src/main/java/org/owasp/webgoat/challenges/challenge1/ImageServlet.java#L23-37\n\nprotected void doGet(HttpServletRequest request, HttpServletResponse response)\n        throws ServletException, IOException {\n\n    byte[] in = new ClassPathResource(\"images/webgoat2.png\").getInputStream().readAllBytes();\n\n    String pincode = String.format(\"%04d\", PINCODE);\n\n    in[81216]=(byte) pincode.charAt(0);\n    in[81217]=(byte) pincode.charAt(1);\n    in[81218]=(byte) pincode.charAt(2);\n    in[81219]=(byte) pincode.charAt(3);\n\n    response.setContentType(MediaType.IMAGE_PNG_VALUE);\n    FileCopyUtils.copy(in, response.getOutputStream());\n}\n\nwebgoat-lessons/challenge/src/main/java/org/owasp/webgoat/challenges/SolutionConstants.java#L34-36\n\nString PASSWORD = \"!!webgoat_admin_1234!!\";\nString PASSWORD_TOM = \"thisisasecretfortomonly\";\nString ADMIN_PASSWORD_LINK = \"375afe1104f4a487a73823c50a9292a2\";\n```\n\n**Can SAST Find?** - Possible (different issue)\n\n**Can DAST Find?**\n- Impossible\n\n**SAST Reasoning:**\n\nThere is no real vulnerability here for a SAST tool to alert on that would match the purpose of the assignment. However, SAST tools will most likely flag hardcoded credentials in `SolutionConstants.java`.\n\n**DAST Reasoning:**\n\nThere is no real vulnerability here for a DAST tool to alert on that would match the purpose of the assignment.\n---\n\n### Challenges > Without password\n\n**Link:** `http://localhost:8080/WebGoat/start.mvc#lesson/Challenge5.lesson`\n\n**Source:** - webgoat-lessons/challenge/src/main/java/org/owasp/webgoat/challenges/challenge5/Assignment5.java\n\n**Challenge:**\n\nThe purpose of this challenge is to login as `Larry` without knowing his password. This can be achieved by exploiting a SQL Injection vulnerability.\n```text\n\nwebgoat-lessons/challenge/src/main/java/org/owasp/webgoat/challenges/challenge5/Assignment5.java#L51-68\n\npublic AttackResult login(@RequestParam String username_login, @RequestParam String password_login) throws Exception {\n        if (!StringUtils.hasText(username_login) || !StringUtils.hasText(password_login)) {\n            return failed(this).feedback(\"required4\").build();\n        }\n        if (!\"Larry\".equals(username_login)) {\n            return failed(this).feedback(\"user.not.larry\").feedbackArgs(username_login).build();\n        }\n        try (var connection = dataSource.getConnection()) {\n            PreparedStatement statement = connection.prepareStatement(\"select password from challenge_users where userid = '\" + username_login + \"' and password = '\" + password_login + \"'\");\n            ResultSet resultSet = statement.executeQuery();\n\n            if (resultSet.next()) {\n                return success(this).feedback(\"challenge.solved\").feedbackArgs(Flag.FLAGS.get(5)).build();\n            } else {\n                return failed(this).feedback(\"challenge.close\").build();\n            }\n        }\n    }\n```\n\n**Can SAST Find?** - Possible\n\n**Can DAST Find?**\n- Improbable\n\n**SAST Reasoning:**\n\nWhile the SQL query is a prepared statement, `username_login` and `password_login` fields are dynamically inserted into the query statement. A SAST tool should identify that the query string is concatenated with user input on line 59.\n\n**DAST Reasoning:**\n\nA DAST tool would most likely not find this vulnerability due to the username being checked against the hardcoded `Larry` value. A DAST tool would need to be configured for this particular page to use the `Larry` username, and then attempt SQL Injection.\n\n---\n\n### Challenges > Admin password reset\n\n**Link:** `http://localhost:8080/WebGoat/start.mvc#lesson/Challenge7.lesson`\n\n**Source:** - webgoat-lessons/challenge/src/main/java/org/owasp/webgoat/challenges/challenge7/Assignment7.java\n\n**Challenge:**\n\nThe purpose of this challenge is to find the synthetic `.git` repository accessible at the `/WebGoat/challenge/7/.git` endpoint. Then extract the git files, decompile classes and run them to generate the password reset link password.\n```text\nwebgoat-lessons/challenge/src/main/java/org/owasp/webgoat/challenges/challenge7/Assignment7.java#L76-80\n\n@GetMapping(value = \"/challenge/7/.git\", produces = MediaType.APPLICATION_OCTET_STREAM_VALUE)\n@ResponseBody\npublic ClassPathResource git() {\n    return new ClassPathResource(\"challenge7/git.zip\");\n}\n\nwebgoat-lessons/challenge/src/main/java/org/owasp/webgoat/challenges/SolutionConstants.java#L34-36\n\nString PASSWORD = \"!!webgoat_admin_1234!!\";\nString PASSWORD_TOM = \"thisisasecretfortomonly\";\nString ADMIN_PASSWORD_LINK = \"375afe1104f4a487a73823c50a9292a2\";\n```\n\n**Can SAST Find?** - Possible (different issue)\n\n**Can DAST Find?**\n- Possible (different issue)\n\n**SAST Reasoning:**\n\nThis is a fake vulnerability that hard codes a git index file to a spring `GetMapping` endpoint. However, a SAST tool would most likely flag the hardcoded credentials in `SolutionConstants.java` on line 36.\n\n**DAST Reasoning:**\n\nDAST tools commonly look for backup or known files, `.git` is usually ne of them. A DAST tool would attempt to find these files in each directory path and should report that the `/WebGoat/challenge/7/.git` git index is accessible. While it may attempt to decompile classes it would be unable to know that it's necessary to run a particular file.\n\n---\n\n### Challenges > Without account\n\n**Link:** `http://localhost:8080/WebGoat/start.mvc#lesson/Challenge8.lesson`\n\n**Source:** - webgoat-lessons/challenge/src/main/java/org/owasp/webgoat/challenges/challenge8/Assignment8.java\n\n**Challenge:**\n\nThe purpose of this challenge is to add a vote without logging in. This is a synthetic vulnerability due to the fact that it only checks if the request is a `GET` request but there's no real authorization checks. It is \"exploitable\" because it does not account for `HEAD` request method types.\n\n```text\n\nwebgoat-lessons/challenge/src/main/java/org/owasp/webgoat/challenges/challenge7/Assignment7.java#L76-80\n\n@GetMapping(value = \"/challenge/8/vote/{stars}\", produces = MediaType.APPLICATION_JSON_VALUE)\n    @ResponseBody\n    public ResponseEntity\u003C?> vote(@PathVariable(value = \"stars\") int nrOfStars, HttpServletRequest request) {\n        //Simple implementation of VERB Based Authentication\n        String msg = \"\";\n        if (request.getMethod().equals(\"GET\")) {\n            var json = Map.of(\"error\", true, \"message\", \"Sorry but you need to login first in order to vote\");\n            return ResponseEntity.status(200).body(json);\n        }\n        Integer allVotesForStar = votes.getOrDefault(nrOfStars, 0);\n        votes.put(nrOfStars, allVotesForStar + 1);\n        return ResponseEntity.ok().header(\"X-Flag\", \"Thanks for voting, your flag is: \" + Flag.FLAGS.get(8)).build();\n    }\n```\n\n**Can SAST Find?** - Impossible\n\n**Can DAST Find?**\n- Improbable\n\n**SAST Reasoning:**\n\nSince this is a synthetic vulnerability with no references to any authorization frameworks, there is nothing for a SAST tool to look for.\n\n**DAST Reasoning:**\n\nA DAST tool may attempt to switch request method types and do differential analysis to see if a `HEAD` request illicit a different response than a `GET` request.\n\n---\n\n\u003C/details>\n\n## Flaws outside of lessons\n\nThere are a large number of flaws that are not necessarily part of the lesson. However, SAST and DAST tools may still report on these issues as they are exploitable.\nSince tools will report on these issues, it is important to have a full set of all actual vulnerabilities that exist in WebGoat, or in any system used for benchmarking.\n## Conclusion\n\nWhile in GitLab's proprietary format, we decided to release our results so that other organizations using WebGoat as a target can identify which flaws are legitimate for both [SAST](https://gitlab.com/gitlab-org/vulnerability-research/blog/-/blob/master/security-benchmarking-webgoat/webgoat-expected-sast-results.json) and [DAST](https://gitlab.com/gitlab-org/vulnerability-research/blog/-/blob/master/security-benchmarking-webgoat/webgoat-expected-dast-results.json) based discovery.\nWebGoat is an excellent tool for learning about web application security. If your organization decides to use it to compare DAST and SAST tools you must be aware of the limitations and caveats during your analysis.\nWebGoat is by no means a \"real application\", while it does contain a common structure of a Spring Boot based application, its flaws are sometimes synthetic and code flow is not indicative of how real applications are built.\n\nGitLab recommends using more than one application as apart of your benchmarking process. 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Define criteria based on file path, directory, or vulnerability identifier (CVE, CWE), choose a dismissal reason, and let GitLab handle the rest.\n\n## Why auto-dismiss?\nAuto-dismiss vulnerability policies enable security teams to:\n- **Eliminate triage noise**: Automatically dismiss findings in test code, vendored dependencies, and generated files.\n- **Enforce decisions at scale**: Apply policies centrally to dismiss known false positives across your entire organization.\n- **Maintain audit transparency**: Every auto-dismissed finding includes a documented reason and links back to the policy that triggered it.\n- **Preserve the record**: Unlike scanner exclusions, dismissed vulnerabilities remain in your report, so you can revisit decisions if conditions change.\n\n## How auto-dismiss policies work\n\n1. **Define your policy** in a vulnerability management policy YAML file. Specify match criteria (file path, directory, or identifier) and a dismissal reason.\n\n2. **Merge and activate.** Create the policy via **Secure > Policies > New  policy > Vulnerability management policy**. Merge the MR to enable it.\n3. **Run your pipeline.** On every default-branch pipeline, matching vulnerabilities are automatically set to \"Dismissed\" with the specified reason. Up to 1,000 vulnerabilities are processed per run.\n4. **Measure the impact.** Filter your vulnerability report by status \"Dismissed\" to see exactly what was cleaned up and validate that the right findings are being handled.\n\n## Use cases with ready-to-use configurations\n\nEach example below includes a policy configuration you can copy, customize, and apply immediately.\n\n### 1. Dismiss test code vulnerabilities\n\nSAST and dependency scanners flag hardcoded credentials, insecure fixtures, and dev-only dependencies in test directories. These are not production risks.\n\n```yaml\nvulnerability_management_policy:\n  - name: \"Dismiss test code vulnerabilities\"\n    description: \"Auto-dismiss findings in test directories\"\n    enabled: true\n    rules:\n      - type: detected\n        criteria:\n          - type: file_path\n            value: \"test/**/*\"\n      - type: detected\n        criteria:\n          - type: file_path\n            value: \"tests/**/*\"\n      - type: detected\n        criteria:\n          - type: file_path\n            value: \"spec/**/*\"\n      - type: detected\n        criteria:\n          - type: directory\n            value: \"__tests__/*\"\n    actions:\n      - type: auto_dismiss\n        dismissal_reason: used_in_tests\n\n```\n\n### 2. Dismiss vendored and third-party code\n\nVulnerabilities in `vendor/`, `third_party/`, or checked-in `node_modules` are managed upstream and not actionable for your team.\n\n```yaml\nvulnerability_management_policy:\n  - name: \"Dismiss vendored dependency findings\"\n    description: \"Findings in vendored code are managed upstream\"\n    enabled: true\n    rules:\n      - type: detected\n        criteria:\n          - type: directory\n            value: \"vendor/*\"\n      - type: detected\n        criteria:\n          - type: directory\n            value: \"third_party/*\"\n      - type: detected\n        criteria:\n          - type: directory\n            value: \"vendored/*\"\n    actions:\n      - type: auto_dismiss\n        dismissal_reason: not_applicable\n\n```\n\n### 3. Dismiss known false positive CVEs\n\nCertain CVEs are repeatedly flagged but don't apply to your usage context. Teams dismiss these manually every time they appear. Replace the example CVEs below with your own.\n\n```yaml\nvulnerability_management_policy:\n  - name: \"Dismiss known false positive CVEs\"\n    description: \"CVEs confirmed as false positives for our environment\"\n    enabled: true\n    rules:\n      - type: detected\n        criteria:\n          - type: identifier\n            value: \"CVE-2023-44487\"\n      - type: detected\n        criteria:\n          - type: identifier\n            value: \"CVE-2024-29041\"\n      - type: detected\n        criteria:\n          - type: identifier\n            value: \"CVE-2023-26136\"\n    actions:\n      - type: auto_dismiss\n        dismissal_reason: false_positive\n\n```\n\n### 4. Dismiss generated and auto-created code\n\nProtobuf, gRPC, OpenAPI generators, and ORM scaffolding tools produce files with flagged patterns that cannot be patched by your team.\n\n```yaml\nvulnerability_management_policy:\n  - name: \"Dismiss generated code findings\"\n    description: \"Generated files are not authored by us\"\n    enabled: true\n    rules:\n      - type: detected\n        criteria:\n          - type: directory\n            value: \"generated/*\"\n      - type: detected\n        criteria:\n          - type: file_path\n            value: \"**/*.pb.go\"\n      - type: detected\n        criteria:\n          - type: file_path\n            value: \"**/*.generated.*\"\n    actions:\n      - type: auto_dismiss\n        dismissal_reason: not_applicable\n\n```\n\n### 5. Dismiss infrastructure-mitigated vulnerabilities\n\nVulnerability classes like XSS (CWE-79) or SQL injection (CWE-89) that are already addressed by WAF rules or runtime protection. Only use this when mitigating controls are verified and consistently enforced.\n\n```yaml\nvulnerability_management_policy:\n  - name: \"Dismiss CWEs mitigated by WAF\"\n    description: \"XSS and SQLi mitigated by WAF rules\"\n    enabled: true\n    rules:\n      - type: detected\n        criteria:\n          - type: identifier\n            value: \"CWE-79\"\n      - type: detected\n        criteria:\n          - type: identifier\n            value: \"CWE-89\"\n    actions:\n      - type: auto_dismiss\n        dismissal_reason: mitigating_control\n\n```\n\n### 6. Dismiss CVE families across your organization\n\nA wave of related CVEs for a widely-used library your team has assessed? Apply at the group level to dismiss them across dozens of projects. The wildcard pattern (e.g., `CVE-2021-44*`) matches all CVEs with that prefix.\n\n```yaml\nvulnerability_management_policy:\n  - name: \"Accept risk for log4j CVE family\"\n    description: \"Log4j CVEs mitigated by version pinning and WAF\"\n    enabled: true\n    rules:\n      - type: detected\n        criteria:\n          - type: identifier\n            value: \"CVE-2021-44*\"\n    actions:\n      - type: auto_dismiss\n        dismissal_reason: acceptable_risk\n\n```\n\n## Quick reference\n\n| Parameter | Details |\n|-----------|---------|\n| **Criteria types** | `file_path` (glob patterns, e.g., `test/**/*`), `directory` (e.g., `vendor/*`), `identifier` (CVE/CWE with wildcards, e.g., `CVE-2023-*`) |\n| **Dismissal reasons** | `acceptable_risk`, `false_positive`, `mitigating_control`, `used_in_tests`, `not_applicable` |\n| **Criteria logic** | Multiple criteria within a rule = AND (must match all). Multiple rules within a policy = OR (match any). |\n| **Limits** | 3 criteria per rule, 5 rules per policy, 5 policies per security policy project. Vulnerabilty management policy actions process 1000 vulnerabilities per pipeline run in the target project, until all matching vulnerabilities are processed. |\n| **Affected statuses** | Needs triage, Confirmed |\n| **Scope** | Project-level or group-level (group-level applies across all projects) |\n\n## Getting started\nHere's how to get started with auto-dismiss policies:\n\n1. **Identify the noise.** Open your vulnerability report and sort by \"Needs triage.\" Look for patterns: test files, vendored code, the same CVE across projects.\n\n2. **Pick a scenario.** Start with whichever use case above accounts for the most findings.\n\n3. **Record your baseline.** Note the number of \"Needs triage\" vulnerabilities before creating a policy.\n\n4. **Create and enable.** Navigate to **Secure > Policies > New policy > Vulnerability management policy**. Paste the configuration from the use case above, then merge the MR.\n\n5. **Validate results.** After the next default-branch pipeline, filter by status \"Dismissed\" to confirm the right findings were handled.\n\nFor full configuration details, see the [vulnerability management policy documentation](https://docs.gitlab.com/user/application_security/policies/vulnerability_management_policy/#auto-dismiss-policies).\n\n> Ready to take control of vulnerability noise? [Start a free GitLab Ultimate trial](https://about.gitlab.com/free-trial/) and configure your first auto-dismiss policy today.\n",{"slug":728,"featured":27,"template":13},"auto-dismiss-vulnerability-management-policy",{"content":730,"config":739},{"title":731,"description":732,"authors":733,"heroImage":735,"date":736,"body":737,"category":9,"tags":738},"GitLab 18.10 brings AI-native triage and remediation ","Learn about GitLab Duo Agent Platform capabilities that cut noise, surface real vulnerabilities, and turn findings into proposed fixes.",[734],"Alisa Ho","https://res.cloudinary.com/about-gitlab-com/image/upload/v1773843921/rm35fx4gylrsu9alf2fx.png","2026-03-19","GitLab 18.10 introduces new AI-powered security capabilities focused on improving the quality and speed of vulnerability management. Together, these features can help reduce the time developers spend investigating false positives and bring automated remediation directly into their workflow, so they can fix vulnerabilities without needing to be security experts.\n\nHere is what’s new:\n\n* [**Static Application Security Testing (SAST) false positive detection**](https://docs.gitlab.com/user/application_security/vulnerabilities/false_positive_detection/) **is now generally available.** This flow uses an LLM for agentic reasoning to determine the likelihood that a vulnerability is a false positive or not, so security and development teams can focus on remediating critical vulnerabilities first.  \n* [**Agentic SAST vulnerability resolution**](https://docs.gitlab.com/user/application_security/vulnerabilities/agentic_vulnerability_resolution/) **is now in beta.** Agentic SAST vulnerability resolution automatically creates a merge request with a proposed fix for verified SAST vulnerabilities, which can shorten time to remediation and reduce the need for deep security expertise.  \n* [**Secret false positive detection**](https://docs.gitlab.com/user/application_security/vulnerabilities/secret_false_positive_detection/) **is now in beta.** This flow brings the same AI-powered noise reduction to secret detection, flagging dummy and test secrets to save review effort.\n\nThese flows are available to GitLab Ultimate customers using GitLab Duo Agent Platform. \n\n## Cut triage time with SAST false positive detection\n\nTraditional SAST scanners flag every suspicious code pattern they find, regardless of whether code paths are reachable or frameworks already handle the risk. Without runtime context, they cannot distinguish a real vulnerability from safe code that just looks dangerous.\n\nThis means developers could spend hours investigating findings that turn out to be false positives. Over time, that can erode confidence in the report and slow down the teams responsible for fixing real risks.\n\nAfter each SAST scan, GitLab Duo Agent Platform automatically analyzes new critical and high severity findings and attaches:\n\n* A confidence score indicating how likely the finding is to be a false positive  \n* An AI-generated explanation describing the reasoning  \n* A visual badge that makes “Likely false positive” versus “Likely real” easy to scan in the UI\n\nThese findings appear in the [Vulnerability Report](https://docs.gitlab.com/user/application_security/vulnerability_report/), as shown below. You can filter the report to focus on findings marked as “Not false positive” so teams can spend their time addressing real vulnerabilities instead of sifting through noise.\n\n![Vulnerability report](https://res.cloudinary.com/about-gitlab-com/image/upload/v1773844787/i0eod01p7gawflllkgsr.png)\n\n\nGitLab Duo Agent Platform's assessment is a recommendation. You stay in control of every false positive to determine if it is valid, and you can audit the agent's reasoning at any time to build confidence in the model. \n\n\n## Turn vulnerabilities into automated fixes\n\nKnowing that a vulnerability is real is only half the work.  Remediation still requires understanding the code path, writing a safe patch, and making sure nothing else breaks.\n\nIf the vulnerability is identified as likely not be a false positive by the SAST false positive detection flow, the Agentic SAST vulnerability resolution flow automatically:\n\n1. Reads the vulnerable code and surrounding context from your repository  \n2. Generates high-quality proposed fixes  \n3. Validates fixes through automated testing   \n4. Opens a merge request with a proposed fix that includes:  \n   * Concrete code changes  \n   * A confidence score  \n   * An explanation of what changed and why\n\nIn this demo, you’ll see how GitLab can automatically take a SAST vulnerability all the way from detection to a ready-to-review merge request. Watch how the agent reads the code, generates and validates a fix, and opens an MR with clear, explainable changes so developers can remediate faster without being security experts.\n\n\u003Ciframe src=\"https://player.vimeo.com/video/1174573325?badge=0&autopause=0&player_id=0&app_id=58479\" frameborder=\"0\" allow=\"autoplay; fullscreen; picture-in-picture; clipboard-write; encrypted-media; web-share\" referrerpolicy=\"strict-origin-when-cross-origin\" style=\"position:absolute;top:0;left:0;width:100%;height:100%;\" title=\"GitLab 18.10 AI SAST False Positive Auto Remediation\">\u003C/iframe>\u003Cscript src=\"https://player.vimeo.com/api/player.js\">\u003C/script>\n\nAs with any AI-generated suggestion, you should review the proposed merge request carefully before merging.\n\n## Surface real secrets\n\nSecret detection is only useful if teams trust the results. When reports are full of test credentials, placeholder values, and example tokens, developers may waste time reviewing noise instead of fixing real exposures. That can slow remediation and decrease confidence in the scan.\n\nSecret false positive detection helps teams focus on the secrets that matter so they can reduce risk faster. When it runs on the default branch, it will automatically:\n\n1. Analyze each finding to spot likely test credentials, example values, and dummy secrets  \n2. Assign a confidence score for whether the finding is a real risk or a likely false positive  \n3. Generate an explanation for why the secret is being treated as real or noise  \n4. Add a badge in the Vulnerability Report so developers can see the status at a glance\n\nDevelopers can also trigger this analysis manually from the Vulnerability Report by selecting **“Check for false positive”** on any secret detection finding, helping them clear out findings that do not pose risk and focus on real secrets sooner.\n\n## Try AI-powered security today\n\nGitLab 18.10 introduces capabilities that cover the full vulnerability workflow, from cutting false positive noise in SAST and secret detection to automatically generating merge requests with proposed fixes.\n\nTo see how AI-powered security can help cut review time and turn findings into ready-to-merge fixes, [start a free trial of GitLab Duo Agent Platform today](https://about.gitlab.com/gitlab-duo-agent-platform/?utm_medium=blog&utm_source=blog&utm_campaign=eg_global_x_x_security_en_).",[725,9,724],{"featured":12,"template":13,"slug":740},"gitlab-18-10-brings-ai-native-triage-and-remediation",{"content":742,"config":751},{"title":743,"description":744,"authors":745,"tags":747,"heroImage":748,"category":9,"date":749,"body":750},"A complete guide to GitLab Container Scanning","Explore GitLab's various container scanning methods and learn how to secure containers at every lifecycle stage.",[746],"Fernando Diaz",[9,723],"https://res.cloudinary.com/about-gitlab-com/image/upload/v1772721753/frfsm1qfscwrmsyzj1qn.png","2026-03-05","Container vulnerabilities don't wait for your next deployment. They can emerge at any\npoint, including when you build an image or while containers run in production.\nGitLab addresses this reality with multiple container scanning approaches, each designed\nfor different stages of your container lifecycle.\n\nIn this guide, we'll explore the different types of container scanning GitLab offers,\nhow to enable each one, and common configurations to get you started.\n\n## Why container scanning matters\n\nSecurity vulnerabilities in container images create risk throughout your application\nlifecycle. Base images, OS packages, and application dependencies can all harbor\nvulnerabilities that attackers actively exploit. Container scanning detects these risks\nearly, before they reach production, and provides remediation paths when available.\n\nContainer scanning is a critical component of Software Composition Analysis (SCA),\nhelping you understand and secure the external dependencies your containerized\napplications rely on.\n\n## The five types of GitLab Container Scanning\n\nGitLab offers five distinct container scanning approaches, each serving a specific\npurpose in your security strategy.\n\n\n### 1. Pipeline-based Container Scanning\n\n* What it does: Scans container images during your CI/CD pipeline execution,\ncatching vulnerabilities before deployment\n\n* Best for: Shift-left security, blocking vulnerable images from reaching production \n\n* Tier availability: Free, Premium, and Ultimate (with enhanced features in Ultimate)  \n\n* [Documentation](https://docs.gitlab.com/user/application_security/container_scanning/)\n\n\nGitLab uses the Trivy security scanner to analyze container images for\nknown vulnerabilities. When your pipeline runs, the scanner examines your images\nand generates a detailed report.\n\n\n#### How to enable pipeline-based Container Scanning \n\n**Option A: Preconfigured merge request**  \n\n* Navigate to **Secure > Security configuration** in your project.\n* Find the \"Container Scanning\" row.\n* Select **Configure with a merge request**.\n* This automatically creates a merge request with the necessary configuration.  \n\n**Option B: Manual configuration**  \n\n* Add the following to your `.gitlab-ci.yml`:\n\n```yaml\ninclude:\n  - template: Jobs/Container-Scanning.gitlab-ci.yml\n```  \n\n#### Common configurations\n\n**Scan a specific image:**\n\nTo scan a specific image, overwrite the `CS_IMAGE` variable in the `container_scanning` job.\n\n```yaml\ninclude:\n  - template: Jobs/Container-Scanning.gitlab-ci.yml\n\ncontainer_scanning:\n  variables:\n    CS_IMAGE: myregistry.com/myapp:latest\n```\n\n**Filter by severity threshold:**\n\nTo only find vulnerabilities with a certain severity criteria, overwrite the\n`CS_SEVERITY_THRESHOLD` variable in the `container_scanning` job. In the example\nbelow, only vulnerabilities with a severity of **High** or greater will be displayed.\n\n\n```yaml\ninclude:\n  - template: Jobs/Container-Scanning.gitlab-ci.yml\n\ncontainer_scanning:\n  variables:\n    CS_SEVERITY_THRESHOLD: \"HIGH\"\n```\n\n#### Viewing vulnerabilities in a merge request\n\nViewing Container Scanning vulnerabilities directly within merge requests makes security\nreviews seamless and efficient. Once Container Scanning is configured in your CI/CD\npipeline, GitLab automatically display detected vulnerabilities in the merge request's\n[Security widget](https://docs.gitlab.com/user/project/merge_requests/widgets/#application-security-scanning). \n\n\n![Container Scanning vulnerabilities displayed in MR](https://res.cloudinary.com/about-gitlab-com/image/upload/v1772547514/lt6elcq6jexdhqatdy8l.png \"Container Scanning vulnerabilities displayed in MR\")\n\n\n\n* Navigate to any merge request and scroll to the \"Security Scanning\" section to see a summary of\nnewly introduced and existing vulnerabilities found in your container images.\n\n* Click on a **Vulnerability** to access detailed information about the finding, including severity level,\naffected packages, and available remediation guidance.\n\n\n![GitLab Security View details in MR](https://res.cloudinary.com/about-gitlab-com/image/upload/v1772547514/hplihdlekc11uvpfih1p.png)\n\n\n\n![GitLab Security View details in MR](https://res.cloudinary.com/about-gitlab-com/image/upload/v1772547513/jnxbe7uld8wfeezboifs.png \"Container Scanning vulnerability details in MR\")\n\n\nThis visibility enables developers and security teams to catch and address container\nvulnerabilities before they reach production, making security an integral part of your\ncode review process rather than a separate gate.\n\n\n#### Viewing vulnerabilities in Vulnerability Report\n\nBeyond merge request reviews, GitLab provides a centralized\n[Vulnerability Report](https://docs.gitlab.com/user/application_security/vulnerability_report/) that gives security teams comprehensive visibility across all Container Scanning findings in your project.\n\n\n![Vulnerability Report sorted by Container Scanning](https://res.cloudinary.com/about-gitlab-com/image/upload/v1772547524/gagau279fzfgjpnvipm5.png \"Vulnerability Report sorted by Container Scanning\")\n\n\n* Access this report by navigating to **Security & Compliance > Vulnerability Report** in your\nproject sidebar.\n\n* Here you'll find an aggregated view of all container vulnerabilities detected across your branches, with powerful filtering options to sort by severity, status, scanner type, or specific container images.\n\n* You can click on a vulnerabilty to access its Vulnerablity page.\n\n\n![Vulnerability page - 1st view](https://res.cloudinary.com/about-gitlab-com/image/upload/v1772547520/e1woxupyoajhrpzrlylj.png)\n\n\n![Vulnerability page - 2nd view](https://res.cloudinary.com/about-gitlab-com/image/upload/v1772547521/idzcftcgjc8eryixnbjn.png)\n\n\n![Vulnerability page - 3rd view](https://res.cloudinary.com/about-gitlab-com/image/upload/v1772547522/mbbwbbprtf9anqqola10.png \"Vunerability Details for a Container Scanning vulnerability\")\n\n\n[Vulnerability Details](https://docs.gitlab.com/user/application_security/vulnerabilities/)\nshows exactly which container images and layers are impacted, making it easier to trace the\nvulnerability back to its source. You can assign vulnerabilities to team members, change\ntheir status (detected, confirmed, resolved, dismissed), add comments for collaboration,\nand link related issues for tracking remediation work.\n\nThis workflow transforms vulnerability management from a spreadsheet exercise into an integrated part of your development process, ensuring that container security findings are tracked, prioritized, and resolved systematically.\n\n#### View the Dependency List\n\nGitLab's [Dependency List](https://docs.gitlab.com/user/application_security/dependency_list/)\nprovides a comprehensive software bill of materials (SBOM) that catalogs every component within\nyour container images, giving you complete transparency into your software supply chain.\n\n* Navigate to **Security & Compliance > Dependency List** to access an inventory of all packages,\nlibraries, and dependencies detected by Container Scanning across your project.\n\n* This view is invaluable for understanding what's actually running inside your containers, from base OS\npackages to application-level dependencies.\n\n\n![GitLab Dependency List](https://res.cloudinary.com/about-gitlab-com/image/upload/v1772547513/vjg6dk3nhajqamplroji.png \"GitLab Dependency List (SBOM)\")\n\n\nYou can filter the list by package manager, license type, or vulnerability status to quickly\nidentify which components pose security risks or compliance concerns. Each dependency entry\nshows associated vulnerabilities, allowing you to understand security issues in the context\nof your actual software components rather than as isolated findings.\n\n\n### 2. Container Scanning for Registry\n\n* What it does: Automatically scans images pushed to your GitLab Container Registry\nwith the `latest` tag\n\n* Best for: Continuous monitoring of registry images without manual pipeline triggers  \n\n* Tier availability: Ultimate only \n\n* [Documentation](https://docs.gitlab.com/user/application_security/container_scanning/#container-scanning-for-registry) \n\n\nWhen you push a container image tagged `latest`, GitLab's security policy bot\nautomatically triggers a scan against the default branch. Unlike pipeline-based\nscanning, this approach works with Continuous Vulnerability Scanning to monitor\nfor newly published advisories.\n\n#### How to enable Container Scanning for Registry\n\n1. Navigate to **Secure > Security configuration**.\n2. Scroll to the **Container Scanning For Registry** section.\n3. Toggle the feature on.\n\n![Container Scanning for Registry](https://res.cloudinary.com/about-gitlab-com/image/upload/v1772547512/vntrlhtmsh1ecnwni5ji.png \"Toggle for Container Scanning for Registry\")\n\n#### Prerequisites\n\n- Maintainer role or higher in the project\n- Project must not be empty (requires at least one commit on the default branch)\n- Container Registry notifications must be configured\n- Package Metadata Database must be configured (enabled by default on GitLab.com)\n\nVulnerabilities appear under the **Container Registry vulnerabilities** tab in your\nVulnerability Report.\n\n\n### 3. Multi-Container Scanning\n\n* What it does: Scans multiple container images in parallel within a single pipeline \n* Best for: Microservices architectures and projects with multiple container images  \n* Tier availability: Free, Premium, and Ultimate (currently in Beta)  \n* [Documentation](https://docs.gitlab.com/user/application_security/container_scanning/multi_container_scanning/) \n\nMulti-Container Scanning uses dynamic child pipelines to run scans concurrently, significantly reducing overall pipeline execution time when you need to scan multiple images.\n\n#### How to enable Multi-Container scanning\n\n1. Create a `.gitlab-multi-image.yml` file in your repository root:\n\n```yaml\nscanTargets:\n  - name: alpine\n    tag: \"3.19\"\n  - name: python\n    tag: \"3.9-slim\"\n  - name: nginx\n    tag: \"1.25\"\n```\n\n2. Include the template in your `.gitlab-ci.yml`:\n\n```yaml\ninclude:\n  - template: Jobs/Multi-Container-Scanning.latest.gitlab-ci.yml\n```\n\n#### Advanced configuration\n\n**Scan images from private registries:**\n\n```yaml\nauths:\n  registry.gitlab.com:\n    username: ${CI_REGISTRY_USER}\n    password: ${CI_REGISTRY_PASSWORD}\n\nscanTargets:\n  - name: registry.gitlab.com/private/image\n    tag: latest\n```\n\n**Include license information:**\n\n```yaml\nincludeLicenses: true\n\nscanTargets:\n  - name: postgres\n    tag: \"15-alpine\"\n```\n\n\n### 4. Continuous Vulnerability Scanning\n\n* What it does: Automatically creates vulnerabilities when new security advisories are published, no pipeline required \n\n* Best for: Proactive security monitoring between deployments\n\n* Tier availability: Ultimate only\n\n* [Documentation](https://docs.gitlab.com/user/application_security/continuous_vulnerability_scanning/)  \n\nTraditional scanning only catches vulnerabilities at scan time. But what happens\nwhen a new CVE is published tomorrow for a package you scanned yesterday? Continuous\nVulnerability Scanning solves this by monitoring the GitLab Advisory Database and\nautomatically creating vulnerability records when new advisories affect your components.\n\n\n#### How it works\n\n1. Your Container Scanning or Dependency Scanning job generates a CycloneDX SBOM.\n\n2. GitLab registers your project's components from this SBOM.\n\n3. When new advisories are published, GitLab checks if your components are affected.\n\n4. Vulnerabilities are automatically created in your vulnerability report.\n\n\n#### Key considerations\n\n- Scans run via background jobs (Sidekiq), not CI pipelines.\n\n- Only advisories published within the last 14 days are considered for new component detection.\n\n- Vulnerabilities use \"GitLab SBoM Vulnerability Scanner\" as the scanner name.\n\n- To mark vulnerabilities as resolved, you still need to run a pipeline-based scan.\n\n\n### 5. Operational Container Scanning\n\n* What it does: Scans running containers in your Kubernetes cluster on a\nscheduled cadence\n\n* Best for: Post-deployment security monitoring and runtime vulnerability detection  \n\n* Tier availability: Ultimate only\n\n* [Documentation](https://docs.gitlab.com/user/clusters/agent/vulnerabilities/)\n\n\nOperational Container Scanning bridges the gap between build-time security and\nruntime security. Using the GitLab Agent for Kubernetes, it scans containers\nactually running in your clusters—catching vulnerabilities that emerge after\ndeployment.\n\n#### How to enable Operational Container Scanning\n\nIf you are using the [GitLab Kubernetes Agent](https://docs.gitlab.com/user/clusters/agent/install/), you can add the following to your agent configuration file:\n\n```yaml\ncontainer_scanning:\n  cadence: '0 0 * * *'  # Daily at midnight\n  vulnerability_report:\n    namespaces:\n      include:\n        - production\n        - staging\n```\n\n\nYou can also create a [scan execution policy](https://docs.gitlab.com/user/clusters/agent/vulnerabilities/#enable-via-scan-execution-policies) that enforces scanning on a schedule by the GitLab Kubernetes Agent.\n\n\n![Scan execution policy - Operational Container Scanning](https://res.cloudinary.com/about-gitlab-com/image/upload/v1772547515/gsgvjcq4sas4dfc8ciqk.png \"Scan execution policy conditions for Operational Container Scanning\")\n\n#### Viewing results\n\n* Navigate to **Operate > Kubernetes clusters**.\n\n* Select the **Agent** tab, and choose your agent.\n\n* Then select the **Security** tab to view cluster vulnerabilities.\n\n* Results also appear under the **Operational Vulnerabilities** tab in the **Vulnerability Report**.\n\n\n## Enhancing posture with GitLab Security Policies\n\nGitLab Security Policies enable you to enforce consistent security standards across your container workflows through automated, policy-driven controls. These policies shift security left by embedding requirements directly into your development pipeline, ensuring vulnerabilities are caught and addressed before code reaches production.\n\n#### Scan execution and pipeline policies\n\n[Scan execution policies](https://docs.gitlab.com/user/application_security/policies/scan_execution_policies/) automate when and how Container Scanning runs across your projects. Define policies that trigger container scans on every merge request, schedule recurring scans of your main branch, and more. These policies ensure comprehensive coverage without relying on developers to manually configure scanning in each project's CI/CD pipeline.\n\nYou can specify which scanner versions to use and configure scanning parameters centrally, maintaining consistency across your organization while adapting to new container security threats.\n\n![Scan execution policy configuration](https://res.cloudinary.com/about-gitlab-com/image/upload/v1772547517/z36dntxslqem9udrynvx.png \"Scan execution policy configuration\")\n\n\n[Pipeline execution policies](https://docs.gitlab.com/user/application_security/policies/pipeline_execution_policies/) provide flexible controls for injecting (or overriding) custom jobs into a pipeline based on your compliance needs.\n\nUse these policies to automatically inject Container Scanning jobs into your pipeline, fail builds when container vulnerabilities exceed your risk tolerance, trigger additional security checks for specific branches or tags, or enforce compliance requirements for container images destined for production environments. Pipeline execution policies act as automated guardrails, ensuring your security standards are consistently applied across all container deployments without manual intervention.\n\n![Pipeline execution policy](https://res.cloudinary.com/about-gitlab-com/image/upload/v1772547517/ddhhugzcr2swptgodof2.png \"Pipeline execution policy actions\")\n\n#### Merge request approval policies\n\n[Merge request approval policies](https://docs.gitlab.com/user/application_security/policies/merge_request_approval_policies/) enforce security gates by requiring designated approvers to review and sign off on merge requests containing container vulnerabilities.\n\nConfigure policies that block merge when critical or high-severity vulnerabilities are detected, or require security team approval for any merge request introducing new container findings. These policies prevent vulnerable container images from advancing through your pipeline while maintaining development velocity for low-risk changes.\n\n![Merge request approval policy performing block in MR](https://res.cloudinary.com/about-gitlab-com/image/upload/v1772547513/hgnbc1vl4ssqafqcyuzg.png \"Merge request approval policy performing block in MR\")\n\n\n## Choosing the right approach\n\n| Scanning Type | When to Use | Key Benefit |\n|--------------|-------------|-------------|\n| Pipeline-based | Every build | Shift-left security, blocks vulnerable builds |\n| Registry scanning | Continuous monitoring | Catches new CVEs in stored images |\n| Multi-container | Microservices | Parallel scanning, faster pipelines |\n| Continuous vulnerability | Between deployments | Proactive advisory monitoring |\n| Operational | Production monitoring | Runtime vulnerability detection |\n\n\n\nFor comprehensive security, consider combining multiple approaches. Use\npipeline-based scanning to catch issues during development, container\nscanning for registry for continuous monitoring, and operational scanning\nfor production visibility.\n\n## Get started today\n\nThe fastest path to container security is enabling pipeline-based scanning:\n\n1. Navigate to your project's **Secure > Security configuration**.\n2. Click **Configure with a merge request** for Container Scanning.\n3. Merge the resulting merge request.\n4. Your next pipeline will include vulnerability scanning.\n\nFrom there, layer in additional scanning types based on your security requirements\nand GitLab tier.\n\nContainer security isn't a one-time activity, it's an ongoing process.\nWith GitLab's comprehensive container scanning capabilities, you can detect\nvulnerabilities at every stage of your container lifecycle, from build to runtime.\n\n> For more information on how GitLab can help enhance your security posture, visit the [GitLab Security and Governance Solutions Page](https://about.gitlab.com/solutions/application-security-testing/).\n",{"slug":752,"featured":27,"template":13},"complete-guide-to-gitlab-container-scanning",{"promotions":754},[755,769,780,791],{"id":756,"categories":757,"header":759,"text":760,"button":761,"image":766},"ai-modernization",[758],"ai-ml","Is AI achieving its promise at scale?","Quiz will take 5 minutes or less",{"text":762,"config":763},"Get your AI maturity score",{"href":764,"dataGaName":765,"dataGaLocation":241},"/assessments/ai-modernization-assessment/","modernization assessment",{"config":767},{"src":768},"https://res.cloudinary.com/about-gitlab-com/image/upload/v1772138786/qix0m7kwnd8x2fh1zq49.png",{"id":770,"categories":771,"header":772,"text":760,"button":773,"image":777},"devops-modernization",[725,567],"Are you just managing tools or shipping innovation?",{"text":774,"config":775},"Get your DevOps maturity score",{"href":776,"dataGaName":765,"dataGaLocation":241},"/assessments/devops-modernization-assessment/",{"config":778},{"src":779},"https://res.cloudinary.com/about-gitlab-com/image/upload/v1772138785/eg818fmakweyuznttgid.png",{"id":781,"categories":782,"header":783,"text":760,"button":784,"image":788},"security-modernization",[9],"Are you trading speed for security?",{"text":785,"config":786},"Get your security maturity score",{"href":787,"dataGaName":765,"dataGaLocation":241},"/assessments/security-modernization-assessment/",{"config":789},{"src":790},"https://res.cloudinary.com/about-gitlab-com/image/upload/v1772138786/p4pbqd9nnjejg5ds6mdk.png",{"id":792,"paths":793,"header":796,"text":797,"button":798,"image":803},"github-azure-migration",[794,795],"migration-from-azure-devops-to-gitlab","integrating-azure-devops-scm-and-gitlab","Is your team ready for GitHub's Azure move?","GitHub is already rebuilding around Azure. Find out what it means for you.",{"text":799,"config":800},"See how GitLab compares to GitHub",{"href":801,"dataGaName":802,"dataGaLocation":241},"/compare/gitlab-vs-github/github-azure-migration/","github azure migration",{"config":804},{"src":779},{"header":806,"blurb":807,"button":808,"secondaryButton":813},"Start building faster today","See what your team can do with the intelligent orchestration platform for DevSecOps.\n",{"text":809,"config":810},"Get your free trial",{"href":811,"dataGaName":48,"dataGaLocation":812},"https://gitlab.com/-/trial_registrations/new?glm_content=default-saas-trial&glm_source=about.gitlab.com/","feature",{"text":503,"config":814},{"href":52,"dataGaName":53,"dataGaLocation":812},1776449960717]